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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the role played by intellectual dissidents in the French Communist 
Party from 1972 to 1981, focusing primarily on the philosopher Louis Althusser and the 
historian Jean Elleinstein, whose ideas in relation to the FCP were closer than previously 
thought. 
The introduction sets the background out in which the FCP evolved after the 
Second World War and brings us to the 1970s, the decade during which the FCP lost its 
steam against most expectations - as the thesis demonstrates it. The first chapter deals 
with the perception communist intellectual dissidents had of their Party's internal 
organisation - an organisation which was deemed too rigid and too inflexible to 
encompass the plurality of opinion of its members. This rigidity was demonstrated by the 
Leadership's refusal to recognise the right to create tendencies within the Party, as the 
second chapter of this thesis shows. In this context, the third chapter argues that 
communist intellectual dissidents felt suffocated by a Party which did not give them 
enough leeway, even more so since it claimed to be the Party of the working class - a 
position which threatened the Party's adaptation to social change and which is developed 
in chapter four. However, this thesis also puts the criticisms expressed by Althusser and 
Elleinstein into perspective. Indeed, if these intellectual dissidents were free to express 
des idees liberales et avancees, this was not the case for the FCP leadership. The Soviet 
Union and its KGB had too strong a grip over the Party and its General Secretary, 
Georges Marchais, for the FCP leadership to be able to act freely. In that sense, if the 
FCP gave up the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat in 1976, as the fifth chapter 
shows, it could not criticise the Soviet Union too much, as chapter six demonstrates, nor 
get too close to the French Socialist Party as chapter seven shows, nor let its dissident 
intellectuals go on expressing des vues trop derangeantes, as chapter eight concludes. 
Each chapter is set against the Party's historical background and brings us to the 
modem times, which have seen the French Communist Party transform itself - a 
transformation which would have been welcomed by Althusser and Elleinstein back in 
the 1970s. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1970s was a key decade for the French Communist Party for three reasons. First, it 
was during this decade that the FCP completed its integration into the French political 
sphere - an integration which it had started in the 1960s. Second, it was a period 
marked not only by the domination of the pompidoulienne then giscardienne Right in 
power, but also by two successive economic crisis which brought to an end Les Trente 
Glorieuses, thirty years of post-war economic expansion. Third, it was in the 1970s that 
an unprecedented wave of dissent - swollen by the biting, but measured, criticisms 
expressed by the communist intellectuals Louis Althusser and Jean Elleinstein - swept 
the Party and affected its most prominent leaders. 
The insertion of the French Communist Party into the French political sphere -
and its consecutive assimilation of the constitutional rules of the Fifth Republic it had 
decried as from its advent in 19581 - started in the 1960s and became conclusive in the 
1970s. The reasons behind the Party's decision to shift from a Leninist and 
antiparliamentary perception of state power to a parliamentary vision of its role within 
the state system were motivated by a clear-cut reflex of urgency. Fossilised into the 
opposition since its eviction from Ramadier's government in 1947/ the Party needed to 
regain a certain political legitimacy among its supporters in order to assert, in a more 
concrete manner, its ambition to move towards the radical change of society advocated 
by its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Relegated to the margins of the French political scene,3 
I Ronald Tiersky, 'Declining Fortunes of the French Communist Party', Problems of Communism 
(1988),2. 
2 Ronald Tiersky, French Communism, 1920-1972 (New York: London Columbia University Press, 
1974), ch. 4. 
-' The Fifth Republic's elections on a majority basis, and in two ballots, contributed to the 
marginalisation of the FCP on the French parliamentary scene; cf. Jean Baudoin, 'L'assimi1ation 
progressive de la Constitution de 1958 par Ie Parti Communiste Fran~ais', Revue Fran~aise de Science 
Politique (1986), 799. 
the FCP needed to become again a prominent political actor insofar as the Fifth Republic, 
General de Gaulle's creation, not only proved to be relatively popular among most 
French people, but also promised to be rather durable. Caught between its determination 
to preserve a distinctive 'revolutionary' identity which left it in the margins of French 
politics, and its will to move towards an integration into politicallife;~ which would make 
it resemble other parties to a greater extent, the FCP's margin of manoeuvre was 
relatively limited, and full of pitfalls - even more so since it was dominated on its left by 
conservateurs, and on its right by progressistes. 5 
Between its marginalisation and its integration into the French political sphere, 
the French Communist Party chose to return to parliamentarism in the 1960s. In 1964, at 
the time of its 17th Congress,6 and under the control of Waldeck-Rochet, who was 
endowed with a reformist character,7 the Party rejected the concept of a single-party 
political system, as applied in the Soviet Union, and instead officially recognised 
parliamentary pluralism.8 In 1972, it accepted the concept of political changeover 
between parties. 9 In 1975, it made a declaration des libertes in which it asserted its 
unconditional attachment to democratic freedoms. 10 In 1976, it rejected the concept of 
~ Isaac Aviv, 'The French Communist Party from 1958 to 1978: Crisis and Endurance', Western 
European Politics, 2, no. 2 (1979), 182. 
5 In 1961, the communists Servin, Casanova and Kriegel-Valrimont were excluded from the Party for 
having, among other things, praised the Gaullist regime. In 1966, the communist cell of the Sorbonne 
faculty, in Paris, was dissolved by the FCP: it had criticised the Party leadership for not having put 
forward its own candidate at the presidential elections of 1965 and for having backed the candidacy of 
Fran90is Mitterrand; cf. Aviv, 'The French Communist Party from 1958 to 1978: Crisis and 
Endurance', ibid, 183. 
6 The 17th Congress of the FCP was held in Paris from 14 to 17 May 1964. 
7 Thomas Ferenczi, 'Adieux au PCF', Le Monde, 9 February 2001, p. viii, by reference to Jean 
Vigreux's book, Waldeck Rochet - Une biographie politique (Paris: Editions La Dispute. 2001). 
Waldeck Rochet (1905-1983) succeeded Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) at the head of the FCP in 1964. 
Severely ill in 1969, he left his place to Georges Marchais (1920-1997), who filled the interim up to 
1972, when he finally became General Secretary of the Party; cf. Stephane Courtois. 'PCF: Ie parti de 
Moscou', L 'Histoire, July-August 1998, p. 47. It is worth noting that Waldeck-Rochet was under 
Moscow's grip. 
8 Baudoin, 'L'assimilation progressive de la Constitution de 1958 par Ie Parti Communiste Fran9ais', 
802: Neill Nugent and David Lowe, 'The French Communist Party: the Road to Democratic 
Government?', Political Quarterly, 48 (1977), 275. 
9 Baudoin, ibid, 803; Nugent and Lowe, ibid, 277. 
10 Baudoin, ibid. 803; Nugent and Lowe, ibid., 277. The freedoms guaranteed by the FCP included, 
among others, the right of association, of demonstration, and freedom of expression - freedoms 
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dictatorship of the proletariat11 and instead advocated a pacific, and parliamentary, way 
to socialism. 12 However, if the French Communist Party had made the first steps towards 
complete acceptance of constitutional rules, it was nonetheless the case that the Socialist 
Party had pushed it in this direction13 and that this assimilation was not made without 
some reluctance. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, the French Communist Party was no longer the 
opposition party par excellence. It was rejoined by the Socialist Party which, after 
having participated in various governments for over twenty-five years, was suddenly sent 
into the limbo of opposition by the Gaullists14 - and it was the trigger. Both parties 
were on known territory. The Popular Front period was still a recent memory,15 and the 
Tripartite era was even closer.16 Both the FCP and the SP clearly knew that, in order to 
put an end to their political isolation and to conquer a strong bipolar state power, there 
was only one solution: they had to forge a Union of the Left. 17 
The union forged between the FCP and the SP was as much tactical as 
circumstantial. It was a marriage of reason which was concluded on 27 June 1972.18 But 
it was also a turbulent marriage. Fran<;ois Mitterrand, who became the leader of the 
Socialist Party in 1971, rapidly appeared to be a strong personality - too strong, and 
too ambitious for the taste of the Communist Party which was used to being in the 
which were not guaranteed in the USSR. This declaration thus marked a further move in the Party's 
destalinisation and confinned the Party's attachment to Eurocommunism; cf. 'PCF-PCI: Ia declaration 
commune - "Toutes Ies Iibertes devront etre garanties et deve1oppees''', Le Momie, 19 November 
1975. 
II See ch. 5. 
12 Baudoin, 'L'assimilation progressive de Ia Constitution de 1958 par Ie Parti Communiste Francrais', 
803. 
\3 Ibid, 802. 
14 Annie Kriegel wrote in that respect that 'les socialistes ont absolument besoin d'exercer [ ... ] Ie 
pouvoir gouvernemental, car iis s'usent et s'etiolent dans une trop constante opposition, comme l'a 
montre Ie rapide declin de Ia SFIO apn!s 1958', in Le communisme au jour Ie jour: chroniques du 
Figaro, 1976-1979 (Paris: Hachette, 1979), p. 87; cf. Aviv, 'The French Communist Party from 1958 
to 1978: Crisis and Endurance', 184. 
15 1936-1938. 
16 Agreement concluded between the FCP, the SFIO and the MRP (1945 to 1947). 
17 Baudoin, 'L'assimilation progressive de Ia Constitution de 1958 par Ie Parti Communiste Franc;:ais·. 
801. 
18 See ch. 7. 
opposition front-line. Mitterrand also rapidly showed that he was a charismatic leader, 
which suited the CP for a while, as it could boost the Union of the Left with new voters 
- but for a while only, as communists did not want to play second fiddle to the 
Socialists. At the 1974 presidential elections, Mitterrand brandished the banner of the 
Left 19 - the Left which was admittedly united and relatively balanced, but which was 
also more and more riddled by internal disagreements, more and more on the verge of 
splitting up - and in 1977, it did split Up.20 As a result, at the 1981 presidential 
elections, everything changed because the FCP and the SP presented their own 
candidates: Georges Marchais stood against Franc;ois Mitterrand.21 Everything changed 
for it was finally Mitterrand who became the winner of this race for power, the 
figurehead of his office - as was the case for de Gaulle in the 1960s, and as the 
communists had always feared - the one bestowing favours on a FCP reduced to the 
role of humble supplicant for ministries.22 Everything changed, for in 1981, the French 
Communist Party was no longer the strong and dominant party of the Left, as had been 
the case in 1972 and since the end of the Second World War in 1945. In 1981, the great 
Communist Party, which was so lauded in its golden years23 as the Party of Thorez, Ie 
fils du peuple, and so decried by others as Ie parti de I 'etranger a la botte de Staline, 
19 At the 1965 presidential elections, Mitterrand was already the candidate of the Left. In the second 
round of the elections, he obtained 45.5% of the votes against 54.5% for de Gaulle, cf. F. Goguel, 
Chroniques electorales: la Cinquieme Republique apres de Gaulle (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1983), 
quoted in Alistair Cole and Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems and Elections since 1789 
(London: Aldershot Gower, 1989), p. 99. During the May 1968 events, the FCP and the SP acted 
unilaterally (see ch. 7). As a result, each Party presented its own candidate at the 1969 presidential 
elections. In the first round, Duclos (PCF) got 21.5% of the vote and Deferre (SFIO) 5.1%. The 
second round was fought between Poher (Centre) and Pompidou (UDR), cf. F. Goguel and A. Grosser, 
La politique en France (Paris: [n. pub.], 1980), quoted in Cole and Campbell, French Electoral 
Systems and Elections since 1789, ibid., p. 115. In the second round of the 1974 presidential 
elections, Mitterrand obtained 49.4% of the votes against 50.6% for Giscard d'Estaing, cf. Goguel and 
Grosser, ibid., quoted in Cole and Campbell, ibid., p. 115. 
20 See ch. 7. 
21 In the first round, Marchais got 15.48% of the votes. In the second round, Mitterrand obtained 
52.22% of the votes against 47.78% for Giscard d'Estaing; Goguel, Chroniques electorales, quoted in 
Cole and Campbell, French Electoral Systems and Elections since 1789, p.125. 
22 Baudoin, 'L'assimilation progressive de la Constitution de 1958 par Ie Parti Communiste Fran-rais', 
813. 
23 Baudoin, 'Le declin du peF', Regards sur l'Actualite (April 1991),36; Michel Winock, 'L'age d'or 
du communisme fi"anIYais', L 'Histoire, July-August 1998, pp. 56-65. 
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was a mere shadow of its former self. 
From 1972 to 1981, the FCP lost its way on the French political scene despite the 
fact that its acceptance of the institutions of the Fifth Republic and its participation in the 
Union of the Left were aimed at propelling it to power. From 1972 to 1981, the CP lost 
its dynamism when it became modelled on the 'Marchais style' .24 Furthermore, if we 
look more closely at this decade, which was a decade both marked by economic crisis 
and dominated by the Right in power, we can see that the Party's decline defied logic. 
From 1974 to 1981, the Party lost its appeal among voters when it had remained strong 
in a period of economic expansion, and at a time when it could have put forward its 
communist ideology as an alternative to capitalism - that is to say at a time when it 
should have been in its element. In this context, any interrogation, as to why and how 
such a decline could have possibly taken place, is perfectly legitimate for as Louis 
Althusser explained: 'L'histoire est un theatre, et [ ... J pour la comprendre, il faut 
chercher derriere les masques, les chefs et leurs discours, et surtout derriere la scene. ,25 
From 1972 to 1981, the Right was still in power, as it had been since 1958. It 
was a Right which was dominated by the successive presidencies of Georges Pompidou26 
and Valery Giscard d 'Estaing27 - two men with very different origins and styles, but 
two presidencies irremediably linked by the disruption of international economic order 
from 1973 onwards. 1973 was characterized by the advent of the first oil crisis,28 which 
triggered a whole string of economic shocks.29 In France, as in other countries, the first 
24 Marchais was General Secretary of the FCP from 1972 to 1994. 
25 Louis Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 25 April 1978. 
26 Pompidou (UDR) was President from 1969 to 1974. 
27 Giscard d'Estaing (UDF) was President from 1974 to 1981. 
28 In October 1973, the victory of Israel against Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippour war pushed the 
OPEC to increase the oil price by 70% and to reduce its oil production by 5% until Israel surrendered 
its occupied territories - which Israel refused to do; c( Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza, Histoire de 
fa France au xX sifxle: de 1974 a nos jours, vol. 5 (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1994), p. 16. 
Interestingly, what industrialised countries called a 'crisis' in the 1970s represented a real economic 
boom in oil producing countries. 
29 In 1973, the increase in oil prices from $3 to $11.65 made the energy bill of industrialised and oil 
dependent countries, such as France, swell. As a consequence, the costs of industrial production 
increased. Stagflation settled in and unemployment escalated; see our ch. -to 
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oil crisis not only provoked a deep sector-based mutatio~ but also an upheaval in social 
behavioural patterns modelled on growth.30 In this context, the Keynesian-style policy, 
which was based on the strengthening of the Welfare State, and which was led by the 
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac as from 1974, proved incapable of turning around a 
depressed economy31 - the policy of economic liberalism advocated by Raymond Barre, 
as from his arrival at Matignon in 1976, did not succeed any better,32 even more so since 
in 1979 the second oil crisis33 affected an already all too weakened France. 
1973 was also a turning point for the French Communist Party: the economic 
crisis which started sweeping France was, potentially at least, a real godsend for the 
Party. Indeed, the Party could revive a Marxist-Leninist language based on the 
proletarianization ofworkers34 and on the collapse of the capitalist system35 - a collapse 
which, ifwe believe French communists, seemed to be materializing at last and thus to be 
placing the advent of socialism 'in the colours of France,36 under favourable auspices, if 
not within arm's reach. The Party could assert itself as the champion of the working class 
and thus find its niche.37 Finally the Party could close ranks, align its battalions behind its 
30 By reference, among other examples, to the need for a reduction in energy consumption. 
31 Chirac (UDR then RPR) was Prime Minister from 1974 to 1976. Personal compulsory contributions in 
tax increased, social security was extended to non working persons and dismissals were made more 
difficult for companies to resort to from 1974 to 1975; cf Bernstein and Milza, Histoire de fa France 
au xX siecle: de 1974 a nosjours, p. 60. 
32 Barre (UDF) was Prime Minister from 1976 to 1981. It is also worth noting that economic liberalism 
was the cornerstone of Margaret Thatcher's and Ronald Reagan's policies. Jean Elleinstein summed 
up the Barre experience: 'Un million et demi de chomeurs d'ici it la fin de l'annee, une inflation de 
l'ordre de 12%, une production industrielle au-dessous de celIe d'il y a quatre ans. Tel est Ie bilan de 
la politique economique liberale qui en revient aux recettes du dix-neuvieme siecle' in 'Pour une 
alliance entre Ie PCF et Ie PS', in 'Pour une alliance historique entre Ie PCF et Ie PS', Le Monde, 24 
August 1978. For Louis Althusser, 'c'est la droite la plus reactionnaire et la plus discreditee', in 'Ce 
qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 25 April 1978. 
33 In 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini, who overthrew the Shah of Iran, reduced his country's oil exports, 
thus provoking an increase in oil prices. The price of the oil barrel tripled between 1978 and 1980, 
going from $13 to $40; cf Bernstein and Milza, Histoire de fa France au ll"" siecle: de 19 -.j a nos 
jours, pp. 25-6. 
3-l See ch. 4. 
35 21 e Congres, Union, Programme Commun, Socialisme: Ie Parti Communiste propose (rapport du 
Comite Central presente par Georges Marchais), (Vitry, 24-27 October 1974); Jean Fabre, 'La crise 
de la societe franryaise, la crise de l'imperialisme' (report to the Party conference on 'La crise de la 
societe franryaise et la crise dans Ie monde capitaliste'), L 'Humanite, 24 May 1975. 
36 See ch. 5. 
37 See ch .... and 7. 
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Leadership,38 and form a stronghold against capitalist forces - a stronghold which 
seemed unassailable to outsiders, but which nonetheless was cracking within. 
It was in the 1970s that an unprecedented wave of dissent swept the French 
Communist Party and affected its most prominent leaders. Inflated by the Party's too 
stringent organisation,39 blown by its ambiguous attitude towards the USSR 40 swollen 
by its inexhaustible strategic waltzes, and amplified by the break up of the Union of the 
Left in 1977 and its consecutive failure to win the 1978 legislative elections, this wave of 
dissident was unprecedented in the Party's history because of its scale and nature.41 
In the 1970s, dissidence was no longer an isolated phenomenon that was mainly 
limited to communist intellectuals. It was ingrained at all levels of the Party's 
organisation. It came from any kind of Party member, from workers and from 
intellectuals. It spread from the conservative left of the Party to its progressive right. 42 It 
thus appeared to be an heterogeneous and disparate form of dissidence 43 which was 
confronted to a sectarian and united communist Leadership, and which seemed either 
doomed to fail or poised to split the Party into factions44 - but appearances can be 
'8 ~ See ch. 1,3 and 4. 
39 See ch. 1. 
40 See ch. 6. 
41 Jean Baudoin, 'Les phenomenes de contestation au sein du Parti Communiste FranlYais (avril 1978-
mai 1979)" Revue Franc;aise de Science Politique, no. 30 (1980), 79; Colette Y smal, 'La crise du 
Parti communiste', Projet, no. 129 (November 1978), 1086; Frank L. Wilson, 'The French CP's 
Dilemna', in 'Eurocommunism in 1978', Problems o/Communism, 17 (July-August 1978),7. Other 
conflicts, opposing communist intellectuals or fellow-travellers to the FCP took place, for instance, at 
the end of the 1930s (at the time of the Moscow trials), in the 1950s (over Soviet deportations), in 
1956 (when Hungary was invaded by the Red Army) and in 1968 (when Czechoslovakia was invaded 
by Soviet troops); see, among others, David Caute, The Fellow-Travellers: Intellectual Friends of 
Communism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 311, 335; Jean-Pierre Gaudard, Les 
orphelins du PC (Paris: Belfond, 1986), p. 108. Roger Martelli also noticed that 'a partir [des annees 
1970] [ ... ] la periodicite des crises s' est acceleree', in Le rouge et Ie bleu: essai sur Ie communisme 
dans l'histoire franc;aise (paris: Les Editions de l' Atelier: Les Editions Ouvrieres, 1995), p. 34. 
41 Wilson, 'The French CP's Dilemna', ibid, 8. 
43 Although, in the 1970s, some communist dissidents came together to sign petitions or to write books; 
cf., for example, 'Cent militants: que valent les formalites juridiques face aux exigences de la 
democratieT (joint declaration), Le Monde, 17 May 1978; "'Le retard de notre parti a se mettre a jour 
ne saurait, sans grave dommage, s'accroitre", dec1arent plus de trois cent communistes' (Petition 
d'Aix-en-Provence signed, among others, by Althusser and Elleinstein), Le A/ondt!. 20 May 1978: 
Etienne Balibar. Guy Bois, Georges Labica and Jean-Pierre Lefebvre, Ouvrons la /enetre, camarades 
(Paris: Maspero, 1979). 
44 See ch. 2. 
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deceptive in some cases and at certain times. 
In the 1970s, communist intellectuals were the driving force of movements of 
dissent within the party:~5 they were the most determined and the boldest in their 
attitude. They did not hesitate to infringe the Party's rules of democratic centralism by 
questioning decisions taken 'sovereignly' by their communist leaders. They did not 
hesitate to bypass the Party-controlled press by voicing their criticisms in the so-called 
bourgeois media.46 They did not hesitate to exploit their own influence in order to try to 
convince other communists of the validity of their 'dissenting' arguments. These were, 
therefore, dissidents who took risks, who were perfectly aware of them, and who 
accepted them because, as far as they were concerned, the transformation ~ 7 and the 
modernisation48 of the FCP were prizes worth fighting for. Jean Elleinstein 
acknowledged this when he wrote: 
Face au Goliath qui gouverne Ie Parti, je ne suis - je Ie sais - qu'un petit David 
avec sa fronde, mais ne sommes nous pas des rnilliers de petits David? Et puis, 
David a bien fini par vaincre Goliath ... 49 
In this context, the leaders of the French Communist Party were ready to crush any 
dissident they faced50 - unaware that two influential intellectual dissidents, endowed 
with a calm but passionate character, were determined to leave their personal mark on 
the Party, namely the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser51 and the Eurocommunist 
45 Interestingly, the most prominent communist intellectual dissidents were those who did not depend 
from the Party financially. 
46 Y smal, 'La crise du Parti communiste', 1088. It is also worth noting that some Party leaders, like 
Georges Marchais, did not hesitate to use non communist media such as Ie Monde and France Inter. 
n Louis Althusser, Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, Paris, IMEC. fond Althusser, 
AL T2.A27-0 1.05, unpublished manuscript. 
48 Jean Elleinstein, 'L'avenir des communistes', Ie Nouvel Observateur, 25 September 1978, p. 50. 
49 Jean Elleinstein, Ils l'OUS trompent, camarades.' (paris: Belfond, 1981), p. IS. 
50 See ch. 8. 
51 In the I970s, the Althusseriens included, among others, Etienne Balibar (a philosopher and a former 
disciple of Althusser), Georges Labica (a philosophy lecturer at the University of Paris X) and Guy 
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historian Jean Elleinstein.52 
Born in 1918, Louis Althusser joined the French Communist Party in 1948,53 
after having met Helene - his future wife,54 his safest lifeboat in his moments of mental 
agitation, the anchor ofhis life, the consenting-recalcitrant victim of his love conquests,55 
the woman he unknowingly and unwillingly strangled in 1980, in the middle of a 
• dreamlike delirium'. In his works about the FCP - whether in books, articles, or 
manuscripts left unfinished and unpublished when he died in 1990 - Althusser is at once 
brilliant, frank, fiery, biting and eloquent: he gave life to his writings and stamped his 
own character on them. It thus transpired that he loved being protected, whether by his 
wife on a personal level, by the Ecole Normale in Paris on a professional level, or by the 
Party on the level of political and intellectual commitment. But what he loved above all 
was his freedom and his independence - his freedom to express any criticism he wanted 
and his intellectual independence. He acknowledged this himself 'Sous les especes de 
[rna] vive contestation [au sein du PCF], conduite sous les garanties d'une protection 
dont jamais je n'enfreignis les limites de la tolerance", he wrote in a manuscript, 'ce que 
je realisais assurement, avant tout, [c'etait] [ ... ] Ie desir d'avoir un monde it moi, Ie vrai 
monde, celui de la lutte.'56 This was his 'gout fantasrnagorique' ,57 as he called it - a 
Bois (a medieval history professor at the University of Paris VII); cf Jean-Pierre Gaudard, Les 
orphelins du PC (Paris: Belfond, 1986). 
52 In the 1970s, the Eurocommunists included, among others, Maurice Goldring (a lecturer at the 
University of Paris VII and a contributor to La Nouvelle Critique and France Nouvelle), Raymond 
Jean (a literature lecturer at the University of Aix-en-Provence), Antoine Spire (a FCP worker and a 
contributor to the Party's Editions Sociales), Henri Fiszbin (the former Secretary of the Federation 
Communiste de Paris); cf. Gaudard, ibid. 
53 At the time of the Stockholm Appeal. 
54 Althusser met Helene in 1946 and married her in the early 1970s. It is also worth noting that in the 
1940s, the FCP accused Helene of having been a Gestapo agent during the Second World War when 
in fact she had been active in the Resistance (she was also Jewish). After her trial within the Party. 
she was excluded from the Conseil communal. Althusser was deeply marked by this event and he 
wrote: 'Cela me donna evidemment sur Ie Parti, ses directions et ses methodes d'action. une vue 
singulierement realiste'; cf Louis Althusser, L 'avenir dure longtemps (Paris: StocklIMEC, 1992), p. 
195. 
55 See, among others, Jean-Pierre Thibaudat, 'Les incantations amoureuses d'Althusser', Liberation, 28 
July 1997, p. 28, by reference to the relationship between Althusser and his Italian mistress Franca: 
Althusser, L 'avenir dure longtemps, ibid., pp. 132-3 (among others). 
5b Althusser. ibid., p. 192. 
57 Althusser. ibid., p. 158. 
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taste which he shared with Elleinstein. 
Born in 1927, Jean Elleinstein joined the FCP at the time of the Liberation, in 
1944.58 'C'est }'histoire de l' Armee rouge, la participation des communistes it la 
Liberation [qui m'ont motive] [ ... J', explained Elleinstein, '[mais] mon engagement it 
moi, c'etait d'abord une liberation personnelle par rapport it mon milieu, par rapport aux 
tabous, aux ambitions. ,59 The background Elleinstein referred to was his family - a 
family which was deeply rooted in the Parisian industrial bourgeoisie, and which had not 
destined him to become a communist activist. But Elleinstein was endowed with an 
independent mind which came across in a brilliant manner in his writings - notably his 
books and his articles about the French and Soviet Communist Parties.60 This was even 
more the case towards the end of the 1970s, when he publicly voiced his disagreements 
with the communist Leadership - for Elleinstein only had 'disagreements' with his 
Leadership. He never described himself - like Althusser in that respect - as being a 
'dissident' of the FCP, even if, in the literal sense of the term, he disagreed with some 
political orientations taken by French communist leaders and with the Party's internal 
organisation. He did not describe himself as a 'dissident' for he was not a separatist: like 
Althusser, he loved his Party too much to see it split into opposing factions. 61 His refusal 
to call himself a 'dissident' was, therefore, a political act by which he signified his 
attachment to the FCP and his desire to remain an integral part of it - but while keeping 
at the same time his intellectual independence and his right to express pointed criticisms. 
In the 1970s, Althusser and Elleinstein were unquestionably the two most 
58 In the 1970s, Elleinstein was the deputy manager of the CERM (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches 
Marxistes); cf. 'Un communiste juge les communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur. 6 September 1976, p. 
60. 
59 Andre Harris and Alain de Sedouy, Voyage a I 'interieur du Parti Communiste (Paris: Le Seuil, J 974), 
p. 169. 
60 See ch. 6. 
61 See ch. 2. 
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prominent dissenting figures within the French Communist party.62 Many non-!vlarxist 
academics turned their attention to their writings and differentiated between the 
ideologies of these two communist intellectuals.63 Althusser was thus generally perceived 
as advocating a return to traditional Marxism and Elleinstein as looking ahead towards 
Eurocommunism. However, if we analyse these dissidents' writings and, more 
specifically, Althusser's unpublished manuscripts, we quickly realise that, in the 1970s, 
most criticisms expressed by Althusser and Elleinstein towards their Party had more in 
common than previously thought. 
In this context, this thesis is, to a large extent, based on French, Russian, British, and 
American publications - any attempt to interview FCP members and officials was most 
of the time blocked by the present communist Leadership.64 Indeed, Party leaders 
showed a considerable reluctance to discuss the subject of 1970s communist intellectual 
dissidents. This subject was certainly judged as being too sensitive, as reviving an 'old' 
controversy, and as potentially validating dissident actions - the Party still does not like 
this kind of interference in its internal affairs. Written sources were, therefore, multiplied, 
diversified, compared and matched up so that this thesis could reflect a diversity of 
opinions - the opinions expressed by French and Soviet communist dissidents, the ideas 
62 Maurice Cranston wrote that 'Louis Althusser must be regarded as the leading theorist of the party. 
Indeed, he is among the most distinctive and original of living Marxist philosophers', in "The 
Ideology of Althusser', Problems o/Communism, 12 (March-April 1973), 53; regarding communist 
historians like Elleinstein, Gaudard wrote that 'si leurs travaux sont si importants, c'est que Ie 
communisme est un monde sans memoire, qui a besoin de l'oub1i pour imposer sa dialectique', in Les 
orphelins du Pc, p. 180. 
63 See, among others, Ysmal, 'La crise du Parti communiste', 1094; Baudoin, 'Les phenomenes de 
contestation au sein du Parti Communiste Fran~is (avril 1978-mai 1979)', 91. 
64 Francette Lazard (a party official who works at the Espace Marx). Mr. and Mrs Charmont (two 
communist activists who belonged to the Party section of Macon, Saone-et-Loire, France), and Mr. 
Gabriel (the Secretary of the Party section of Macon) were the only persons who agreed to meet me 
(respectively in July 1999, on 7 August 1998 and on 28 July 1998). When I tried to meet other 
activists, I was told that I could not do so. When I tried to meet Party officials in Paris. they were 
either "unavailable' or 'on holiday', despite the fact they had told me that they would see me. Letters 
sent to Party officials 'never arrived'. When I arrived at the Party headquarters in July 1999, four 
communists received me at the reception only to tell me that 'they would help' but that 'nobod) could 
meet me' - I was politely dismissed and nothing came out of that rather short "meeting'. 
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voiced by FCP and CPSU leaders, the points made by French communist activists, the 
line taken by Soviet historians, and the views put forward by non communists. These 
sources come from University libraries, the National Library of Scotland, the 
Documentation Service of the FCP, the Party's Bibliotheque Marxiste and the Espace 
Marx in paris,65 the Bibliotheque Nationale de France and the Institut Memoires de 
l'Edition Contemporaine (IMEC). The lMEC provided the original material of this 
thesis, namely Althusser's unpublished manuscripts which were placed at the disposal of 
researchers after his death in 1990. Without these manuscripts, it would have been near 
enough impossible to have a full vision of Althusser's criticisms towards the FCP and to 
link them to that ofElleinstein.66 
This thesis deals, therefore, with the subject of 'Elleinstein and Althusser: 
intellectual dissidents in the French Communist Party, 1972-1981'. Themes examined 
revolve around the dissenting ideas expressed by Althusser and Elleinstein, the way their 
criticisms were received by both French and Soviet communists, and the impact they had 
on the Party both in the 1970s and in the long run. 
65 The Espace Marx was fonnerly called the IRM (Institut ~e. Recherche Mar~iste). . 
66 It is worth pointing out that although Althusser was wIllIng to open. up ?IS work to researchers, thiS 
has not been the case for Elleinstein. At the end of the 1990s, the hlstonan refused to talk about the 
role he played within the Party in the 1970s despite numerous letters sent to him and several phone 
calls. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The internal organisation of the French Communist Party 
The French Communist Party was, at the outset, a breakaway group of the French 
Socialist Party: I the contentious issue which bitterly divided the socialists was the 
adoption of Lenin's 21 conditions of adhesion to the 3rd Communist International. Leon 
Blum and a majority of socialists were against it, a minority in favour. 2 It was this 
minority of socialists who founded the FCP in 1920.3 From there onwards, French 
communist leaders followed the tune called by Moscow.4 This was generally true from an 
ideological point of view - as this thesis will demonstrate in the following chapters -
and this was the case for the FCP's internal organisation in three respects. 
First, the internal organisationS of the French Communist Party was, up to 1993,6 
based on the principle of democratic centralism which was defined by Lenin's twelfth 
condition of adhesion to the 3rd Communist International. This stipulated: 
[Tout parti] appartenant it l'Internationale Communiste [do it] etre [edifie] sur Ie 
principe de la centralisation democratique [ ... ]. [II] ne pourra remplir son role que 
1 The French Socialist Party was then called the SFIO. 
2 See, among others, Georges Lefranc, Le mouvement socialiste sous la troisieme repub/ique (1875-
1940), (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963), ch. 1, 'Ie grand schisme'. 
3 The FCP (or SFIC, as it was called at that time) was created at the Tours Congress which was held 
from 25 to 29 December 1920; Lefranc, ibid., ch. 1. 
-l Moscow called the tune up to 1984: Tchernenko died in 1985 and the communist reformer Gorbachev 
arrived in power; see our ch. 2. 
5 Jean Elleinstein, Le PC (Paris: Grasset, 1976), pp. 63-6; Annie Kriegel, Les communistes fram;ais 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968), ch. X on 'Le mecanisme de selection': see our appendix. 
6 After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the FCP became completely liberated from its Soviet 
tutelage. At its 28th Congress of 1994 the FCP thus decided to abandon the principle of democratic 
centralism and to replace it by the concept of 'souverainete des communistes'; Francette Lazard, 
Rapport introductif au Comite Central des 28, 29 et 30 septembre 1993, (L 'Humanite, 29 September 
1993); 28i: Congres, Rapport de la commission sur les statuts (rapport presente par Francette Lazard) 
suivi de Les statuts du PCF(St-Ouen, 25-29 January 1994): see our ch. 2 and conclusion. 
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s'il est organise de la fac;on la plus centralisee, si une discipline de fer7 confinant it 
la discipline militaire y est admise et si son organisme central est muni de larges 
pouvoirs, exerce une autorite incontestee, beneficie de la confiance unanime des 
militants,g 
This twelfth condition was unequivocal: the grassroots of the FCP had to be organised in 
a 'military' manner around a powerful, if not apparently untouchable, communist 
leadership - a type of organisation which was commended by the 'revolutionary' 
position occupied by the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, and which was transposed 
onto the French Communist Party. 
Second, in the early 1920s, the Soviet Union was a relatively young state. Russia 
had gone through consecutive revolutions in 1917, the second of which allowed the 
Bolsheviks to seize power. The Bolsheviks still feared the revanchist assault of the 
'bourgeois' enemy, but were determined to assert their 'socialist' power and to crush any 
'bourgeois' element in a class struggle.9 This battle was permanent as any subversive 
element could penetrate the Party's ranks: purges became a by-word to protect the 
party.lO This battle was constant: the 'discipline militaire,11 necessary to any struggle had 
to be strictly applied - and it certainly was in the French Communist Party, even after 
the death of Lenin in 1924, the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943, and 
the death of Stalin in 1953. When one enjoys 'une autorite incontestee', 12 it is difficult to 
7 Vladimir Hitch Lenin, La maladie infantile du communisme: Ie gauchisme, French translation (Paris: 
Editions Sociales, 1953: [no pub.], 1962), p. 13. 
8 Jean BurIes, Le Parti Communiste dans la societe jran<;aise (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1979), p. 136. 
9 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 18·+4, English translation (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1970), pp. 65, 70, 81, 107, 120; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist 
Manifesto, English translation (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), pp. 12, 16, 34, 39; Vladimir 
Hitch Lenin, Lenin's Thesis on Bourgeois Democracy and Proletarian Dictatorship, English 
translation (Glasgow: Socialist Labour Press, 1920), p. 14. 
10 Stalin. The Party ([n.p.]: [n.pub.], 1924), pp. 97-109, quoted by Martin McCauley, Stalin and 
Stalinism (Harlow: Longman. 1995), p. 90. 
II BurIes. Le Parti Communiste dans la societe jran<;aise. p. 136, by reference to the twelfth condition of 
adhesion to the Communist International. 
12 BurIes. ibid., p. 136. 
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question it, and all the more so to do without it. The long-lasting and centrally focused 
domination of Maurice Thorez and, to a lesser extent, of Georges Marchais at the head 
of the FCP proved this. 13 
Third, the strengthening of the Party leadership - in the CPSU as in the FCP -
led to the near deification of the Leader,14 which meant that the power of the Party was 
intermingled with that of its General Secretary. Khruschev was fully aware of this, and in 
1956, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, he denounced both Stalin's abuses of power 
and personality cult in an attempt to reform the Soviet systeml5 - an attempt which 
failed in the long term. 16 Nothing changed in the CPSU: from Brezhnev to Gorbachev,17 
the power of the CPSU kept intertwining with that of its leaders. 18 Nothing changed in 
the FCp: 19 Thorez' personality cult did not fade awalo and the confusion between the 
power of the Leadership and that of the Party as a whole remained as such. However, 
too great a concentration of power in the hands of the FCP leadership could only cause a 
backlash in the long term - and in the late 1970s, this is precisely what happened. 
The breakdown of the 'Programme Commun de la Gauche' in 197721 and the 
failure of the Left at the 1978 legislative elections22 sparked off a wave of discontent 
\3 Lenin justified this position by writing that 'il ne saurait y avoir de solide mouvement n!volutionnaire 
sans une organisation de dirigeants qui en maintienne la continuite dans Ie temps', Vladimir Hitch 
Lenin, La maladie infantile du communisme: Ie gauchisme, French translation (Paris: Editions 
Sociales, 1953: [n. pub.], 1962), p. 139; it is worth noting that Thorez was the leader ofthe FCP from 
1930 to 1964. He was succeeded by Waldeck-Rochet from 1964 to 1972. Marchais was then Party 
leader from 1972 to 1994; Stephane Courtois, 'PCF: Ie parti de Moscou', L 'Histoire, July-August 
1998, p. 47. 
14 Lenin and Stalin were deified to such an extent that they were even embalmed at their death and put 
into a mausoleum. 
15 Khruschev thus started a destalinisation which could have led to a 1950s-style perestroika (he was 
leader of the CPSU from 1953 to 1964); Nicolas Werth, 'La Russie sovietique: revolution, socialisme 
et dictature', L 'Histoire, July-August 1998, p. 20. 
16 Pierre Daix, Ce que je sa is de Soljenitsyne (Paris: Le Seuil, 1973), pp. 26-7. 
17 Brezhnev was leader of the CPSU from 1964 to 1982. Andropov (1982-1984), Chemenko (1984-
1985) and Gorbachev (1985-1991) then became leaders of the CPSu. 
18 Pierre Daix, Le socialisme du silence (Paris: Le Seuil, 1976), p. 201. 
19 Daix, ibid, p. 13. 
20 Michel Winock, 'L'age d'or du communisme fran~is', L 'Histoire, July-August 1998, p. 59. 
21 On 27 June 1972. the FCP and the SP signed the "Programme Commun de Gouvemement de la 
Gauche'; see ch. 7. 
22 At the 1978 legislative elections, the Union of the Left got 45.6% of the votes; the FCP scored 20.7% 
in the first round and the SP 24.9%; David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, The French Communist Party 
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which was not only unprecedented in the French Communist party.23 but which was also 
very much targetted at the Leadership.24 Indeed, after having followed their Leadership 
blindly in the name of an iron discipline 'justified' by class struggle, in the name of 
'l'unite de tous les communistes autour [d'une] politique,/5 and in the name of a 
promised victory, French communists only reached a defeat. As a result. the Party 
leadership was singled out for criticism, 26 for it was the Leadership which had carried out 
a doomed strategy and which had applied Stalin's motto word for word: 'Iron discipline 
does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only 
conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline,27 - and in the 1970s, the leaders of the 
French Communist Party had made the best of it. 
It was in this context that voices like those of Louis Althusser and Jean 
Elleinstein started to be raised. According to them, the defeat of March 1978 was the 
direct consequence of policies devised for too long in a dictatorial manner by the leaders 
of the FCP. As a result, they launched direct and pointed attacks against democratic 
centralism, which they both wanted to democratise.28 They put their fingers into the cogs 
of the 'machine,29 and, from there onwards, delved deeper and deeper.3o 
This chapter on the internal organisation of the French Communist Party will thus 
in the Fifth Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 167; Fran'(ois Platone and Jean Ranger, 
'L'echec du Parti Communiste Fran~ais aux elections du printemps 1981', Revue Fran9aise de 
Science Politique, no. 31 (1981), 10 17. 
23 See introduction. 
24 As AIthusser explained, 'a partir du moment OU Ie Parti s'ouvre largement vers l'exterieur, et pratique 
avec les non-communistes de nouvelles formes d'echange et de discussion, pour renforcer l'unite 
populaire, cette meme exigence se fait plus fortement ressentir a I'interieur du Parti', Louis Althusser, 
22e congres (Paris: Maspero, 1977), p. 67. 
2522e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
26 Jean Elleinstein, lis vous trompent, camarades! (Paris: Bel fond, 1981), p. II; Denis Berger, 'La 
forteresse lezardee (A propos du XXIIIe Congres du PCF)', Critique Communiste, no. 27 (June 1979), 
23; Louis Althusser, Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie Parti Communiste (Paris: Maspero, 1978). 
27 Joseph Stalin, The Party ([n.p.]: [no pub.], 1924). pp. 97-109, quoted in McCauley, Stalin and 
Stalinism, p. 90. 
28 Elleinstein, lis vous trompent, camarades!, p. 120. 
29 Althusser called the French Communist Party the 'machine' in Projet de texte de la cellule Paul 
Langevin, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, AL T2.A27-0 1.05, unpublished manuscripts; c( Georges 
Lavau, 'A quoi sert Ie PCFT, in Duhamel and Weber, Changer Ie PC?, pp. 209-10. 
30 See following chapters. 
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examme the mam elements which cemented the internal organisation of the French 
Communist Party in the 1970s, meaning first the Party's monolithism and second its 
regimentation. 
The FCP's monolithism was characterised on the one hand by the unity of the Party, 
which ensued directly from a mastery of general political thought given concrete 
expression by unity of action,3! and on the other hand by the sacralisation of the 
Leadership's power which expressed itself through dogmatism and strict efficiency. 
The unity of the Party was a general watchword in the 1970s. If joining the FCP 
resulted from a personal decision, and if by becoming a member the communist 
expressed his will to become part of the edifice, his originality would later be erased: the 
edifice was only made of one block for, as Party official Paul Laurent explained, . [Ie 
parti] est une organisation volontaire qui rassemble tous ceux qui approuvent la politique 
communiste sur un plan genera1'32 - which was true in general. However, for Party 
leaders, this 'approbation' had a very special meaning: it was conceived in term of 
submission to decisions taken at the Summit.33 One had to agree with any political 
orientation decided by one's superiors and one had to form a block behind them for a 
precise reason: only unity of thought within the Party could lead to a strong and coherent 
unity of action and thus to a greater manoeuvre of communist activists by the Party 
leadership. 
In this context, the FCP formed and moulded its cadres in the schools of the 
Party. It published leaflet after leaflet - real codes of conduct for the perfect communist 
- in order to 'inform' its members. It . recommended , quite strongly precise reading to 
31 Louis Althusser. Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Le malaise du 11" congres). Paris, IMEC, 
fond Althusser. ALT2.A24-01.0Il02 to -02.01, unpublished manuscripts; Althusser, 27 Congres. p. 
58. 
32 Paul Laurent. 'Centralisme democratique: tenir les deux termes" La .vouvelle Critique, 1977, p. 2. 
33 Daix, Cc que jc sais de Soljenitsyne, pp. 170-2. 
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ItS actIvISts, thus offenng them a cadre de pensee which they could not go out of for 
fear of becoming 'class enemies,.35 If Mao had his little red book, the FCP had its 
references too, for in the name of I 'unite du Parti all communists were to be cast in the 
same image/6 thus giving the image of 'soumission ou [ ... ] simple conformisme', as 
Althusser put it cynically. 37 
However, this image could have been reversed for, according to Elleinstein. 'Ie 
Parti communiste ne doit pas etre une sorte d'Eglise it laquelle on est attache d'une fa90n 
religieuse,.38 This was right in theory. It was indeed perfectly possible for communist 
activists to question the Party's unity of thought for, whatever the Leadership said in the 
name of communist ideology, unity of thought was not the sine qua non condition of 
unity of action. Plurality of thought and unity of action could have been combined. But in 
practice, the system favoured by the Party leadership appeared to run well in the 1970s. 
From the signature of the Common Programme in 1972 to the defeat of the Left in 1978, 
communist activists kept hoping that, ultimately, things would change. They kept hoping 
that they would have a voice, their own voice, within the Party. The 1976 22nd Congress 
certainly strengthened this hope with the opening up of preliminary discussions/9 but it 
was an empty gesture as once again the Leadership simply imposed a new line for the 
activists to follow40 - and they did follow it, thus tacitly adhering to the unity of 
thought and action promoted by their Party leaders. 
34 Such as Thorez's book, Fils dupeuple; Winock, 'L'clge d'or du communisme fran9ais', p. 58. 
35 Jean-Pierre Gaudard, Les orphelins du PC (Paris: Belfond, 1986), pp. 57, 129. 
36 See ch. 4. 
37 Althusser, Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, unpublished manuscripts; Antoine Spire, 
Profession: permanent (Paris: Seuil, 1980), p. 45; it is worth noting that in some cases, discussion 
could be buoyant and far from being entirely conformist; cf Jane Jenson and George Ross, View from 
Inside a French Communist Cell in Crisis (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press. 1984): 
they refer to Henri Fiszbin's Eurocommunist federation; Denis Berger, 'peF: I'impossible strategie', 
Critique Communiste, no. 22 (February-March 1978),43. 
38 Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades!, p. 110. , 
W Michel Barak, Fractures au PCF - Des communistes par/en! (Aix-en-Provence: EDISUD; Paris: 
Karthala, 1980), pp. 13-4; Raymond Jean, La singularite d'etre communiste (Paris: Editions du SeuiL 
1979), p. 74 . 
.to By reference to the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat; see ch. 5. 
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In the 1970s, communist activists did follow the unity of thought and action 
promoted by their leaders even more so since the economic crisis, which swept France as 
from 1973, seemed to toll the bell of French capitalism41 and announce the potential birth 
of socialism. In this context, it was more than ever necessary for FCP leaders to ensure 
the coherence of the Party. It was imperative that communists marched as one man 
behind their Leadership. As a result, the Leadership itself could only be strengthened: not 
only did it have a monopoly on political thought, but it could also move its activists like 
pawns42 on a chessboard. It went too far in doing so, however, as the rise of discontent 
after the defeat at the 1978 legislative elections proved. As Althusser explained: 
Genereux et confiants, les militants peuvent oublier bien des choses. Mais quand 
on les traite comme des pions, pour les mener a la defaite d'un combat OU ils se 
sont devoues corps et arne, alors ils veulent savoir.43 
Excessive centralisation of decision-making in the name of unity of action was arguably 
tolerable as long as victory appeared to be within reach. However, when everything 
collapsed and that hope was broken, the leaders of the FCP were the first to be 
answerable for it and to be punished for it. The activists no longer subordinated 
themselves to the Leadership. They began to think for themselves. 
Consequently, in order to guarantee a certain unity of action, the Leadership 
could have strengthened the Party's democratic character - an idea which was put 
forward by Elleinstein who explained that 'au niveau de Paction, il faut une coherence, 
41 Jean Fabre, 'La crise de la societe franryaise. la crise de I'imperialisme' (report to the Party conference 
on 'La crise de la societe franryaise et la crise dans Ie monde capitaliste'), L 'Humanite, 24 May 1975. 
42 -Des pions' in French: this term was used by Simone de Beauvoir and Althusser. 
4~ Louis Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 26 April 1978; 
Barak, Fractures au PCF, p. 96: 'II a fallu cet echec historique de mars 1978, l'autosatisfaction 
incroyablement affichee, l'operation de perroquetterie qui s'ensuivit pour que nos yeux s'ouvrent 
enfin: c'en etait trop.' 
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c'est cela Ie centralisme, mais il doit venir de la democratie et y retourner.,44 Indeed, the 
Leadership's constant pressure on grass roots activists was not entirely justifiable: unity 
of action within the Party was naturally achieved by activists through their membership 
of the FCP, their subsequent adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology, and their respect 
for democratic centralism, whereby decisions were taken at the summit and followed by 
the grass roots, inevitably acted in conformity with their communist convictions. In that 
sense, the communist dissidents, and nonetheless activists, Elleinstein and Althusser 
inscribed their roles as intellectuals within the French Communist Party with a perfectly 
unitary perspective.45 They only started attacking democratic centralism and the Party 
leadership when the FCP's unity, which virtually merged with that of the Common 
Programme after 1972, started crumpling in 197746 and in 1978. 
In this context, the criticisms expressed by Elleinstein and Althusser were 
unequivocal: they put the Party leadership in the dock. According to these communist 
intellectual dissidents, the power of the Party had merged with that of its leaders as a 
result of the adoption of Stalinist practices by the FCp.47 Democratic centralism had lost 
its democratic character.48 As Althusser wrote, 'Ie centralisme democratique a ete 
travesti et caricature par les effets et la "deviation stalinienne.",49 Hence the power, 
which should have been in the hands of all members in a Party which was nominally 
communist, was monopolised in the hands of leaders whose decisions were given a 
sacred status. 
The leaders of the FCP had made its power sacred by adopting a very dogmatic 
44 Jean Elleinstein, 'L'avenir des communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 25 September 1978, p. 51. 
45 See ch. 2: Elleinstein and Althusser never wanted to split the Party into factions as a result of their 
dissenting actions. 
46 At the time of the break-up ofthe Common Programme. 
47 Philippe Robrieux, Histoire interieure du Parti communiste (1972-1982), vol. 3 (Paris: Fayard, 1982), 
p.336. 
48 Jean Elleinstein, 'PC: Elleinstein s'explique', Politique Hebdo, 23-29 January 1978, p. 6; Helene 
Parmelin, 'La contestation dans Ie PCF? C'est la suite normale du XXW congres'. Le Nouvel 
Observateur, 10 July 1978. 
49 Althusser, Les vaches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
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image: they allowed themselves to think for their members as they believed - and were 
admittedly made to believe so following the exampled set by communist leaders in the 
Soviet Union - that they were not only the font of all Knowledge, but also of all Truth50 
which had to be swallowed by grass roots communists like fledglings just out of the 
egg.51 In that sense, communist leaders nurtured them completely, and it was with blind 
faith that most activists followed their trail. For the case cannot be misjudged: the Party 
was here to guide, to educate, to transmit its Knowledge and its Truth to the masses -
whether they were workers, white collar employees or intellectuals. Consequently, as 
Althusser put it to Marchais in a conversation he had with him in 1977: 'Le Parti, comme 
organisation, [ ... ] est incapable de reconnaitre la verite qui est dans la tete de ses 
militants. ,52 
Within the FCP, the individual was crushed by a leadership system which was 
derived from the Soviet Union and which denied grass roots communists the right to 
think for themselves. In this context, communist intellectuals did not form a separate 
category. It was up to them to pave the way by ratifYing everything that emanated from 
the Party leadership for fear of being condemned by it. 53 Just as the court prayed in the 
direction of the Sun King, French communists kneeled in front of the divine authority of 
the Leadership which treated them like 'valets,54 more often that not - or at least that 
was the impression given by communist dissidents such as Althusser who did not hesitate 
to warn that, in this context, 'une des sentences les plus anciennes de la pratique 
50 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Ie Monde, 26 April 1978. 
51 Helene Parmelin, Iiberez les communistes! (Paris: Editions Stock, 1979), p. 83. 
52 Althusser, discussion with Marchais (1977) reported in Projet de livre sur Ie communisme, 
unpublished manuscripts. Althusser told Marchais: 'Quand un ouvrier [ou un autre communiste] ne 
veut pas parler, tu peux parier it 100% qu'il a des choses it dire, et des choses tres importantes. S'il ne 
parle pas, ou bien il croit que toi, Secretaire General dirigeant et I"appareil du parti, et ses chercheurs. 
tu es bien mieux place que lui pour connaitre la reponse, donc il se tait. Ou bien il a des choses a dire 
sur Ie parti et son syndicat, que les choses ne vont pas, et comme tu es Ie Secretaire General, il ne va 
pas te faire un dessin [ ... ] Alors il ferme sa gueule. Mais tu peux etre sUr qu'il l'ou\Te avec ses 
copains. ' 
53 See further. 
54 Althusser. Proje! de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, unpublished manuscripts. 
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politique [ ... J dit qu'on n'a jamais interet a prendre les gens pour des imbeciles,.55 The 
wave of criticism which swept the Party at the end of the 1970s demonstrated this. 
Tactically, the Party justified the extremely tight control it exercised over its 
members because it increased its margin of political manoeuvre - a strategy which was 
justifiable to some extent. Indeed, the leaders of the French Communist Party could not 
only impose last minute decisions without the risk that they would be contested within 
the FCP, but they could also respond rapidly to measures taken by outside movements. 56 
This made the Leadership highly efficient. The fortress might well have been under siege 
from all sides - as much from inside, notably by intellectual dissidents, as from outside 
by the Socialist Party after the breakdown of the Common Programme in 1977 and the 
defeat of 1978 - and the edifice might well have been falling into ruins, but the 
Leadership remained intact, all be it weakened. However, as Machiavelli put it, 'celui qui 
se bat it une forteresse et s'y refugie se fait Ie prisonnier de ses murs: il est perdu non 
seulement pour la guerre, mais aussi pour la politique,57 - a warning the FCP could not 
take into account because of pressures exercised by Moscow, as will be demonstrated. 
The monolithic character of the Party was unshakeable, even more so since it was 
accompanied by an unfailing regimentation at the level of its internal organisation. 
Paul Laurent produced quite an interesting definition of democratic centralism because it 
gave a good picture of what the leadership of the French Communist Party believed: 
Le centralisme democratique se definit par une double pratique: d'abord celie de 
la discussion, d 'une confrontation large et democratique des opinions entre to us 
55 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 25 April 1978. 
56 Sue Ellen Charlton, 'Deradicalization and the French Communist Party', Review of Politics, no. 41 
(1979),53. 
57 Machiavelli quoted in Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Ltl .\{onde, 28 
April 1978. 
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les adherents du parti et la participation de tous it l'elaboration de sa politique. Et 
en second lieu, cette idee que les decisions prises, une fois la discussion terminee, 
elles doivent etre appliquees par toUS.58 
If we thus trust Paul Laurent, the Party was indeed democratic in the 1970s, and if we 
believe Georges Marchais, it was at that time 'Ie plus democratique de ce pays,59 - an 
opinion Elleinstein and Althusser both contested. Talking about the Leadership, 
Althusser thus wrote in an unpublished manuscript: 
C' est organiquement dans ses habitudes [ ... ] [ de J se payer Ie luxe de laisser 
'librement' discuter les militants, pUlsque de toute fa90n 9a ne tire pas it 
consequence, les vraies discussions (secretes) [ayant J lieu au Secretariat et au BP 
ou se prennent les decisions qu'enterine comme un seul homme Ie Comite Central 
qui a [ ... J l'avantage de se croire pres de la Verite.60 
This criticism cannot be contested for it shows what really happened inside the Party in 
the 1970s. On the one hand the internal organisation was too compartmentalized, as the 
principle of verticalism was used by the Leadership to sift out dissenting opinions, and on 
the other hand the Leadership proved sectarian at the level of the circulation of ideas, 
which had ineluctable repercussions on the Party's relations with the masses. 
First, in the 1970s, the Party was endowed with a hierarchical pyramidal structure 
which allowed the Leadership to cloister its activists in order to indoctrinate them.61 
From the cell to the Central Committee, all the internal tiers of authority applied the 
58 Paul Laurent, 'Centralisme democratique: tenir les deux termes', p. 2. 
59 Georges Marchais, Avancer sur fa voie du 22" Congres (rapport prt?sente au Comite Central des l6, 
:;7 et l8 avril 1978), (Cahiers du Communisme, March 1978 and L 'Humanite. 28 April 1978). 
60 Althusser, Proje! de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, unpublished manuscripts. 
61 Regis Debray, Leftre ouverte aux communistes fram;ais et a quelques autres (Paris: Seuil, 1978), p. 
115. 
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principle of verticalism which made it possible not only to filter information coming from 
the grass roots,62 but also to dilute the harshest and the most radical decisions taken at 
h 63 t e top. As a consequence, the power of Party leaders came out strengthened. At the 
base of the pyramid, communist activists played a rather diminished role, whereas at the 
summit the Leadership had the principal one. Indeed, if communist activists held lively 
discussions in their cells, these merely gave them the illusion to play an 'active' role 
within the FCP when, in fact, decisive strategical decisions were taken by the Central 
Committee.64 However, when it came to applying decisions taken 'by the majority' and 
to vote at a congress,65 then information went back up from the cells to the Leadership 
with ease and rapidity: any dissident was identified, singled out and sharply held to 
account, or even condemned.66 No deviation was to be tolerated. No criticism was to be 
put up with. No dissenting action was to be endured. In this context, it took a great deal 
of boldness for dissidents to dare to take off their iron collars and put forward a more 
flexible alternative to the organisational verticalism of the Party - and in the 1970s, they 
did. 
With regard to the FCP's internal organisation, the ideas of Elleinstein and 
Althusser coalesced. Indeed, they both argued that the principle of horizontalism should 
be substituted for that of verticalism, 67 as this would allow the activists to break out of 
62 Pierre Daix, La crise du PCF (Paris: Seuil, 1978), p. 175; Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans 
Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 26 April 1978. 
63 'Mardi 2 mai Etienne Fajon rend compte devant les communistes de la Seine-St-Denis des travaux du 
CC du PCF', Dialectiques, no. 23 (1978), 32-3. 
64 Jacques Denis, 'Sur l'eurocommunisme et les relations europeennes', Cahiers du Communisme, no. 4 
(April 1978), 103. 
65 Philippe Robrieux, La secte (Paris: Editions Stock, 1985), p. 112; Robrieux, Histoire interieure du 
Parti communiste, pp. 520-1. 
66 See ch. 8; it is worth noting that this situation changed in the 1990s with the democratization of the 
Party and its recognition of the diversity of opinion of its r:nembers; c£ 2ge Congres, La politique du 
Parti Communiste Franr;:ais (document adopre par Ie 2~ Congres) , (Arche de la Defense, 18-22 
December 1996); L 'Humanire, 23 December 1996; Jacques Chambaz, Realites et strategie: Ie PCF. 
une demarche nouvelle (Paris: Messidor/Editions Sociales, 1990), p. 154. 
67 Jean Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme (Paris: Julliard, 1979), p. 93; 'Du XXlle Congres 
du PCF it l'echec de la Gauche - Aller au fond des choses', Le Monde, 15 April 1978; Althusser, 'Ce 
qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 26 April 1978. 
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the confined framework of their cell by collaborating with other communists from the 
grass roots. Their argument was relatively convincing in the sense that this system could 
not only have broken the routine of well-established relations between cells, sections and 
federations, but also offered the grass roots a broader overall view of the Party's 
activities. In that respect Althusser, who used to complain '[de n'avoir] jamais rencontre 
un seul proletaire ni dans [sa] cellule, ni dans les conferences de section auxquelles [il a] 
assiste' ,68 could have made fruitful contacts with the Party's most humble members if 
horizontalism had been implemented. This could have resulted in wide-ranging 
discussions between activists at all levels. Furthermore, if we go beyond the thought of 
Elleinstein and Althusser, we can argue that horizontalism could have strengthened 
relations between workers and intellectuals. Indeed, verticalism sealed the debate off in 
individual cells which, in most cases, were not entirely representative of the composition 
of the Party as a whole. In that sense, horizontalism could have put an end to this 
compartmentalization which existed between intellectuals and workers. As a result, the 
debate could only have been richer and more fertile. 69 
However, in the 1970s, FCP leaders had a very different view from that of 
Elleinstein and Althusser. Horizontalism was unthinkable, and was not going to be 
applied within the Party as it would have robbed them of a weapon which was certainly 
very useful when it came to shooting down intellectual dissidents - i.e. to set the 
intellectuals, who were 'assis derriere un bureau' /0 against the workers who toiled in 
factories and mines. 71 The fact was that Party leaders had everything to fear from a close 
alliance between the workers and the intellectuals: they feared that this alliance would 
68 Althusser, Les vaches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
69 Michel Donati, un siderurgiste, in Michel Cardoze, Nouveau voyage a f'interieur du PCF (Paris: 
Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1986), p. 43; Stefan Lequiem, 'Droit de tendance ou centralisme 
democratique', Luttes et Debats, June 1979, p .. 51. 
70 Georges Marchais, Al'ancer sur fa voie du 22" Congres (rapport presente au Comite Central des 26. 
~7 et 28 avril 19-8J. 
71 See ch. 3 and 4. 
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open up debate to a considerable extent and spread dissent from the intellectuals to the 
workers, who were the real pillars of the Party. At the end of the 1970s, their fears 
proved justified. To see this, one only has to take into account the flood of letters of 
complaint written by FCP members coming from the most diverse social strata and sent 
to newspapers such as Le Monde and Luttes et Debats. The althusserien Etienne 
Balibar72 confirmed this by writing: 
Ce que la direction pervoit tres bien, c'est que la discussion au grand jour [ ... ] 
manifesterait [ ... ] des conflits internes qui vont tres au-dela de son pro pre 
disc ours et celui des 'intellectuels' [ ... ]. C'est que les conflits latents affectent sa 
b ·, 73 ase ouvnere. 
The aim ofhorizontalism, however, as promoted by Elleinstein and Althusser, was not to 
nourish dissent. Their aim was to widen discussion within the Party. The cause was 
noble, but its realisation through horizontalism would not have gone far enough. In fact, 
there was no use building bridges between cells and between sections, in other words at 
the same level within the pyramid, if the information did not go up. The principle of 
horizontalism could only have worked insofar as workers, white collar employees and 
intellectuals were not compartmentalized into class specific cells in working-class towns 
or 'bourgeois' areas. It would have been worth implementing it if all social strata 
representative of the FCP had maintained relations which were close and favourable 
enough to restore a sense of criticism on the part of the activists. Horizontalism, as 
conceived by Elleinstein and Althusser, would not have led to the collapse of the Party's 
vertical structure. By contrast, what could have altered the Party's structure was the 
72 Balibar studied under Althusser's supervision and became his disciple. 
73 Etienne Balibar, 'La responsabilite des communistes', Dialectiques, no. 23 (1978), 27. 
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direct control by the grass roots over decisions taken at Party congresses. Indeed, it 
would have been desirable to democratise the Party Congresses by giving participants the 
right to vote in all honesty for, or against, the resolutions put forward by the Central 
Committee. This system would have had the advantage both of putting an end to the 
unanimous vote which gave too Stalinist an image to Party congresses and of potentially 
renewing the FCP leadership,74 thus reflecting the dominant currents of ideas of the 
Party.75 However, in the 1970s, verticalism was here to stay. 
From the FCP leadership's point of view, the Party's rigid structure helped to 
contain and overcome any divergence of opinion coming from the grass roots: 76 dissident 
could easily be marginalized within a particular cell. 77 Consequently, other tiers of 
authority remained untouched by what constituted an r.isolated act' and criticisms did not 
gain ground - that is, as long as they were expressed within the Party's organisations, a 
limitation both Althusser and Elleinstein did not hesitate to bypass to have a better 
impact on the whole Party. They thus wrote extensively in what the FCP called the 
r.bourgeois' press, and their articles were published in papers such as Ie Monde and Ie 
Nouvel Observateur. However, what should have been a Chinese puzzle for Party 
leaders proved to be a child's game. They only had to turn their enemies' own weapons 
on them. As these intellectuals were writing in the so-called r.bourgeois' press, the 
Leadership considered that they were giving arguments to the class adversary and thus 
opposing the FCP publicl/8 - an argument which not only derived from the Soviet' s 
74 Duhamel and Weber, Changer Ie PC?, p. 40; Charles Piraux, 'Pour une democratie revolutionnaire', 
Luttes et Debats, January 1979, p. 25; Michel Dreyfus, PCF: crises et dissidences de 1920 a nosjours 
(Brussels: Ed. Complexe, 1990), pp. 215-6: 'Aucune lutte de succession ne semble menacer Ie pouvoir 
de Georges Marchais, installe aux commandes depuis deux decennies'. 
75 See ch. 2. 
76 Auguste Lecoeur, Le PCF: continuite dans Ie changement (Paris: R. Laffont, 1977). p. 79: cf. 
Althusser. 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 25 April 1978: see our ch. 
8. 
77 Elleinstein. Une certaine idee du communisme. p. 67. 
78 Paul Laurent, Le PCF comme il est: entretien avec Roger Faivre (Paris: Editions Sociales. 1978). pp. 
146-7; see our ch. 8. 
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attitude towards French communist dissidents,79 but which also proved relatively popular 
within the FCP, thus helping its leadership to marginalise intellectual dissidents.8o 
Second, by securing its power on a rigid and highly compartmentalized structure, 
the French Communist Party showed definite signs of sectarianism However, communist 
activists did believe that their party was opening up at the time of the 22nd Congress in 
1976. Tribunes of discussion were opened in the columns of L 'Humanite and the debate 
was very lively in the cells where communists talked about such matters as the 
abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat,8] thinking it could be useful and lead 
to something positive at the highest level of the hierarchy - although the decision to 
abandon the concept had already been taken unilaterally by Georges Marchais.82 
Unfortunately, communist activists were hiding themselves from reality for, as Althusser 
wrote: 
Le XXIr~ Congres [ ... ] ne changea en rien les pratiques de la direction. Car 
l'appareil avait deja fait la decouverte [ ... ] qu'il pouvait s'offrir Ie luxe de laisser 
les militants discuter librement dans leurs cellules, sans exclusion ni sanction, 
puisque de toute fac;on c;a ne tirait pas a consequence: '<;a leur fait tellement 
plaisir et c;a nous coilte si peu', fait dire Chamfort a une marquise genereuse de 
h 83 ses c armes. 
It was naive to think that the Party leadership could have changed so rapidly, for even 
79 See following chapters. 
80 See chapters 2 and 8. 
81 Barak, Fractures au PCF, pp. 13-4; Jean, La singularite d'etre communiste, p. 74: 'II nous semblait 
n' avoir jamais rencontre tant de camarades differents, entendu tant de propos nouveaux, senti passe 
un souffle si neuf..'; see our ch. 5. 
82 George Ross, 'The PCF and the End of the Bolshevik Dream', The Politics of Eurocommunism: 
Socialism in Transition, ed. by Carl Boggs and David Plotke (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 39; see 
our ch. 5. 
83 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste'. Le Monde, 26 April 1978; cf. Jean 
Rony, 'La discipline sterilisante', in Duhamel and Weber, Changer Ie PC?, p. 57; Barak. Fractures 
au PCF, pp. 13-4. 
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the tribunes of discussion were strictly controlled. Indeed, if a communist activist 
contradicted decisions taken by Party leaders, his arguments were automatically 
destroyed by many other communists who preferred to follow the imposed line.84 This 
was a very clever means of action on the part of the Leadership as it achieved two 
objectives. First, it did away with the criticisms coming from intellectual dissidents that 
Party leaders did not listen enough to their activists. Second, it helped convince the vast 
majority of communists that the decisions taken by the Central Committee were right and 
well-founded. The dissidents were thus marginalized85 - which made the Leadership 
look certainly victorious, but also intransigent and over-controlling. However, Party 
leaders did not see things from this angle. 
Talking to Althusser, Georges Marchais admitted that '[les ouvriers] ne veulent 
pas parler', 86 and Paul Laurent echoed him by noting that: 
On exprime ses idees, ses propositions dans sa cellule, mais on ne les transmet 
pas encore assez au Comite Central. Cela arrive de plus en plus souvent, mais il 
est certainement vrai que de bonnes idees se perdent encore et c'est dommage.87 
If the intentions of Party leaders seemed to be good at first sight, the fact remains that 
under cover of a permanent democratic concern, they hid themselves from reality. The 
Leadership could have, by contrast, turned the problem upside down: instead of blaming 
the activists at the grass roots, it could have looked closer at its own actions, as it was 
precisely here and not anywhere else that there was a blockage. Indeed, only opinions 
that echoed those of the Central Committee were taken into account. If an activist 
84 Conseil National du PCF (9 et 10 fevrier 1980), Les intellectuels, la culture et I 'avancee 
democratique au socialisme (proje! de resolution), (L 'Humanite, 11 December 1979). 
85 See ch. 8. 
86 Althusser, Proje! de livre sur Ie communisme, unpublished manuscripts. 
87 Laurent, Le PCF comme il est, p. 106; cf J-P. Gaudard in Andre Harris and Alain de Sedouy, Voyage 
a I 'interieur du Parti Communiste (Paris: Le Seuil, 1974), p. 51. 
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expressed an original idea, then the Party's educational machine swiftly responded.88 The 
activist was forced to repent his heresy. He had to be convinced that the arguments put 
forward by the Leadership were the right ones.89 Therefore, in front of such a 
demonstration of strength, the 'heretic' could only retreat into silence. He was 
condemned to silence by a Party which feared losing control over the mass of its 
activists, and by Party leaders who had to be right.90 By demonstrating such sectarianism, 
the Leadership forgot that in order for a party to move forward, ideas should constantly 
be renewed.91 Otherwise the party moves backwards or, at best, stands still. 
Contrary to what Marchais thought, permanent discussion in no way paralysed 
action.92 In fact, it was precisely by constantly confronting the ideas of everyone that 
new solutions could have been found93 not only to current problems, but also to future 
ones, as debate favours the anticipation of forthcoming events. The FCP was admittedly 
not a debating society animated by a leader who would play the role of referee.94 
However, if the Leadership had genuinely wanted to rally all its activists into action, then 
it would have delegated some of its powers by encouraging creativity and initiative at the 
grass roots. The Party would have overcome sterile ideas by recognising the right to 
differences in opinion,95 by objectively analysing criticisms stemming from communist 
activists, and by drawing conclusions from these.96 It was only under these conditions 
88 Lavau, A quoi sert Ie Parti Communiste Franr.;ais?, p. 202. 
89 Parmelin, Liberez les communistes!, p. 83. 
90 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Ie Monde, 26 April 1978. 
91 Jean Kanapa, 'Le debat dans Ie mouvement communiste', Le Monde, 3 January 1977. 
92 Georges Marchais, Avancer sur la voie du 27 Congres (rapport presente au Comite Central des 26, 
27 et 28 avril 1978); it is worth noting that Marchais contradicted what he wrote in Le deft 
democratique (Paris: Grassel, 19 73), p. 199. 
93 Althusser, Les vaches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
94 Laurent 'Centralisme democratique: tenir les deux termes', p. 2: 'Le parti communiste n'est pas un 
club ou s'af'frontent des opinions fondamentalement opposees'; cf 'Preserver et developper la vie 
democratique du parti - Resolution du Bureau Politique du PCF', L 'Humanite, 20 May 1978; see our 
ch.2. 
95 See ch. 2 and conclusion. 
96 Piraux, 'Pour une democratie revolutionnaire', pp. 23-6. 
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that democratic centralism could have assumed its true meaning, 97 and that the 
Leadership could have got closer both to its grass roots and to the masses as a whole for. 
as Althusser wrote, 
qui dit rapport d' auto rite hierarchique dit forcement non seulement distance, 
coupure entretenue entre l'appareil et les militants, mais aussi distance et coupure 
entre Ie parti et les masses.98 
And it was precisely this relationship with the masses that the Party put at stake by being 
so sectarian. 
Contrary to what the Leadership thought, communist intellectuals did not make 
criticisms for the sake of attacking what Party leaders described as the 'permanently 
besieged fortress,99 from the outside. If Elleinstein and Althusser denounced both the 
monolithism and the regimentation of their Party, it was precisely because they saw in 
these two characteristics a sign of immobility. Indeed, by cutting itself from the grass 
roots, the Leadership also cut itself from daily realities: if communist workers, white-
collar employees and intellectuals were permanently in touch with the outside world, for 
their part Party leaders only evolved in the high stratospheres of insider politics. Thus, at 
the level of what was lived and experienced by each communist, a great gulf opened up 
between the activists from the grass roots and the Party leadership. On one side there 
were those who did not hesitate to mix with non-communists on an everyday basis, who 
talked to them and who not only knew but also shared their problems. On the other side 
was the Party leadership which locked itself up in its Ivory Tower and refused to open 
97 Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme, pp. 66, 93; Lettre ouverte aux fram;ais sur fa 
Repub/ique du Programme Commun (Paris: Albin Michel, 1977), pp. 93-4. 
98 Althusser, Projet de texte de fa cellule Paul Langevin, unpublished manuscripts. 
99 Meaning the Fep itself. 
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the door to reality by only thinking in terms of classes, of good and evil, of for and 
against. If you were not for the French Communist Party, then you were automatically 
against it. But it was precisely this 'fonne de pensee manicheenne' 100 which distanced the 
Party from the masses. Indeed, by withdrawing into itself, it cut itself off from the people 
who, if the FCP could have offered a truly democratic image in a period of revival of the 
Left, would have taken up membership of the Party, would have rallied to the communist 
cause and would have voted accordingly.101 The zone of influence of the Party could 
only have been greater as a result. 102 
Therefore, what the Party could have done in the 1970s was to fit into a new 
dynamic. It could have accepted debate and criticism in order to regenerate, on a 
perpetual basis, both its ideas and its approach to daily reality. It could have gone out of 
the immobility which sterilised its actions and prevented it from going forward. In fact, at 
the end of the 1970s, it was the Party's existence itselfwhich started to be at stake in the 
long run, for if the Party could not evolve and thus adapt to social change,103 it was 
bound to be disappear as a credible political force. 104 
To conclude, by expressing criticism of democratic centralism, intellectual dissidents 
such as Althusser and Elleinstein rang alarm bells in the French Communist Party: 
communist activists did not flourish in their Party and too few new members came to 
replace the mass of those leaving. In this context, Althusser addressed himself to the 
leaders of the FCP by writing that: '[II faut] revoir entierement les principes 
d'organisation du [ ... ] parti communiste. Les fonnes sont vieilles et caduques [ ... ] [les] 
100 Althusser. 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 25 April 1978. 
101 Gerard Belloin, Nos reves camarades (Paris: Seuil, 1979), p. 180. 
102 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le ;\fonde, 28 April 1978; cf. 
Parmelin, Liberez les communistes!, p. 265. 
1m See ch. 4. 
104 See conclusion. 
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resultats [sont] epouvantables.' 105 Elleinstein agreed fully with him when he declared: 
'L'important [ ... ] c'est de changer radicalement Ie systeme et d'abandonner des pratiques 
qui remontent aux ages archeologiques de la vie du Parti .. 106 There was, therefore. a 
consensus between these two intellectuals who, by expressing criticisms, only reflected 
the internal crisis undergone by the Party. Indeed, the actions of Elleinstein and Althusser 
were far from being isolated: other activists also attacked their Leadership publicly by 
writing to newspapers, by signing petitions, and by rebelling in their cells. Consequently, 
the crisis was general l07 and it found its roots in the monolithism and the regimentation 
of the French Communist Party. 
What the activists desperately wanted was to democratise the Party and to be 
able to take a deep breath of fresh air inside it. Because they loved their party so much, 
they devoted themselves to it, keeping quiet and enduring stoically the authority of the 
Leadership. It was precisely because they cherished their Party that they did not want to 
see it sink. On the contrary, they wanted to see it sail ahead, go further and further again 
at full steam in order to carry the flag of hope for all communists. In this context, the 
French Communist Party could have overcome the barrier of democratic centralism by 
listening to what the activists had to say, by analysing their views and by drawing the 
appropriate lessons from their criticisms. The FCP could have undergone a fundamental 
process of democratisation. However, contrary to what Elleinstein and Althusser 
thought, it was not by democratising democratic centralism that things were going to 
change - dictatorial practices were too deep rooted, and when an edifice cracks on all 
sides, there is no point fixing it by patching it up here and there. What the Party could 
have done, by contrast, was to follow the route marked out at the 22nd Congress of 
105 Louis Althusser, Lettre d'Althusser de Grece, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, ALT2.A28-03.01 to .07, 
unpublished manuscripts. 
106 Elleinstein, lls vous trompent, camarades!, p. 115. 
107 Berger, 'La forteresse lezardee', 29. 
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1976. After abandoning the dictatorship of the proletariat,108 it could have dispensed 
with democratic centralisml09 and reinvented itself on the basis of new principles of 
internal organisation that corresponded to the aspirations of all communist activists. 110 
But for Party leaders, and particularly for the FCP's General Secretary Georges 
Marchais, it was not that easy - if not completely out of the question. 
According to recent evidence published in The Mitrokhin Archive, III the KGB 
was determined not to let Georges Marchais open up the Party any further by continuing 
on the route which was paved at the 22nd Congress. Enough was enough. The USSR 
had already witnessed the rise of Eurocommunism and the abandonment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat in France and Italy, I 12 it could not afford to lose any more 
control over some Western Communist Parties and to have its zone of influence in 
Western Europe greatly reduced. It was in this context that the Soviet Union had to cut 
back the margin of manoeuvre of Marchais by the end of 1976. In an interview with Ie 
Nouvel Observateur, Christopher Andrew declared that 'Ie KGB a serieusement envisage 
de faire publier les documents sur Ie passe de Marchais [en tant que travailleur volontaire 
dans une usine] en Allemagne pendant la guerre'. 113 If these revelations had come from 
non communist sources, they would have been deemed as pure anti-communist 
propaganda. But coming from the homeland of socialism, a country which exercised a 
tight financial, ideological and strategic control over the FCP, these revelations had to be 
taken seriously, for the CPSU could have 'replaced' Marchais by a more conservative 
and docile man. This is why Georges Marchais had to walk straight, and this is why the 
108 See ch. 5. 
109 The FCP gave up democratic centralism in 1993. 
lID See further and see conclusion. 
III Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (London: Penguin, 1999). 
112 See ch. 5. 
113 Christopher Andrew. interview of, 'Le KGB en France', Ie Nouvel Observateur, 23-29 September 
1999, p. 145; cf. Althusser, Sur la mort du PCF (Mort et survie du PCF), (l98~-83?), Paris, IMEC, 
fond Althusser, AL T2.A29-01.05, unpublished manuscripts: 'Tout ce beau monde vit sous la 
direction d'un Georges Marchais tenu par les sovietiques et ses propres camarades pour avoir eu un 
jour vingt ans et avoir commis la bevue de partir dans la production de guerre allemande.' 
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French Communist Party could not reinvent itself on the basis of new principles of 
internal organisation - that is until the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989 and the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
The FCP paved the way for a 'new' Communist Party little by little in the 1990s. 
Instead of Stalinist practices, the Party implemented new democratic reforms. Instead of 
democratic centralism, it opted for '1a souverainete des communistes'. 114 Instead of a 
pyramidal internal organisation, it substituted a more horizontal approach. liS Paul 
Lespagnol, a member of the National Committee, thus declared at the 30th Party 
Congress which was held in March 2000: 
[II faut] sortir de la logique 'pyramidale', d'une direction se cooptant et se 
recooptant sans cesse [ ... ]. Nous voulons desacraliser encore la fonction de 
dirigeant [ ... ]. L'experimentation proposee [ ... ] va permettre aux communistes 
"d'· I ~ d· d d· . 116 eux-memes mventer es .Lormes e VIe enos rrectIons. 
This was precisely what Althusser and Elleinstein had demanded in the 1970s. 
114 281: Congres, Rapport de fa commission sur fes statuts (rapport presente par Francette Lazard) suivi 
de Les statuts du PCF (St-Quen, 25-29 January 1994); see our ch. 2. 
115 301: Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites (textes adoptes par Ie 3(/ 
Congres), (Martigues, 23-26 March 2000). 
116 Paul Lespagnol quoted in L 'Humanite, 27 March 2000, pp. 8-9. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Trends and tendencies 
or the risk of factionalism within the FCP 
In the 1990s the French Communist Party underwent a fundamental and unprecedented 
transfonnation by looking closely at its past and by questioning its Stalinist practices. 
This extensive transfonnation was carried out in three successive stages. The first stage 
was marked by the opening up of the FCP to the outside world, the second by the 
abandonment of democratic centralism, and the third by the recognition of the diversity 
of opinion of the communists activists. 
First, perestroika - meaning the politics of restructuring led in the USSR by 
Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985 to 1991 - catalysed the transfonnation of the Party into 
a 'new FCP,.l This strategy of modernisation and the opening up of the Soviet Union to 
the rest of the world had, as direct consequences, not only the collapse of the Eastern 
bloc,2 but also the dismantling of the USSR3 and the resulting overthrow of the CPSU 
with the arrival of Boris Yeltsin in power. 4 This blatant failure of socialism, in countries 
which were used for so long as models by the French Communist party,5 allowed 
Georges Marchais to express his opinion about these so called socialist regimes in an 
open way - and no longer in private.6 This experience led Party leaders to reach 
1 2ge Congres, La politique du Parti Communiste Fran9ais (document adopte par Ie 2rj Congres) , 
(Arche de la Defense, 18-22 December 1996); report also published in L 'Humanite, 23 December 
1996. 
2 Cf. the fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989, the end of the communist regime in Hungary on .23 
October 1989, the nomination of a non-communist Prime Minister coming from Solidarnosc in Poland 
in 1989 and the overthrow ofCeausescu's dictatorial regime in Romania in December 1989. 
3 On 8 Decem ber 1991. 
-l M. Gorbachev had to resign on 25 December 1991. 
5 See ch. 6. 
6 Andrew, Christopher, and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (London: Penguin, 1999), see 
chapter 18 on Eurocommunism. 
37 
conclusions which were beyond reproach: 'L 'experience historique enseigne qu'aucune 
transformation sociale ne peut s'effectuer en faveur du peuple qui ne soit decidee, 
maitrisee, controlee par celui-ci.' 7 The General Secretary of the Party could thus act 
freely as from 1991 in order to pursue the strategy of 'socialism in the colours of 
France', which he had advocated in the 1970s. He was able to distance the FCP from the 
former socialist bloc and to launch it on a new trajectory. In that sense, Georges 
Marchais gave his Party the new impetus which it had needed for so long and which was 
so vigorously demanded by dissident communists in the 1970s. 
However, if it is certain that Marchais really wanted to open up the Party to the 
outside world in order to integrate it more effectively into French society, it is 
nonetheless true that the FCP's transformation was accelerated by the collapse of 
socialism in Eastern Europe. In fact, at that time, pressures exercised in order to change 
the Party became external. They were no longer internal as in the 1970s, when 
communist dissidents such as Althusser and Elleinstein sparked a wave of discontent. 8 In 
that sense, the intensive media coverage of the 1989 events opened the eyes of a great 
majority of communist activists who clearly saw that their Party had to undergo a 
fundamental mutation in order to distance itself from socialism as applied in the former 
eastern bloc. In that respect an activist declared that: 
La fin du bloc de l'Est, la chute du mur de Berlin ont completement bouleverse 
les choses [ ... J. Tout a coup on s'est apen;u qu'on n'avait pas toujours raison. On 
avait affirme des choses qui s' etaient averees fausses par la suite [ ... ]. Le Parti 
communiste n'a pas pu s'emanciper tant qu'on a trame ce fardeau. 9 
7 2ge Congres, La politique du Parti Communiste Fran9ais. 
8 See ch. 1. 
9 Mme Charmont, interviewed by myself on 28 July 1998; see our ch. 6. 
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However, if the transformation of the FCP came rather late, it is to Marchais" credit that 
he prepared the ground for Robert Hue, his successor at the head of the Party in January 
1994. 
Robert Hue was elected as the new leader of the French Communist Party at the 
28th Congress of the Party.1O If Hue placed his men in key positions within the different 
levels of authority of the FCP, and ifhe distanced his style from that of his predecessor, 
he nevertheless knew how to pursue the politics of modernisation launched by Marchais. 
The 29th Congress of the FCP, which was held in December 1996, thus went back to the 
precepts laid at the 22nd Congress of the Party I I with a delay of twenty years exactly -
the irony being that it is never too late to do the right thing, as the party usually reacts 
twenty years too late12 - by declaring that 'a:ffirmer la modernite communiste implique 
que la retlexion soit poursuivie sur ce qui s'est passe au nom du communisme et sur les 
empreintes du stalinisme sur notre pro pre histoire.' 13 
An analysis of major events which shook the FCP in the 1970s was therefore 
drawn up. If we go back to this decade, we can see that the 1970s were not only marked 
by the signature of the Common Programme with the Socialist party in 1972,14 which 
demonstrated a common will to conquer power, but also by a crisis. This period of crisis 
was interpreted by the Communist Party as an economic, political and social crisis 
marking the limits and the potential end of capitalism. It is in this context that class 
struggle was truly meaningful: with its intensification, it allowed the Communist Party to 
play its role of enlightened guide to the popular masses. 15 Under the aegis of Georges 
Marchais, the leadership of the Party thus tightened its ranks. All communist activists had 
10 St-Ouen, 25-29 January 1994. 
11 St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976. 
12 By reference to Khruschev's report (1956), in which he denounced Stalin's crimes and personality 
cult, and to the FCP's destalinisation in 1976. 
13 2ge Congres, La politique du Parti Communiste Franc;ais. 
14 See ch. 7. 
15 See ch. 4. 
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to form a bloc behind their leadership. No criticism was permitted, under the pretext that 
it served the game of the bourgeoisie, and no faux pas was tolerated for fear of being 
sent away from the party.16 Unity at any cost was thus the key word within the FCP. 
Nothing other than a Marxist-Leninist ideology riddled with Stalinism could cement this 
unity which sterilised Party life, for as Althusser put it, 'si Ie parti est vivant, son unite 
sera contradictoire, et Ie parti sera unifie par une ideologie vivante, qui devra etre 
contradictoire, mais qui sera ouverte et feconde.' 17 However, at the end of the 1970s, 
this idea was not to the taste of the Party as its internal organisation - too central and 
not democratic enough, as we have just seen in the previous chapter - did not leave 
room for any manoeuvre. The 1990s were, in that respect, the decade in which theory 
broke free from these organisational constraints. 
Following a decision taken by the Central Committee ill September 1993, the 28th 
Congress of the FCP held in 1994 wiped away the principle of democratic centralism by 
replacing it with the concept of'souverainete des communistes' 18. Born under a new sign 
imposed by Robert Hue, '[un homme] d'une autre generation, eloigne des jeux de 
pouvoir interne ret] denue de toute sensibilite d'apparatchik',19 this Congress was 
memorable because of its content. It was indeed the only one in nearly twenty years to 
answer at last expectations from communist activists and to insert itself fully into the new 
Eurocommunist line set by the 22nd Congress of the Party in 1976.20 Francette Lazard 
underlined that matter in the successive reports she presented to the Central Committee 
on 29 September 1993 and to the Commission on Status in January 1994: 
16 See ch. 8. 
17 Louis Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 17 April 1978. 
18 28e Congres, Les statuts du PCF (St-Ouen, 25-29 January 1994); See our ch. I. 
19 Pascal Virot, 'Le Parti communiste a fait son autocritique en novembre, mais aucune victime de purge 
ne souhaite revenir. Les exclus du PCF refusent la main tendue de Hue', Liberation, 30 December 
1998, p. 2. 
20 See ch. I. 
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La decision prise en 1976 a propos de la dictature du proletariat a ouvert une 
nouvelle page. II appartient aux communistes d'elaborer eux-memes toute leur 
politique, dans toutes ses dimensions [ ... ].21 II n'est plus question, comme avec Ie 
centralisme democratique, de subordination des organisations au 'centre' et 
d'obligation d'application. II [ ... J est question de souverainete des adherents et de 
promotion de leurs capacites d'initiative, en toute responsabilite individuelle et 
co llective. 22 
Finally launched on this new trajectory, and remammg faithful to its willingness to 
democratise its internal organisation, the French Communist Party decided to take a new 
step at its 29th Congress in 1996.23 The Party officially recognised that 'la diversite des 
communistes est une realite non seulement toleree, acceptee, mais [aussiJ revendiquee 
. h ,24 comme une fIC esse. 
It is therefore certain that this step ahead was a historic moment in the life of the 
Communist Party in the sense that any activist is now apparently free to think and 
express himself in all honesty.25 Currents of ideas, which were advocated by Elleinstein in 
the 1970s, are theoretically accepted - but as always with a delay of twenty years. 26 
However, the French Communist Party still categorically refuses to consider Althusser's 
demand for a right to create tendencies within the Party. In that sense, the Party does not 
push its logic to its own conclusion. In the eyes of Party leaders, it is one thing to 
acknowledge tactically what a dissident like Elleinstein demanded, but it is another 
21 2St! Congres, Rapport de la commission sur les statuts (rapport presente par Francette Lazard) suivi 
de Les statuts du PCF (St-Quen, 25-29 January 1994). 
22 Francette Lazard, Rapport introductif au Comite Central des 28, 29 et 30 septembre 1993 suivi de La 
discussion (L 'Humanite, 29 September 1993). 
23 The 29th Congress of the FCP was held at the Arche de la Defense from IS to 22 December 1996. 
24 29t! Congres, La politique du Parti Communiste Fram;ais. 
25 Jacques Chambaz, Realites et strategie: Ie PCF. une demarche nouvelle (Paris: Messidor/Editions 
Sociales, 1990), p 154. 
20 By reference to Khruschev's report (1956), in which he denounced Stalin's crimes and personality 
cult, and to the FCP's destalinisation in 1976. 
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matter to take Althusser's point of view into account. If the FCP went back on its past 
errors, the Party still refuses to talk, to mention or even to make an allusion to the 
dissidents who were active in the 1970s - they could have been right. In the 1990s, we 
could thus see the same pattern being drawn up as in the 1970s. On the one hand we had 
the Party, which was ready to open itself up, and Elleinstein who wanted to move 
carefully towards a system of internal organisation animated by currents of ideas. And on 
the other hand we had Althusser who pushed the logic further than ever by demanding 
the recognition of the right to create tendencies. 
The first part of this chapter on the right to form tendencies in the 1970s 
establishes the positions of the Party as well as those of Elleinstein. The second part 
throws into relief the theory which Althusser developed in his unpublished manuscripts 
whose titles are Les vaches noires, Sur la mort du PCF and Projet de livre sur Ie 
. 27 
commumsme. 
According to Marxist-Leninist thought, the Party must be perfectly unified around its 
leadership in order to secure the coherence of its action in a context of class struggle. 
The role of the Party is therefore to guide the masses towards communism with the help 
of 'revolutionary' intellectuals who are here to educate and enlighten all those who 
believe in this cause with their knowledge.28 Intellectuals thus occupy a key position, 
although they do not have any real authority as the Party leadership centralises all 
decisions, and consequently all the power.29 It is only too true for, as we have just seen 
in the previous chapter, the Stalinist deviation strengthened the leadership of the FCP by 
giving it the keys of supreme knowledge in the name of a so-called scientific and 
n Documents held in the achives of the lMEC (Institut de la Memoire de I"Edition Contemporaine, 
Paris). 
28 Vladimir Ilitch Lenin, Que faire? French translation (Paris: Librairie de I"Humanite, 1915), pp. 31, 
76, 142; see our ch. 3. 
29 See ch. 1. 
irrefutable socialism. The role which should have been played by communist intellectuals 
was thus wiped away: not only could they not think freely, but they also had to ratifY 
blindly the decisions of the Leadership.30 Any criticism was going against the Party·s 
interests and played into the hands of the bourgeoisie, and by expressing such criticisms, 
dissidents like Althusser and Elleinstein were accused of creating factions within the 
Party. Publicly condemned in this French version of the Moscow trials,31 dissidents were 
subjected to the wrath of the Party. But when Althusser started demanding the right to 
create tendencies within the French Communist Party, the storm blowing around the 
communist dissidents worsened. The FCP certainly knew how to brandish its two most 
cutting arguments in order to crush Althusser's demands. The first one consisted in the 
looming spectre of a Communist Party stuffed with so-called bourgeois elements and the 
second one, which was also the more apocalyptic argument, warned all communists 
against the weakening and the subsequent splitting up of the Party. 
First, the leaders of the French Communist Party were particularly keen to apply 
the little phrase launched by Lenin who argued that 'la "liberte de critique" est 
effectivement [ ... ] la liberte de faire penetrer dans Ie socialisme les idees et les elements 
de la bourgeoisie. ,32 In fact, in a context of class struggle, exacerbated both by the 
increasing popularity of the Union of the Left33 and by social divisions that were 
becoming deeper in a period of crisis,34 this 'liberte de critique' endangered the 
seemingly unshakeable unity of the Party around its leadership. And according to Party 
leaders, it could have been all too real if the movements of discontent raised by Althusser 
and Elleinstein in the 1970s had taken the form of tendencies which were advocated by 
30 See ch. 3. 
31 See ch. 8. 
~~ Lenin, Quefaire?, pp. 4-5. 
33 Number of seats obtained at legislative elections - 1973: FCP 73 and SP 89; 1978: FCP 86 and SP 
102; cf Maurice Larkin, France since the Popular Front (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 335, 
350. 
34 See ch. 4. 
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our philosopher.35 However, the point was that the FCP could not in any way be diverted 
from its prime objective, meaning the institution of a 'tricolour' socialism in France by 
crushing the bourgeoisie democratically and by conquering power. The Party had thus to 
concentrate all its efforts on this unique objective. In this context, it could not afford to 
scatter its resources uselessly by fighting on two fronts: on the external one raised by 
class struggle and on the internal one mounted by communist dissidents. The Party could 
even have fought on numerous fronts if dissidents had managed to organise themselves 
into tendencies. As in any orderly battle, there was no way the FCP could scatter its 
forces for this would have risked strengthening the class adversary. On the contrary, the 
Party had to unify and concentrate all its resources around its objective. Althusser 
confirmed this by writing that 'l'essence de [1'] unite [de l'organisation de lutte des 
classes] [est] une unite politique [ ... ] [qui] ne peut etre qu'une unite de pensee [ ... ]. Cela 
veut dire que Ie parti ne peut non plus etre soumis it une contrainte interne. ,36 In that 
sense, the very claim for a larger expression within the Party, or even for an official 
recognition of the currents of ideas put forward by Elleinstein and - worst of all - of 
the tendencies advocated by Althusser, was completely vain. In fact, French communist 
leaders were too afraid to see the very comfortable position they occupied in the Party 
put in jeopardy by well targeted criticisms which potentially could have become more 
and more popular with communist activists. Party leaders thus retreated behind the 
unavoidable, implacable and resolutely convincing argument: tendencies play into the 
hands of the class adversary. All the weapons were pointed at those who, like Althusser, 
dared to go further than the simple idea of enlarging the discussion within the Party by 
35 Ecole elementaire du PCF, La crise de la societe jranc;aise, la democratie avancee et Ie socialisme, 
I 'union du peuple jranc;ais, Ie role d'avant-garde du parti communiste, pp. 9~-7. 
36 Louis Althusser, Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Ie malaise du 2l' congres). Paris, IMEC, 
fond Althusser, ALT2.A24-01.01/02 to -02.01, unpublished manuscripts~ cf Georges Labica, an 
Althusserien, 'Pour des pratiques nouvelles', in Olivier Duhamel and Henri Weber, Changer Ie PC? 
(Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1979), p. 97 and Etienne Balibar. another Althusserien, 'La 
responsabilite des communistes', Dialectiques, no. 23 (1978), .25. 
.+4 
talking about the right to create tendencies outside the FCP's columns, meaning in the 
so-called bourgeois press. 
The argument developed by the Party leadership was extremely brutal for all 
intellectual dissidents as it invoked the deepest class instincts of communist activists. In 
fact, according to the leaders of the French Communist Party, when Althusser and his 
followers put forward the simple notion of tendencies, they were acting not only in order 
to 'detourner une partie [du] potentiel [du Parti] vers un combat politique interne' /7 but 
also to infiltrate bourgeois ideas inside the FCP. On that matter, Marchais declared: 
L'instauration dans notre parti de courants et de tendances [ ... ] ruinerait sa vie 
democratique [ ... ] Ie transformerait en champs clos de rivalites personnelles et de 
querelles de clans qui donneraient it l'adversaire de classe des moyens reves pour 
manipuler des communistes contre d' autres et de peser sur nos decisions.38 
In that sense, the underground revolutionary fight, which was surrounded by suspicion 
and which was led by Lenin at the beginning of the last century, left a deep imprint on the 
whole history of the French Communist Party. Thus, in the 1970s, a general mistrust 
shrouded the Party. There was a permanent and latent doubt as to what real ideas and 
intentions were among communist activists for, in this counter-society39 fighting 
endlessly against the bourgeoisie, every Party member was an object of suspicion in the 
eyes of other comrades - real camaraderie, in the initial sense of the term, was 
practically non-existent. Once more, this theory was justified by Marxist-Leninist theory 
37 Gilbert Berez, letter addressed by, 'Intelleetuel, eontestataire, done eommuniste', L 'Humanite, 14 June 
1978~ ef. Regis Debray, Lettre ouverte aux communistes jranfais el a quelques autres (Paris: Seuil, 
1978), p 176~ Ronald Tiersky, 'Le PCF, parti du passe ou parti d'avenir', in Duhamel and Weber, 
Changer Ie PC? , pp. 239-40. 
38 Georges Marehais quoted in Christian Colombani, 'M. Marehais: nous ne souhaitons, nous ne voulons 
exclure personne', Le Monde, 6 June 1978. 
39 Expression used, among others, by Annie Kriegel. 
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according to which the bourgeoisie might infiltrate, 'contaminate' and destroy the Party 
at any time. 
However, the class instinct was also very much alive inside the French 
Communist Party because of internal pressures sparked voluntarily by Party leaders. By 
accusing intellectual dissidents of playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie, the FCP 
leadership set working class activists, who either could acquire or had puppet powers 
inside the Party, against the thinking minority. Marchais thus went into the attack one 
more time by raising the standard of I 'ouvrierisme and by addressing himself to the 
bourgeois press he denigrated so much, and which could not be used by Party members 
others than FCP leaders for fear of being accused offactionalism.40 He declared: 
Les tendances, ou les tentatives pour creer des tendances, la negation du role des 
directions elues et responsables it tous les niveaux, Ie refus oppose dans les faits 
aux ouvriers de devenir permanents, ne pourraient que diviser et affaiblir notre 
parti, paralyser sa vie democratique et son efficacite.41 
We therefore can see very well that the Party called for the straight forward opposition 
between workers and intellectuals in order to eradicate the notion of tendencies. 
However, as we will see later on, I 'ouvrierisme was not the best strategy adopted by the 
Party. Far from that indeed. And in fact, regarding tendencies, awakening the class 
instinct of communist activists was not even the most dangerous weapon held by the 
leaders of the Communist Party against intellectual dissidents. The Party's most lethal 
weapon was of another kind, and it was pointed at those who, like Althusser. were 
40 Marchais interviewed on Antenne 2, Question de Temps, 9 August 1978, and quoted in 'Comprendre 
pour construire I'union - Le texte complet des reponses de Georges Marchais it I'emission 
d'Antenne 2. Questions de Temps', L 'Humanite, II August 1978. 
41 23e Congres, Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comite Central prf;;Stll/lt; par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 9-13 May 1979). 
.+6 
actively in favour of the right to create tendencies. 
The FCP's heavy artillery was deployed in the late 1970s because Party leaders 
saw a faction in each tendency. They feared the fragmentation of the Party which would 
consequently lose its influence in French society. In that sense, a communist activist was 
right to say that 'on pousse les extremes en agitant Ie spectre de la scission, du 
fractionnisme qui porterait atteinte it l'integrite du Parti' .42 In fact, FCP leaders rejected 
categorically the right to create tendencies because they feared that they might not be 
able to control and to dominate such movements. That was the reason why they 
brandished the spectre of factionalism in the same way one uses a lucky charm to ward 
off evil spirits. 
According to Party leaders such as Georges Marchais, Paul Laurent and Jean 
Kanapa, tendencies could split up the French Communist Party into '[des] chapelles' led 
by '[des] chefs de fiefs', 43 and theses 'luttes autochthones ,44 aimed at conquering power 
were diverting the Party from its real battle.45 The FCP's action was thus paralysed 
precisely when the Union of the Left could potentially have catapulted the Party into 
power and have lead it to socialism in the colours of France. In this context Georges 
Marchais, who saw looming behind any criticism not only a tendency, but also a faction, 
did not mince his words by ordering 'rune] ferme riposte politique [du] 
Parti' .46 Intellectual dissidents had to keep quiet, as otherwise the Party's steamroller 
42 Charles Piraux, 'Pour une democratie revolutionnaire', Luttes et debats, January 1979, p. 26. 
43 Paul Laurent quoted in France Nouvelle, 6 June 1977; cf. Roland Leroy, La quete du bonheur (Paris: 
Grasset, 1995), p. 213. 
44 Jean Kanapa, 'Favoriser l'apparition de valeurs morales nouvelles', Le Monde, 10 June 1976; see also 
Kanapa quoted in France Nouvelle, 26 January 1976, p. 11; Georges Marchais, Le deft democratique 
(Paris: Grasset, 1973), pp. 201-2. 
-15 'Preserver et developper la vie democratique du parti - Resolution du Bureau Politique du PCF', 
answer of the Political Bureau to the text of the 300 signatories (petition of Aix-en-Provence, 19 May 
1978), in L 'Humanite, 20 May 1978, ,and quoted in Michel Barak, Fractures au PCF - Des 
communistes par/ent (Aix-en-Provence: EDISUD; Paris: Karthala, 1980), annexe; cf. Henri Malberg, 
'Le mecanisme de la tendance', France Nouvelle, 5 June 1978, p. 9; Jacques Denis, a member of the 
FCP's Central Committee, 'Sur I'eurocommunisme et les relations europeennes', Cahiers dll 
Commllnisme. no . .f (April 1978). 103. 
-16 Georges Marchais quoted in 'Renforcer notre Parti en qualite et en quantite - Les reponses de G. 
Marchais aux joumalistes', L 'Humanite, 22 June 1978. 
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would crush them. 
However, there is a misunderstanding. If organised tendencies could theoretically 
lead to factions, which could have greatly harmed the Party's unity, this fear was less 
justified than FCP leaders thought, as neither Elleinstein nor Althusser talked about 
organising behind them such tendencies. Althusser sharply denied being "Ie dirigeant 
occulte [d'une] "frange d'intellectuels" rebelle' ,47 and Elleinstein preferred not to engage 
too much in the debate and to opt for a 'majority of ideas,48 which would render the 
debate more flexible by finding common ground on certain pointS.49 This latter idea 
seemed to be a good one insofar as it could have established a compromise between the 
unshakeable monolithism of the Party leadership and the desire expressed by intellectual 
dissidents to open up discussion within the FCP. These currents of ideas could also have 
encouraged livelier and broader debates within the Party by developing the confrontation 
of opinions expressed by communist activists. 50 As a consequence, the rigid organisation 
of the FCP could have been broken down.51 However, it was vain to hide from reality: 
Elleinstein juggled with words, as under the cover of 'majority of ideas', or currents of 
ideas, he laid the notion of tendencies. 
If on the one hand it was right to say that organised tendencies tore apart the 
debate and ineluctably led to the creation of factions, on the other hand it was also true 
that simple tendencies could have reflected the richness of diversity of opinions which, in 
the 1970s, were vegetating in a Party wiping off any trace of individualism in the name of 
unity of action and thought.52 It was thus in this context that Althusser's theory came to 
-17 Althusser, Les vaches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
48 Jean Elleinstein, 'L'avenir des communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 25 September 1978, p. 51; Jean 
Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme (Paris: Julliard, 1979), p. 66. 
-l9 Elleinstein, 'L'avenir des communistes', ibid, p. 51; cf Gerard Molina and Yves Vargas, Dialogue a 
I 'interieur du parti communiste jran9ais (Paris: Maspero, 1978), p 15. 
50 Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme, p. 66; Gerard Molina, "Sur un pluralisme interne au 
parti', La Nouvelle Critique, 1978, p. 13. . . . " . 
51 Gerard Molina and Yves Vargas, 'Des contradictIOns au sem du Part I , m Duhamel and Weber, 
Changer Ie PC?, p. 113. 
52 See ch. 1. 
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fruition, for as this philosopher said, 'il faut avoir Ie courage theorique et politique de 
reconnaitre non seulement la necessite, mais aussi Ie bien fonde et l' utilite des 
tendances. ,53 
The French Communist Party had a very Manichean way of conceiving society. On one 
side there was the bourgeois class, and on the other that of the proletariat which was 
unified around its Party leadership in this fierce class struggle. However, if this 
conception was right from a purely theoretical Marxist-Leninist point of view, dating 
back to the early twentieth century, it was not only outdated, but also completely false in 
the 1970s. Indeed, the FCP committed two major mistakes. 
First, any communist who did not have any working class ongms could 
potentially become a 'class enemy', hence the mistrust, or even the contempt shown by 
the Party towards communist intellectuals who, even as far back as the 1970s, were 
workers in their own way. The problem they thus faced was that intellectuals could not 
insert themselves fully into any group. As communists, they were repudiated by the 
bourgeois class. As intellectuals, they were suspected of being 'class enemies' by their 
own Party at the slightest slip. Their margin of manoeuvre was, therefore, extremely 
limited. In that context, the safest route to take was either to follow the Party leadership 
blindly, or to avoid any problem, as in the case of Ell einstein, and follow the FCP leaders 
while keeping their distance by opting for a 'majority of ideas'. The other alternative was 
to be bold like Althusser and be willing to create tendencies. If this latter solution was by 
far the most dangerous one, as the Party was ready to respond swiftly, it was also the 
real way ahead. Indeed, tendencies would have fully integrated communist intellectuals 
into a group in which they could have recognised themselves, and in which they could 
have evolved, while still being part of the FCP's organisation. Tendencies could have, 
53 Althusser, Les vaches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
.+9 
therefore, offered not only some kind of recognition to dissenting intellectuals, but also 
various platforms of reflection from which the Party could have gained in terms of the 
richness and the fruitfulness of internal debate. The diversity of opinion, which came to 
be recognised in the 1990s, could have found its meaningful sense two decades earlier 
inside such circles. 
Second, the FCP hid behind the narrow conception of ouvrierisme which 
politically only took workers into account, and which saw them as similar to the 
proletarians of Charlie Chaplin's Modern Times. 54 The Party thus left on the side not 
only communist intellectuals, but also all those who could not be labelled as workers. 
This was a terrible mistake because, in the race for power which took place in the 1970s 
- and against the Socialist Party to some extent55 - the French Communist Party could 
not afford to forget the great majority of its electorate. 56 It was committing political 
suicide to the advantage of the Socialist Party, which was both a partner and a rival, as it 
appealed to the same section of the French electorate as the Communist Party. 57 
Therefore, it would have been desirable for the FCP to move with the times, and insert 
itself into a post-industrial society in which the tertiary sector flourishes, while the 
number of industrial workers declines. In that sense, the Party could also have recognised 
fully the diversity of social origin of its members back in the 1970s.58 This diversity could 
have enriched the Party if communist activists had been able in practice to debate their 
ideas inside tendencies reflecting diverse viewpoints. However, this was precisely what 
the Communist Party refused to accept at that time. 
54 See ch. 4. 
55 See ch. 7. 
56 Percentage of votes in favour of the FCP in 1973 and 1978: fanners 13 and 9%, small shopkeepers 10 
and 14%, industrialistslhigh ranking executives/self-employed 6 and 9%, middle managementlwhite-
coIlar employees 17 and 18%, workers 37 and 36%, non-working population 20 and 17%, in Fran90is 
Platone, 'Les electorats legislatifs sous la Cinquieme Republique', ReVile Fran~aise de Science 
Politique, no. 42 (1992),306,310. 
57 Louis Althusser, Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, 
AL T2.A27-0 1.05, unpublished manuscripts. 
58 Louis Althusser, ]]" congr(\s (Paris: Maspero, 1977), pp. 63--L 
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The Party leadership was afraid of plurality of thought, be it reflected in 
tendencies or not, because it endangered the supreme knowledge of FCP leaders which 
allowed them to manipulate their activists like puppets. It questioned the power of the 
Leadership which allowed it to define unilaterally a precise political line by centralising 
excessively and by flouting any democratic principle. Thus, as Althusser put it, '[la] 
diversite [des communistes] est atomisee en une infinite d' opinions individuelles'. 59 
Internal debate was therefore completely frozen precisely when the richness of ideas 
could have animated it. Far from 'ruiner la vie democratique du Parti' ,60 the free 
confrontation of ideas could on the contrary have given internal debate the meaningful 
sense which had been lost over so many years as a result of the Stalinist practices used by 
the French Communist Party. But, as Althusser wrote, '[la seule fa<;on] de donner it cette 
diversite [ ... ] Ie moyen de s' exprimer [et] de se reconnaitre [ ... ], c' est d' admettre au 
grand jour, juridiquement, Ie droit aux tendances. ,61 In this context tendencies could have 
played two active roles. First, they could have helped to embrace all communists, and 
second they could have helped to recognise fully the currents of ideas which ran through 
the Party. 
The representation of all communists was essential in the sense that it could have 
given a voice to the minority of communists who felt they did not fit into the system of 
decision-making, on behalf of the majority, implemented by those who governed the 
Party. This system was indeed very perverse as the FCP leadership was free to act as a 
complete despot. Party leaders submitted their resolution schemes to Congresses, all 
Party executives ratified them unanimously, and all communists, without exception, had 
to apply them. Any minority of activists which abstained on a resolution was deemed to 
59 Althusser, Les l'aches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
60 Georges Marchais quoted in ColombanL 'M. Marchais: nous ne souhaitons, nous ne voulons exclure 
personne'. 
61 Althusser, Les l'Oches noires. unpublished manuscripts. 
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form a faction and thus to represent a danger to the Party. In principle, the problem was 
not to determine ifit was the majority or the minority of communists who were right, but 
rather to allow the minority to express itself, to put forward its arguments, to try to 
convince the others, and to overturn the majority.62 In practice, this right never 
questioned the position of Party leaders and factionalism was not on the agenda. On the 
contrary, the aim was to give a voice to all communists, so that they could recognise 
themselves in the decisions taken at the apex of the organisation, and to give democratic 
centralism its true meaning by making it more flexible. It was the only way currents of 
ideas could have met and parted on certain points, as Elleinstein expressed it. However, 
at the end of the 1970s, a very long road still lay ahead before such demands would be 
acknowledged. 
If the leadership of the Communist Party was in the 1990s prepared to talk about 
'diversity of opinions', it always saw a faction in every current of ideas and tendency,63 
thus mixing up the terminology in order to crush divergence even better. It is therefore 
necessary to define these terms precisely. Tendencies are the formal recognition of 
current of ideas which have always run through the Party. 
In the 1970s, dissidents were divided into the Althusseriens and the supporters of 
Elleinstein. However, what we must see is that by adopting these appellations, the Party 
strengthened the logic of its position. The Althusseriens had Althusser as their 'chef de 
file ,64 and the supporters of Elleinstein fell under the domination of the historian. 
Tendencies thus became organised around personalities who, according to Party leaders, 
could split up the FCP. In fact, communist leaders were afraid of seeing their dominant 
position questioned by so-called 'bourgeois' intellectuals. The way round this problem 
62 Stefan Lequiem, 'Droit de tendance ou centralisme democratique', Luttes et Debats, June 1979, p. 51 ~ 
see our ch. 1. 
('-' Althusser, Les \'aches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
(>-1 Expression used by Marchais and reported in Le Monde, to May 1979. 
could have been to comfort the Party leaders and to use cunning. If the leaders of the 
French Communist Party juggled with words, then communist dissidents could have 
done this too. For instance, instead of accepting talk of the Althusseriens, the tenn Neo-
Marxists could have been used. Althusser would no longer have been considered as a 
'chef de fief 65 ready to launch his battle, but rather as an ideological guide without any 
thirst for power. 
This notion of ideological guide was rather appropriate as it could have allowed 
dissidents such as Althusser and Elleinstein to play fully their roles as intellectuals, and as 
mentors in some ways, Althusser advocating a return to Marxism and Elleinstein 
commending a definite switch to Eurocommunism. Far from battling pennanently around 
themes like the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, these two tendencies 
found points of agreement on the need for internal democratisation for instance, as 
Elleinstein advocated. In fact, these infonnal tendencies made the richness of the 
movement of discontent which flooded the Party in the 1970s. Debate had never been so 
wide-ranging. Many communists recognised themselves in and became inspired by ideas 
put forward by these two intellectual dissidents. Althusser and Elleinstein thus led a 
multitude of communists ideologically. 
At that time, the refusal to recognise tendencies was to hide from reality, because 
they did exist inside the French Communist Party. They certainly found their expression 
outside the various levels of authority of the FCP, but they did not have any choice as 
communist leaders denied the very existence of discontent within the organisation. 
Marchais claimed in an interview with L 'Humanite: 'Chez nous, il n'y a pas de 
contestation. ,66 There was no discontent, there were no tendencies: the Party had the last 
word at the end of the 1970s, as it had to paper over any crack in the facade of the Party 
65 Paul Laurent quoted in France Xouvelle, 6 June 1977. 
66 Georges Marchais quoted in 'M. Marchais: il ya quelques contestations', Le Monde, 15 April 1978. 
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unity.67 However, the French Communist Party lost out in the long-term, for as Althusser 
wrote, 'ce parti, tous ses intellectuels et la majorite de ses vieux cadres l'a abandonne 
[ ... ] [mais] il durera, mort vivant, tant qu'il [ ... ] trouvera des commandes a passer.,68 
To conclude, by recognising the 'diversity of approaches' within the French Communist 
Party in the 1990s and by coming back to the logic of opening up the Party which was 
underlined at the 22nd Congress in 1976, communist leaders made a great step forward. 
As a consequence, communist activists should not theoretically be afraid of reprisals if 
they express ideas that go against those of the Party leadership, for as Jacques Chambaz 
wrote, 'un communiste qui manifeste de veritables divergences quant a l'orientation 
collectivement decidee n'est pas pour aut ant ecarte de ses responsabilites. ,69 However, 
this recognition should be applied in practice and, considering the past experience of the 
Communist Party in term of internal democracy, it is difficult to believe truly in such an 
open attitude. This fear is confirmed by the fact that the FCP still refuses to recognise the 
existence of tendencies. There is thus a long way ahead before the Party even accepts the 
right to create tendencies. That is precisely what 1990s dissidents such as Guy Hermier, 
Lucien Seve and Roger Martelli warned against when they wrote: 
Le progressisme vit et continuera a vivre dans une pluralite ~ la fois concurrente 
et feconde de sensibilites, de courants et d'organisations. Mais l'emergence de 
nouveaux points de repere, de nouveaux axes majeurs de combat doit permettre 
67 Etienne Balibar, Guy Bois, Georges Labica and Jean-Pierre Lefebvre, Ouvrons fa !enetre, camarades 
(Paris: Maspero, 1979), p. 184. 
68 Louis Althusser, Sur fa mort du PCF (Mort et survie du PCF) , (1982-83?), Paris, IMEC, fond 
Althusser, AL T2.A29-0 1.05, unpublished manuscripts. 
69 Jacques Chambaz, Realites et strategie: fe PCF, une demarche nouvelle (Paris: Messidor Editions 
Sociales, \990), p. 154; see our ch. 8. 
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de nouvelles convergences, de nouvelles formes d'action et de regroupement. 70 
By expressing themselves in such a way, they talked about '[un] pluralisme de droit'. 
They thus went further than the concept of a 'majority of ideas' envisaged by Elleinstein, 
but without daring to venture themselves towards the right to create tendencies which 
was advocated by Althusser. It means that in the 1990s, as in the 1970s, the existence of 
tendencies raised the spectre of factionalism. The Party, and the majority of its members, 
still feared that the FCP could split up and disappear. However, this risk did not exist in 
either the 1990s or the 1970s. On the one hand, as we have just seen, the main 
intellectual dissidents such as Althusser and Elleinstein did not want at all to create 
factions around themselves. They perfectly knew that they could potentially weaken the 
Party, which would have gone against their communist faith. On the other hand, 
tendencies would not have led automatically to the creation of factions within the Party 
as FCP leaders could have managed them and inserted them inside the Party's 
organisation. In that sense, in the 1990s as in the 1970s, the Communist Party could have 
looked at other parties to see what happened there. It would have seen that the Socialist 
Party was full of tendencies while still being relatively powerful and influential. The 
Chevimementistes, the Rocardiens and the Mitterrandistes certainly did not agree on 
everything, and they effectively had their own supporters, but they also knew how to 
make their ideas converge and how to unite their efforts. The French Communist Party 
could have taken this lively, rich and fruitful party life as a model. However, in the 
1970s, the FCP would never have 'lowered itself by imitating the Socialist Party for two 
reasons. 
First, the Socialist Party was not only an ally, but also a competitor. In this 
70 Text signed by, among others, Charles Fiterman, Jacques Ralite, Guy Hermier, Lucien Seve and 
Roger Martelli and quoted in 'Declaration du Bureau politique du parti communiste fran~is', 
L 'Humanite, 29 October 1993. 
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context, it was out of the question for Communist leaders to take this party as a modeL 
The identities of both parties were far too mixed up in the eyes of FCP leaders at a time 
when the Communist Party wanted to distinguish itself from the socialists. 71 Secondly, 
accepting tendencies in the 1970s would have meant that the FCP was recognising the 
value of Althusser's demands. However, in a period of deep discontent, the Party refused 
categorically to consider, or even to take into account demands expressed by communist 
dissidents. Party leaders would have interpreted this intervention as a step back in their 
power and as a weakening of the Party unity which required that activists followed their 
Leadership rather than dissidents. 
Nonetheless, it was in the 1970s that the FCP could have transformed itself It 
could have recognised the diversity of opinion and the right to create tendencies when 
this desire became more intense and when a new wave of discontent was flooding the 
Party. On the contrary, the FCP did not embark on these mutations soon enough, and it 
lost both in term of influence and in term of political credibility. As Althusser wrote: 
'Ceux qui ont eu Ie simple courage de voir clair avant les autres, d'avoir ete non pas 'en 
retard' mais en avance [ ... ] ou tout simplement pas d'accord [ ... ] se [sont retrouves] sur 
les paquerettes.' 72 At the end of the 1990s, it was too late, and if the French Communist 
Party could not turn back the clock, it still had the possibility to push its logic to its own 
conclusion. It could have answered a more and more pressing need which was advocated 
by Althusser: it could have recognised the right to create tendencies. However, at 
present, the road ahead is still very long and the French Communist Party is not ready to 
accept the existence of tendencies, be it in theory or in practice. If it did, it would mean 
that Althusser was right back in 1970s, and it would also mean that movements of 
discontent were useful to the Party's progress. However, the inherent flaw in Althusser 
71 This was confinned to me by Francette Lazard (July 1999); see ch. 7. 
72 Louis Althusser, Proje! de livre sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee de la main peut etre Ie 
communisme, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, AL T2.A28-03.0 1 to .07, unpublished manuscripts. 
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and Elleinstein's position is that they treated the Party and its leader, Georges Marchais, 
as free agents who could take momentous decisions without the prior approval of 
Moscow. This, as we shall see, was not the case and therefore the responsibility of the 
Party leadership in this matter may well have to be viewed with circumspection. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The role of communist intellectuals in the Party of the working class 
In the 1970s, the main problem faced by French communist intellectuals was to define 
precisely the role they should play within a party which went further than the mere 
representation of the working class, by incarnating this class intrinsically, even at the 
highest levels of its decision-making bodies. 1 The question was of central importance 
both for the French Communist Party and for its intellectuals. It was a matter of knowing 
whether the role of communist intellectuals was to reflect and to apply the Party line, 
intellectual activities thus serving the socialist cause, or whether they should preserve 
their intellectual independence at any cost. In that sense, the problem which was raised 
within the ranks of the FCP in the 1970s was relatively similar to the issue which 
emerged in the USSR of the 1920s, and which was solved by the FCP in 1994, when it 
officially allowed its members to express themselves freely. 2 
Lenin, whose manichean vision of society pushed him to think in terms of class 
conflicts, divided intellectuals into two very distinct camps. On the one hand, there were 
those truly revolutionary intellectuals, who dedicated their work to the Party and to 
Communism. On the other hand, there were those who were "'indecrotablement" petits-
bourgeois par leur ideo 10 gie, / and who any communist party worth the name should 
'vaincre', 'transformer', 'refondre', 'reeduquer'.4 Lenin's words had a powerful 
meaning. Beyond the simple compartmentalisation of intellectuals, his ideas of breaking 
1 Maurice Thorez was previously employed in a mining company, Waldeck-Rochet was a former farm 
worker, Georges Marchais was a former metal worker, and Robert Hue was previously a nu~se. 
2 291: Congres, La politique du Parti Communiste Fran~ais (document adopte par Ie 217 Congres) , 
(Arche de la Defense, 18-22 December 1996); L 'Humanite, 23 December 1996. 
3 Louis Althusser, Positions (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976), p. 44. 
4 Vladimir 1Iitch Lenin, La maladie infantile du communisme: Ie gauchisme, French translation (Paris: 
Editions Sociales, 1953: [no pub.], 1962), p. 177; c( David S. Bell, 'Communism and French 
Intellectuals', Modern and Contemporary France (1993),27-36. 
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down 'deviationist' intellectuals had a much deeper implication. His ideas sought to 
ascertain whether art and intellectual thought should be revolutionised, thus submitted to 
a proletarian culture serving the Party. 
Faced with this question, two trends were opposed in the 1920s USSR. On the 
one hand, 'proletarian writers' of the RAFP - the association of Russian proletarian 
writers
5 
- gathered around Vardine, a man of letters who proposed to create in 1924 a 
'literary Tcheka,6 in charge of controlling the strictest application of the Party line in 
Russian literature. On the other hand, Trotsky was completely opposed to the concept of 
proletarian culture.7 He swept away any interventionist Party action on art in general by 
declaring: 
Un pouvoir authentiquement revolutionnaire ne peut ni ne veut se donner la tache 
de 'diriger' I'art, et encore moins de lui donner des ordres, ni avant ni apn!s la 
prise de pouvoir. 8 
And yet, although the 1917 Russian Revolution loosened for a while the artistic 
censorship which had been imposed during the reign of the Tsars,9 it again became the 
norm in the Soviet Union. In the 1920s, the cleaver of the literary censorship fell 
infallibly on works which were judged as being too critical towards the Soviet system, 
5 Alia Chelkiva, 'Qui a ecrit Le Don paisible?', in Mikhail Cholokov, Le Don paisible, French 
translation (Paris: Julliard: Presse de la Cite, 1991), pp. 1391-1402; The Association Russe des 
Ecrivains Proletariens (RAFP) became the Union des Ecrivains in 1932, cf. Sophie Coeure, 'Un 
ecrivain face au systeme: Ie cas Pasternak', L 'Histoire, July-August 1998, pp. 38-9; in France, Paul 
Vaillant-Couturier created the Association des Ecrivains et Artistes Revolutionnaires in 1932. The 
association had a journal, Commune, to which Aragon, Nizan, Gide, Rolland and Barbusse 
contributed, cf. David Caute, The Fellow-Travellers: Intellectual Friends of Communism (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), ch. 3. 
() Jean-Jacques Marie, Trotsky: textes et debats (Paris: Librairie Generale FranlYaise, 1984), p. 240. 
7 Marie, ibid., p. 231. 
8 Trotsky, Litterature et Revolution, quoted in Marie, ibid., p. 245. 
9 See, among others, the short story written by Alexander Pushkin, 'Dubrovsky', in The Queen of Spades 
and Other Stories, English translation (London: Penguin Books, 1962), pp. 61-150. 
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and as from 1934, Socialist Realism became the method of literary representation. 1O In 
the USSR, under the influence of Lenin, then of Stalin, intellectual expression was 
transformed into a revolutionary instrument I I used both to transmit a positive image of 
the homeland of socialism, and to strengthen the political strategy of the CPSU. 12 The 
authors Mikhail Cholokov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn demonstrated this point. 
Mikhail Cholokov's historical novel, Le Don paisible, which was serialised in the 
Russianjournals Oktiabr and Novy Mir from 1928 to 1940, illustrated the problem posed 
by an artistic representation of Soviet power. Although as soon as the first part was 
published in 1928 the RAFP accused Cholokov of treason against proletarian literature, 13 
communist activists being depicted in a rather disparaging way,14 Cholokov's work 
nevertheless managed to acquire the status of official book in the USSR,15 thanks to a 
decision taken by Stalin himself in 1941. From a deviationist traitor to a literary master, 
Cholokov owed his reversal of fortunes to a different and more revolutionary 
interpretation of his book. From political criticism to historical glorification, Cholokov's 
masterpiece was transformed into a revolutionary instrument used by the CPSU to ratify 
its communist ideology. 
This blatant manipulation of art in favour of the Russian Communist Party was 
not unique. It was also used in 1962, when Khruschev authorised the publication of the 
amended version of Solzhenitsyn's controversial book, Une journee d'/van 
Denissovitch. 16 Khruschev did not interpret Solzhenitsyn's book as a general criticism of 
the Soviet regime as a whole. Instead, he saw in it an open criticism of the Stalinist era. 
10 Introduction of J. Curtis in Mikhail Bulgakov, Diaboliad, English translation (London: Harvill Press, 
1995), p. viii. , 
II 'Est-ce Ie communisme qui a echoue en ce siecle?', in 30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour 
s 'attaquer aux intigalites (textes adoptes par Ie 3d Congres), (Martigues, 23-26 March 2000) and in 
L 'Humanite, 27 March 2000, p. vii. 
12 Pierre Daix, Ce que je sais de Soljenitsyne (Paris: Le Seuil, 1973), p. 31; cf. Coeure, 'Un ecrivain face 
au systeme: Ie cas Pasternak', pp. 38-9. 
13 Chelkiva, 'Qui a ecrit Le Don paisible?', p. 1394. 
l-l Chelkiva, ibid., p. 1394. 
15 Ibid., p. 1395. 
16 Alexander So\zhenitsyn, Une journee d'Jvan Denissovitch, French translation (Paris: Julliard, 1975). 
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It allowed Khruschev to redirect Solzhenitsyn's criticisms against his predecessor, and it 
allowed him to strengthen the logic of the denunciation of the cult of Stalin that he had 
initiated in 1956, at the CPSU's 20th Congress. 17 The manoeuvre was skilful, and the 
result was decisive. In the hands ofKhruschev, Solzhenitsyn's book became once again 
an ideological instrument and a political backing. 
In the homeland of socialism, the land of social equality and social freedom, 
intellectuals were just like puppets activated by a puppeteer at the apex of the Socialist 
state. The balance was precarious, for intellectuals could be condemned at any time, and 
they could be rehabilitated at any moment, on a simple decision made by the CPSU. 
Surrounded by suspicion, crushed by a powerful partisan ideology, the margin of 
manoeuvre of Russian intellectuals was extremely limited until the arrival of Gorbachev 
in power in 1985. 18 The democratisation of media and institutions, which was first 
initiated by the new General Secretary of the CPSU, then strengthened by the collapse of 
the USSR in 1991, unlocked the intellectuals' right of critical expression not only in the 
former Soviet Union, but also in France, inside the FCP. 
Although in the 1970s any criticism stemming from a French communist 
intellectual was deemed contrary to the FCP's interests, in the 1990s the French 
Communist Party paved the way for a greater freedom of critical expression within its 
own ranks. Thus, at its 28th Congress of 1994, the FCP decided to place each party 
member at the very centre of its strategy, and at its 29th Congress of 1996, the Party 
officially declared that 'la diversite des communistes est une realite non seulement 
17 Preface from Jean Cathala, in Alexandre Solzhenitsyn, Unejournee d'Jvan Denissovitch, ibid., pp. 9-
24. 
18 Gorbachev rehabilitated all those who had been politically condemned, with a few exceptions, cf. 
Pierre Broue, 'La verite sur les proces de Moscou', L 'Histoire, July-August 1998, p. 36. The French 
Communist Party refused to do the same as, according to Francette Lazard (unrecorded conversation, 
July 1999), it would mean holding a trial in which the Party would be the judge, which was to be 
avoided; cf. Francette Lazard, Rejlexion de la commission d'arbitrage sur la portee, au regard de 
I 'histoire, de la mutation des pratiques du debat dans Ie parti (rapport presente au Comift! Central 
des 16 L'I 17 nOl'cmbre 1998), (L 'Humanite, 19 November 1998). 
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toleree, acceptee, mais aujourd'hui revendiquee comme une richesse·. 19 This strategic 
reversal was possible insofar as the international political context was radically different 
from that of the 1970s. At that time, on the one hand the model of Marxist-Leninist 
thought applied, thus making the working class the core of the FCP's action, and on the 
other hand the separation of the world into two antagonistic camps conditioned the 
allegiance of the FCP to the CPSU. It was neither the moment to repudiate a proletarian 
theory applied in the land of socialism, nor the time to question the practices of a Soviet 
Union which was confronting the capitalist United States. And this was precisely what 
the 29th Congress of the Communist Party recognised in 1996. Published in L 'Humanite 
on 23 December 1996, this breakthrough document stipulated: 
Notre conception de la societe et du monde [ ... ], de notre role n'est plus celIe 
qui, longtemps, inspira notre action [ ... ]. La coherence de ce modele de pensee 
[ ... ] instituait comme realite determinante de l'evolution de la societe la lutte 
entre la classe capitaliste et la classe ouvriere [qui] [ ... ] en se liberant [ ... ] liberait 
la societe tout entiere.20 
This position was that of the French Communist Party in the 1970s, and at that time the 
role of communist intellectuals was tom between two opposite conceptions. On the one 
hand the FCP considered that communist intellectuals should serve the cause defended , 
by their Party unconditionally. On the other hand, intellectual dissidents such as 
Althusser and Elleinstein demanded both the right to preserve their intellectual 
independence and the right to playa more active role within the Party. 
The first part of this chapter on the role of communist intellectuals within the 
19 29~ Congres. La politique du Parti Communiste Fran~ais; L 'Humanite. 23 December 1996. 
20 2ge Congres. ibid 
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Party of the working class establishes the position of the FCP. and the second part 
underlines the demands of intellectual dissidents such as Althusser and Elleinstein. 
Politically and economically, the 1970s were characterised by three phenomena which 
pushed the French Communist Party to keep a firm hand on its intellectuals. First, the 
bipolarisation of the world into two antagonistic blocs as from 194i l pushed the FCP to 
become the unconditional ally of the Soviet Union and to tighten its ranks around its 
Leadership. Party unity became imperative. Ideological consensus became central, and 
conformism to the party line became the norm. In this context, criticisms expressed by 
communist intellectuals were deemed unacceptable by the French Communist Party, for 
they had considerable ideological weight and profound political impact on the communist 
electorate and on the FCP in generaL Coming from outside the Party, these criticisms 
would have been mere anti-communist propaganda. Coming from inside the Party, they 
were much more credible and dangerous. 
Second, the accentuation of social disparities, coupled with the loss of intluence 
of the Communist Party to the benefit of the Socialist party/2 forced the FCP to re-
centre its identity and its strategy around the working class by bringing back the well-
tried tactic of 'class against class' applied from 1928 to 1934. However, if this class 
struggle strategy attracted numerous intellectuals at that time, in the 1970s, it had 
precisely the opposite effect. Communist intellectuals felt relegated to a subaltern 
position compared to the working class. They felt deprived of any power compared to 
the workers who monopolised all communist energy. 
Third, the wave of dissidence which fell on the Party at the end of the 1970s 
21 The French, Italian, Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav 
Communist Parties adhered to the Cominform in 1947. In 1947-8, the Soviet model was imposed on 
all popular democracies. 
n See graph in Michel Winock, 'L'age d'or du communisme fran.yais', L 'Histoire, July-August 1998, p. 
58: the Socialist Party had a greater influence than the Communist Party until the 1940s. The SP 
regained that influence around 1974; see our ch. 7. 
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showed the power of intellectual expression. By expressing themselves on various media 
platforms, and by targeting the non communist press, communist intellectuals took their 
criticisms out onto the public stage. Their ideas were thus widely disseminated. They 
provoked thought among communist activists. They polarised communist opinion and 
they divided the Party into tendencies.23 Faced with this risk of compartmentalization, the 
FCP had no other alternative but to try to gather all its troops. The strategy adopted by 
the Party was thus relatively simple. On the one hand, it tried to flatter communist 
intellectuals by showing them why the Party needed them, while on the other it tried to 
bring them closer to the working class by proving to them that they too needed the 
party.24 
In accordance with Marxist-Leninist ideology, the French Communist Party 
granted a central place to its intellectuals insofar as it was up to them to disseminate 
communist thought.25 The role of communist intellectuals was thus to educate the 
workers, to form those who would later on assume responsibilities within the Party. The 
schools of the FCP proved this, for it was in these schools that intellectuals not only 
diffused the revolutionary ideology, but also spread the Party's political line. Highly 
political executives were thus trained, then mobilised at all levels of the communist 
hierarchy, from the cell to the section, and from the federation to the Central Committee. 
Real soldiers standing to attention, their role was in turn to disseminate communist 
thought and to control its strictest application within the Party. In tight ranks, the Party 
army could go on to assault French capitalist society.26 
In this context, communist intellectuals were the organists of the church-Party 
23 See ch. 2. 
1.t Georges Marchais, Ie Parti communiste fram;ais s 'adresse aux intellectuels: Ie changement avec 
vous (Paris, Hotel Sheraton, 9 June 1977); cf., among others, Fran90is Hincker, Le Parti Communiste 
au carrefour: essai sur quinze ans de son histoire, 1965-1981 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1981), pp. 157-8. 
25 David S. Bell, 'Communism and French Intellectuals', Modern and Contemporary France (1993),29. 
26 Vladimir Ilitch Lenin, Que faire? French translation (Paris: Librairie de I'Humanite, 1925). pp. 88. 
91. 
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which they served both as intellectuals and as communists.27 As intellectuals, they had to 
resort to their knowledge and to their analytical faculties. As communists, it was their 
duty to keep in check their critical sense in order to follow and to legitimate the line of 
the Party they adhered to voluntarily. Thus, in the Party schools, they used the approved 
texts of communist literature in such a way as to strike the right note. They catalysed 
thought in one direction, then disseminated it with flawless hannony and perfect strength. 
During the Second World War, Stalin's organs emitted fire; in the period of the Cold 
War and the intensification of class struggle, those of the FCP disseminated a collective 
thought within the Party. And it was precisely this collectivisation of thought that the 
Party needed to unite its forces behind it. Any criticism became an attack on the group, 
on the common policy and on the collective ideology. Any disagreement was considered 
as dissent by a party which preferred unifonn adherence to orthodox communist thought. 
However, if on the one hand the Party tried to avoid any breach in its ideological 
system by channeling and unifYing the thought of communists, it attempted on the other 
hand to make a precise distinction between intellectuals and workers. This distinction 
allowed it to act like a real puppeteer and to co-ordinate the functions of the fonner and 
the latter.28 Thus if the workers needed the intellectuals both to enrich their political 
culture and to develop their revolutionary consciousness,29 it was also true that, in the 
eyes of communist leaders, intellectuals needed the Party of the working class. 
In order to prove to communist intellectuals that they needed the Party, 
communist leaders made a simple observation. The social and economic crisis which was 
27 Jacques Chambaz, 'Intellectuels, classe ouvriere: faire progresser l'alliance', France Nouvelle, 10 July 
1978, p. 13. . . 
28 Etienne Balibar, 'La responsabilite des communistes', Dialectiques, no. 23 (1978), 27; Chrlstme 
Buci-Glucksmann quoted in 'En publiant leurs interventions a la reunion de Vitry - Les intellectuels 
contestataires precisent leurs positions', Ie Monde, 2 March 1979; Buci-Glucksmann's speech given 
at a meeting organised in Vitry by the FCP for 400 intellectuals on 9 and 10 December 1979, 'Breve 
histoire d'une destalinisation impossible: sur les "retards" de 56, 68 et 78', in Ouverture d 'une 
discussion? (Rencontre de -100 intellectuels communistes a Vitry, 9 et 10 decembre 1979), (Paris: 
Maspero, 1979). 
29 Jacques Chambaz, 'Les communistes et les intellectuels', Cahiers du Communisme, no. 6-7 (June-July 
1978), p. 3 I. 
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shaking France in the 1970s had an effect not only on the workers, but also on the 
intelligentsia. Communist and non-communists intellectuals therefore needed the Party 
on two levels. First, the Party offered them a protective space in which they could 
evolve, and second the project of communist society was their guarantee of a better 
future. 3D 
According to the Communist Party, the crisis of the 1970s affected intellectuals 
both personally and professionally. As Georges Marchais put it in 1977, 
Ie systeme [capitaliste] actuel exploite et opprime plus que jamais les intellectuels, 
les atteint dans leurs conditions materielles d' existence, entrave leurs possibilites 
d' epanouissement, mutile ou devoie leur activite creatrice.31 
The conclusion of the Party was beyond reproach. Like workers, intellectuals too had 
quantitative and qualitative claims which only the Party of the working class could 
meet.32 It was indeed the Party which acquired an experience in terms of social 
conflictS.33 It was the Party which was at the forefront of popular demands/4 and it was 
only the FCP which could unite workers and intellectuals in a common fight for 
socialism.35 Intellectuals could thus rely on the reassuring protection of a FCP which, 
30 Waldeck-Rochet quoted in La Nouvelle Critique, no. 22 (March 1969) and reported in Roland Leroy, 
'Le Parti Communiste, les intellectuels et la culture', Cahiers du Communisme, no. 12 (December 
1970),96. 
31 Georges Marchais and Roland Leroy, Pour la culture avec les intellectuels (discours prononces lors 
du 25e anniversaire de La Nouvelle Critique), (18 December 1977). 
32 Jacques Chambaz, 'Classe ouvriere et intellectuels: une alliance feconde necessaire', Cahiers du 
Communisme, no. 2 (February 1977), 24, 26-7; 'Les communistes et les intellectuels', Cahiers du 
Communisme, no. 6-7 (June-July 1978), 28-9; Guy Konopnicki, 'Ouvriers et intellectuels. Au jour Ie 
jour ... et au-delit', France Nouvelle, 1 March 1976, p. 11; Wolikov, in Jean Buries, Lucien Marest and 
Serge Wolikov, 'Les intellectuels', France Nouvelle, 28 April - 4 May 1979, p. 8; Speech given by 
Georges Marchais, 'Intellectuels et ouvriers: l'alliance capitale', L 'Humanite, 10 June 1977; Conseil 
National du PCF (9 et 10 fevrier 1980), Les intellectuels, la culture et I 'avancee democratique au 
socialisme (projet de resolution), (L 'Humanite, II December 1979). 
33 Gerard Belloin, 'Un discours, une politique', France Nouvelle, June 1977, p. 10. 
34 Roland Leroy, 'Le parti communiste, les intellectuels et la culture', 88. 
35 Danielle Bleitrach, 'Des changements it prendre en consideration', Cahiers du Communisme, no. 2 
(February 1980),43. 
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while offering them a wne of expression through its pUblications36 and its research 
centre,37 went even further by guaranteeing them a brighter future. 38 This brighter future 
would be secured by socialism which could achieve it insofar as the project of society of 
the French Communist Party gave a predominant place to culture. Socialism would 
ensure that everyone could participate in cultural and intellectual life by freeing it from 
bourgeois hegemony. As Jacques Chambaz, who was in charge of the intellectuals' 
section at the end of the 1970s, wrote, 
liberateur, Ie socialisme Ie sera en permettant une croissance nouvelle orientee 
vers la satisfaction des besoins materiels et intellectuels dans leur diversite [ ... ]. II 
fera de la culture, dans la diversite de ses composantes, un bien reellement 
partage.39 
By depicting an ideal society in which intellectuals could really blossom, and in which 
culture could flourish, the Communist Party called for intellectual idealism. Culture in a 
socialist land was compared favorably to the petty materialistic capitalist world. 
Knowledge in a socialist country would be shared among all instead of being the 
privilege of the few. The Communist Party therefore brought hope. It gave intellectuals 
the unexpected chance to imagine, to change, and to build a cultural world on a par with 
their idealism. 
However, in front of this display of flattering arguments, the answer of some 
intellectuals was not really the one that the FCP expected to hear. Far from uniting 
36 It was the case of France Nouvelle and La Nouvelle Critique which opened their columns to 
intellectuals. 
37 The Espace Marx is an example. It was previously called the Institut de Recherche Marxiste. 
~8 Georges Marchais, Le Parti communiste fram;ais s 'adresse aux intellectuels: Ie changement avec 
vous (Paris, Hotel Sheraton, 9 June 1977). 
39 Jacques Chambaz, 'Classe ouvriere et intellectuels: une alliance ~econde et necessaire', 25; 'Des 
raisons nouvelles pour I'alliance', France Nouvelle, 1976, p. 24; 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la 
Francl.' (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges Marchais), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
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themselves around the Party, some dissident communist intellectuals like Althusser, 
Elleinstein and Pierre Daix, a man of letters, camped on their positions by asserting that 
intellectual activities should not be subordinated to the needs of the Party, and by 
demanding to playa more active role within the Party. 
Communist intellectuals had a dual role in the 1970s. As members of a Communist Party 
which advocated a revolutionary social change, they were not only highly politicised, but 
they also belonged to the revolutionary battalion of the Party. As intellectuals only, they 
were specialised in a specific area of knowledge which led them to think in an objective 
way. And it was precisely this dual role which pushed them to be tugged between two 
very distinct positions. Either they considered that the intellectual could not be 
dissociated from the communist, and in that case they became the associates of the 
Leadership of the French Communist Party, or they considered that communist 
intellectuals should preserve their independence of judgement by dissociating the 
intellectual from the communist 40 and, as Althusser wrote, '[en agissant] [ ... ] en 
conformite avec [leurs] convictions'. 41 
By subordinating their activities to the needs of the Party, communist intellectuals 
agreed to depoliticise themselves, and to playa relatively reduced role within the FCP, 
insofar as they allowed their thinking to be directed by the Leadership.42 It was indeed 
the Party which held supreme knowledge in the name of a Stalinist Marxist-Leninist 
theory which was meant to be 'scientific', therefore inflexible and undeniable. It was the 
Party leadership which determined the revolutionary political line members had to follow 
in tight ranks and to approve unconditionally. In this context, some communist 
40 Raymond Jean, . Politique et litterature', L 'Humanite, 12 May 1978., 0 ~ 
41 Louis Althusser, Projet de livre sur Ie communisme (co 1980): A portee de la mam peut etre Ie 
communisme, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, ALT20A28-03001 to 007, unpublished manusriptso 
42 Jorge Semprun quoted in Les Nouvelles Litteraires, 15 June 19790 
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intellectuals felt suffocated and diminished by their Party.-u They were not short of 
expressions to describe this situation. From Althusser who wrote that "Ie PC traite ses 
intellectuels [comme des] valets' 44 to the writer Raymond Jean, who compared 
communist intellectuals to "[ des] potiches d 'honneur' , and to "[ des] fleurs a la 
boutonniere' ,45 all these strong expressions served to convey their sadness, or even their 
anger towards a Party which, according to them, used intellectuals to boost itself But it 
was a fact. Intellectuals such as Roger Vailland, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir46 gave 
the French Communist Party a certain prestige which contributed to its popularity up to 
the 1970s. Unfortunately, the gilded coat-of-arms of the Party, which went together with 
the image of the USSR, lost its brightness little by little. Disenchanted intellectuals left 
the Party as early as the Soviet political trials of the 1940s,47 the Red Army invasion of 
Hungary in 1956,48 the Prague Coup in 1968, and finally the TV pictures of Siberian 
camps coupled with the Solzhenistyn Affair in 1974.49 This slow exodus of communist 
intellectuals and fellow-travellers bled the Party white, for all these figureheads backed 
and legitimised communist policy, both nationally and internationally. 
In the 1970s, the Communist Party could afford even less to lose its intellectuals 
insofar as the Cold War and the economic crisis intensified class struggle, and as the 
Union of the Left advanced the perspective of a Socialist France. The Party therefore 
gathered its intellectuals behind the Leadership by pushing them to think both as 
intellectuals and as communists. Any form of intellectual activity was put in the service 
of class struggle. Any writings were made in the name of class struggle. In this context, 
43 Jeannine Verdes-Leroux, Le reveil des somnambules: Ie parti communiste, les intellectuels et la 
culture (1956-1985), (Paris: Fayard, 1987), p. 45. 
-t-t Louis Althusser, Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, Paris, IMEC fond Althusser, 
AL T2.A27-01.05, unpublished manuscripts. 
45 Raymond Jean quoted in Les Nouvelles Litteraires, 15 June 1979, p. 15. 
-t6 Roger Vailland was a member of the French Communist Party between 1953 and 1956; Sartre and de 
Beauvoir were fellow-travellers of the FCP. 
-t7 Caute The Fellow-Travellers, ch. 8. 
48 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'I condemn entirely and without any reservation the Soviet Aggression', quoted in 
Caute, ibid, p. 335. This condemnation was approved, among others, by de Beauvoir and Vercors. 
-tlJ 'Le parti de la c1asse ouvriere ... et les intellectuels', Luttes et Debats, January 1980, p_ 33. 
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communist intellectuals who accepted the rules of the game of the Party submitted 
themselves consciously, or unconsciously, to a certain form of censorship. 50 In some 
cases - which were certainly relatively exceptional - as in Great Britain with 
Christopher Hill51 and in France with extremely conservative activists, this censorship 
took the form of a refusal to see clearly and to analyse the facts objectively if these went 
against Communism. 52 If Russian famines were the so-called 'invention of anti-
communist propaganda', the gulags were so-called 'mere' prison camps. The idealisation 
of Socialism could become excessive in the West, as it was to an even greater extent in 
the USSR, homeland of political distortions and lies. 53 This idealisation thus brought up 
the question of intellectual responsibility. But in 1970s France, if communist intellectuals 
could allow themselves neither to criticise their Party too much, nor to condemn the 
Soviet Union as a whole insofar as it could directly arm the FCP, some of them 
nonetheless refused to sacrifice their intellectual integrity to the Socialist cause. 
Communist intellectuals who wanted to keep their own independent judgement faced 
two choices. Either, like Pierre Daix in 1974, they decided to leave the Communist Party 
in order to give free rein to their ideas outside any political shackles, or, like Jean 
Elleinstein, they remained in the FCP and entered into dissent by choosing to fight for 
greater freedom of expression inside the Party. However, if the question of independence 
of mind was raised by these intellectuals, the Party denied the very existence of the 
problem. Georges Marchais declared that '[Ie Parti] ne [veut] pas tenir l'art en laisse, Ie 
controler, Ie censurer' .54 As for the Party official Guy Hermier and the philosopher 
Lucien Seve, they asserted that 'rien ne nous est plus etranger que la volonte de regenter 
50 Georges Labica, 'Le parti, les intellectuels: contribution a I'analyse d'un desordre', in Ouverture 
d'une discussion? (Rencontre de 400 intellectuels communistes a Vitry, 9 et 10 decembre 19-9), 
(Paris: Maspero, 1979), pp. 88-9. 
51 See 'Tourists of the Revolution - The people's flag', BBC2. 25 March 2000. 
52 David S. Bell, 'Communism and French Intellectuals', Modern and Contemporary France (1993). 28. 
5~ Pierre Daix, J'ai cru au matin (Paris: R. Laffont, 1976), pp. 445-6. 
q Marchais, 'Intellectuels et ouvriers: I'alliance capitale·. 
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l'art.
55 [No us nous interdisons de] distribuer de honnes ou mauvaises notes: 56 There was 
no discord in this respect. No discord, no dissidence, the Party wanted to be open in the 
1970s. But in practice, things were not as simple for the French Communist Party. Tied 
up by the CPSU, it was difficult for the FCP to accept openly the critical writings of 
communist intellectual dissidents, even more when they dealt with the Soviet Union. 
Pierre Daix's book, Ce que je sais de Soljenitsyne/7 and Jean Elleinstein's Histoire de 
l'URSyB proved it. 
It was in 1973 that the Solzhenitsyn Affair reached its full extent in the USSR, 
after L 'Archipel du Goulag59 had been published abroad. Violently pilloried for having 
exposed the world of Soviet prison camps, Solzhenitsyn was arrested in 1974, deprived 
of his citizenship, and expelled from the country. In France, reactions were quick and 
antagonistic. On the one hand, the FCP was forced to play its diplomatic card. On the 
other hand, Pierre Daix asserted his 'intransigeance intellectuelle,60 by publishing in 1973 
his indictment against the Stalinist character of the Russian and French Communist 
Parties in Ce que je sais de Soljenistyne, and by leaving the Party in 1974. 
Pierre Daix, who had discovered as early as 1953 the full horrors produced by the 
Stalinist terror thanks to Elsa Triolet,61 Aragon's companion, could no longer contain his 
indignation at the time of the French publication of L 'Archipel du Goulag in 1973. 
Solzhenitsyn's book proved to be the final straw and pushed Daix to declare: 
Je decouvris [ ... ] qu'en croyant defendre l'honneur de la cause [communiste] 
55 Guy Hermier quoted in Conseil National du PCF (9 et 10 fevrier 1980), Les intellectuels, la culture et 
I 'avancee democratique au socialisme. 
56 Lucien Seve quoted in Les Nouvelles Litteraires, 15 June 1979. 
57 Pierre Daix, Ce que je sais de Soljenitsyne (Paris: Le Seuil, 1973). 
58 Jean Elleinstein, Histoire de I 'URSS, 4 vols (Paris, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975). 
59 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, L 'Archipel du Goulag, French Translation (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974). 
60 Daix, J'ai cru au matin, p. 448. 
61 Daix, Ce que je sais de Soljenistyne, p. 12; in 1949, Pierre Daix, and other communist intellectuals 
and fellow travellers, testified against the Russian renegade civil servant Kravchenko, arguing that 'il 
n 'existe pas de camps de concentration en Union sovietique', in Michel Winock, 'L 'age d'or du 
communisme fran9ais', p. 63. 
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j' avais hurle avec les loups,62 [et je decidais] enfin [de mettre] mes actes en 
rapport avec ma vie et ma conscience,63 [et] de me conformer a la verite [ ... ]. 
C'est, me semble-t-il, l'honnetete d'un intellectuel.64 
He considered indeed that he had a moral obligation, as a man of letters, not to remain 
silent. The Solzhenitsyn Affair was the last straw. However, if as an individual it was 
possible for him to detach himself from what he called 'Ie mensonge' ,65 and to adhere to 
the truth, the margin of manoeuvre of the FCP was, by contrast, rather limited. 
As a political organisation, the French Communist Party could not allow itself to 
repudiate the Soviet model, which represented the Socialist ideal, without risking 
collapse. This preservation of Communist ideology was not only vital for the Party, but 
also relatively important insofar as the year of the Solzhenitsyn Affair was also that of the 
presidential elections. It is thus understandable that the Party criticised Pierre Daix' s 
book, Ce que je sais de Soljenistyne, so pointedly, given that it cut to pieces the very 
reason for the existence of the FCP. Daix recognised this with the benefit of hindsight. In 
1978, he wrote: 
[L'] ideologie [du Parti] lui commande [ ... ] de maintenir que l'URSS est la 
preuve du socialisme. En somme, il doit conserver au socialisme les charmes 
absolus de l'utopie, en Ie lavant de ses souillures temporelles, et convaincre qu'il 
, . d' . 66 n a nen utoplque. 
The FCP was thus forced to moderate its remarks and to be two faced. In public, the 
62 Daix. Ce queje sais de Soljenistyne, ibid., p. 12. 
63 Daix, J'ai cru au matin, p. 443. 
64 Daix. ibid., p. 449. 
65 In Des voies sous les decombres ([n.p.]: [no pub.], 1974), Solzhenitsyn asked communists 'not to live 
in a lie', quoted in Claude Durand, 'Le choc Soljenitsyne', L 'Histoire. July-August 1998, p. 68. 
66 Pierre Daix. La crise du PCF (Paris: Seuil, 1978). p. 63. 
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Party had no other option but to follow the USSR. In private, it could criticise the Soviet 
government's repressive grip on literature. Pierre Juquin proved the moderation and the 
realism which the Party could show in private by declaring in March 1974: 
Voila notre probleme: comment faire comprendre aux intellectuels fran9ais que Ie 
fait de ne pas mettre 'S' en prison, c'est un progres [ ... ] Pourquoi "ils' ne Ie 
publient pas? II faut dire qu'en Russie, la litterature a toujours ete une anne 
politique [ ... ]. Et puis, il n'y a aucune tradition liberale dans ce pays. Les poetes 
en prison, c'est une donnee historique. Entin, esperons qu'ils ne finiront pas par 
[ ... ] mettre [Soljenitsyne] en taule. Je nous vois mal expliquer cela dans les 
• ., 67 Ulllversites. 
However, if Literary Realism created a feeling of general discomfort within the French 
Communist Party, historical writings about the Soviet Union placed the spotlight finnly 
on the FCP. This rather unstable position, which was also rather uncomfortable for the 
FCP, was illustrated by Jean Elleinstein's book, Histoire de I 'URSS. Published in several 
volumes up to 1978, this historical work could only embarrass the French Communist 
Party. Written by a communist historian, it gave an historical context to literary works 
like L 'Archipel du Goulag. If it had been written by a non-communist historian, the 
political consequences of this history book would certainly have been relatively minor. 
Such an individual would have been presented as '[un] ideologue bourgeois,68 who could 
only be expected to slander the USSR. But coming from a historian who was not only 
communist, but also a dissident, the criticisms were intolerable for the CPSU, and for the 
FCP which was forced to follow the stance adopted by his fellow party. In Temps 
67 Pierre Juquin quoted in Andre Harris, and Alain de Sedouy, Voyage a /'interieur du Parti 
Communiste (Paris: Le Seuil, 1974), p. 12. 
68 Youri Sedov, 'Une falsification au lieu d'une etude objective', Temps Nouveaux, January 1977, p. 12. 
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Nouveaux, a Soviet magazine translated into French, several articles published between 
1976 and 1978 by Youri Sedov attacked Jean Elleinstein violently. It is thus possible to 
read that '[son] ouvrage est emaille d'erreurs de faits69 [ ••• ] ret d'] enormites tout it fait 
deplacees de la part d'un homme qui se donne pour communiste.'70 And on top of that, 
not content with having 'une imagination debridee', 71 'Elleinstein s' eleve deja carrement 
contre son parti,.72 This last argument could not have hit home any better with the FCP, 
and the reply was not long in coming. Obliged to protect the myth of the homeland of 
socialism, insofar as the FCP based its ideological and political action on it, Georges 
Marchais also accused the historian Elleinstein of 'falsifications' and 'ignorance'. 73 The 
position of communist historians was thus relatively difficult to sustain, their writings 
helping to revisit the history of the USSR, and also to expose skeletons in the Party's 
cupboard. This was why Elleinstein, who was acutely aware of the precarious position in 
which communist intellectuals found themselves, called for a diplomatic approach, while 
advocating independence of judgement. He wrote in 1976: 
J'ai un probleme de responsabilite. J'ecris en mon nom personnel, pas au nom du 
PC. Mais il est naturel qu'en faisant ce travailj'aie quelque souci de la fa~on dont 
j'ecris peut etre re~ue ou interpretee (sic.). C'est pourquoije suis astreint non pas 
a l' art de la litote mais it une certaine prudence de vocabulaire. 74 
No matter whether it was about 'verbal cautiousness', or 'literary verve', the problem 
69 Sedov, ibid., p. 12. 
70 Sedov's article, ibid, mentionned in Jean Elleinstein, 'Continuons Ia discussion', France Nouvelle, 
1976, p. 20. 
71 Sedov, 'Une falsification au lieu d'une etude objective', p. 12. 
72 Youri Sedov, 'Revenir it Eduard Bernstein? EIIeinstein decouvre son jeu', Temps Nouveaux. May 
1978, p. IS. 
73 Jean EIIeinstein, 'L 'avenir des communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 25 September 1978, p. 50. 
74 Jean EIIeinstein, 'Un communistejuge Ies communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 6 September 1976, 
p.74. 
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faced by communist intellectuals was to measure precisely the impact of their writings. 
Overseen by the FCP, they risked exposing themselves to the wrath of the Party at the 
slightest faux pas. Overseen by the CPSU, the FCP risked, in tum, hearing the Russian 
bear roar if it granted too much freedom of critical expression to its intellectuals. And it 
was precisely this domino effect which suffocated communist intellectuals. Quartered in 
their cells, confined to their own specialisms,75 and relegated to the role of legitimists of 
the Party's policies, communist intellectuals only desired one thing. They wanted to 
contribute actively to policy making within the French Communist Party. 76 
Outside the French Communist Party, communist intellectuals had at their 
disposal a large area of expression which allowed them to assert their roles as 
instructors, analysts and critics. They could, therefore, develop a personal and 
intellectual vision of their surroundings, whether in the political, economic, social or 
cultural fields. This proliferation of ideas, this capacity to adapt themselves to various 
situations, and to analyse them, constituted the very richness of the intellectuals. It was 
precisely this liberal practice which was proposed for the Party by dissident communist 
intellectuals. They wanted to replace the compartmentalization of ideas with open 
discussion.77 They aimed to dispense with ideological conformism and to substitute their 
own personal contributions. In so doing, they hoped to make communist ideology more 
relevant to modem conditions. Numerous expressions were used by communist 
intellectual dissidents in the 1970s to show their desire to break free from the shackles 
that the Party had imposed upon them. The writer Raymond Jean wrote in 1979: 
[Les intellectuels doivent etre] profondement lies aux luttes du peuple et it sa vie 
reelle, capables d'analyse et d'ecoute. Donc des intellectuels critiques qui, par 
75 Gerard SeHoin, Nos reves camarades (Paris: Seuil, 1979), p. 183. 
76 SeHoin, ibid., p. 183 
77 Althusser, Projef de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, unpublished manuscripts; cf. our ch. 1. 
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defInition, ne sont pas la docilite meme. 78 
In addition, Althusser warned the Party against the risk of losing its intellectuals if it did 
not give them a more active role to play. He wrote in a manuscript: 
Dans tous les domaines [culturels et intellectuels], Ie bilan de l'activite du parti 
est maigre ou negatif malgre quelques reussites proviso ires. Ce n'est pas un 
hasard. Car Ie propre des intellectueis dans Ie parti fran<;ais est de traverser Ie 
parti rapidement sans y demeurer. 79 
This condemnation of the Party was beyond appeal, for the only ways for communist 
intellectuals to regain their freedom of expression were either to leave the Party or to 
enter into dissent and face expulsion. This was precisely what happened in 1980. 
Althusser left the Party and Elleinstein was expelled, for their only faults were that they 
refused to transform their works into political and ideological instruments placed in the 
hands of the FCP. They refused to adhere to the mystification of the Soviet Union80 and 
they refused to conform to the Socialist Realism which was tacitly applied within the 
ranks of the FCP. In the 1970s, both Althusser and Elleinstein confronted the Party in 
order to keep their intellectual independence and to give a greater role to communist 
intellectuals within the Party. But at the end, if they were right to enter into dissent, they 
both lost and found themselves outside the Party. Despite this failure, Althusser and 
Elleinstein had a profound impact on the Party in the long term. 
78 Raymond Jean quoted in Les Nouvelles Litteraires, 15 June 1979, p. 15. 
79 Louis Althusser, Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Le malaise du 22e congres), Paris, IMEC, 
fond Althusser, ALT2.A24-0 1.0 1102 to -02.01, unpublished manuscripts. 
80 See ch. 6. 
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To conclude, in the 1970s, the French Communist Party juggled with two very distinct 
policies. On the one hand it centred its action on I 'ouvrierisme by appealing to the class 
consciousness of its activists. 81 On the other hand, faced with either a haemorrhage from 
its ranks of communist intellectuals or open criticisms from them, the Party tried to bind 
the intellectuals more closely to it. The leaders of the FCP walked therefore on a 
tightrope. They risked making a faux-pas at any time. Too much ouvrierisme could 
provoke a feeling of marginalization among communist intellectuals. Too much 
intellectualism could have led in turn to a feeling of frustration among the workers. A 
balance between the two was thus desirable, although relatively precarious. It became 
even more precarious as a national inquiry showed in the mid 1970s that intellectuals 
were more inclined to vote for the Socialist Party than for the FCP, and a new wave of 
intellectual discontent swept the Party at the end of the 1970s.82 And it was precisely 
these two blows given to the Party which pushed the Leadership of the FCP to make a 
partial retreat to its old positions ouvrieristes and to distrust communist intellectuals. 
Intellectuals were those who the Leninist-Stalinist practice of the Party traditionally 
placed in the same ranks as the 'bourgeois'. They were also those who were often the 
cause of internal conflictS.83 Workers therefore represented a positive value in the eyes of 
the Party, which was and wished to remain the Party of the working class. 
It would have been in the interest of the FCP to have continued to attract 
intellectuals. It would have been desirable for the Party to have retained its appeal to 
large numbers of fellow travellers. These intellectual figures made it a different party, 
which was unique in its own way, and which certainly captivated many other people. By 
the 1970s, the gradual strengthening of the Brezhnev regime's grip over its satellite 
81 See ch. 4. 
82 Fran'Yois Hincker, Le Parti Communiste au carre/our: essai sur quinze ans de son histoire, 1965-1981 
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1981), pp. 158-9. 
83 Jean-Pierre Gaudard, Les orphe/ins du PC (Paris: Belfond, 1986), pp. 103-4. 
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countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland,84 and the French economic crisis, pushed 
the FCP to bind its troops more closely to its Leadership in the name of international 
proletarianism and class struggle. In this context, the FCP could not accept the criticisms 
of communist dissidents - even if they were pertinent - without risking internal 
desintegration, and political intervention by the Soviet Union. However, it was this 
suppression of internal discussion which ended up harming the Party in the long term, as 
for communist intellectuals, this position was unacceptable. Althusser noticed it around 
1982-83. At that time, he wrote: 
Et nous memes, tout 1es premiers il [Ie Parti] nous remettait a notre place, nous 
qui avions eu la pretention de dire ce que nous pensions savoir, il nous rendait a 
notre silence detinitif Qui, definitif, car maintenant plus rien n' est possible 
comme avant. 85 
The conclusion of Althusser was far-sighted, for even after the opening up of the FCP in 
the 1990s, some former communist intellectual dissidents who had left the Party still 
refused to come back.86 Even the 30th Congress of the Party in March 2000, which 
presented itself as marking the advent of a 'new' reformed Communist Party, and which 
definitely buried its past Stalinist practices, did not deal with the question of the role of 
communist intellectuals within the Party. 
84 Examples include the suppression of dissent in Poland, after the strikes ~Y :olish workers in 1970, 
and the undermining of opposition to the Husak regime in CzechoslovakIa In the 1970s. The other 
satellite countries were the GDR, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungaria and Albania. 
85 Louis Althusser, Sur fa mort du PCF (Mort et survie du PCF) , (1982-83?), Paris, IMEC, fond 
Althusser, ALT2.A29-0 1.05, unpublished manuscripts. 
86 Claude Llabres (a former French communist dissident), 'Retoumer au PCF? Je suis mieux dehors', 
Liberation, 30 December 1998, p. 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The social role of the FCP 
and its failure to adjust to social change 
The French Communist Party established itself as the party of the working class as from 
its foundation in 1920. 1 Bolshevised by the Third Communist International and placed 
under the domination of the USSR, the first 'proletarian state', the FCP became an 
ouvrieriste party as much in its structure as in its ideology. Thus, in 1925, workers 
started replacing middle-class members as communist Congress delegates2 - as an 
attempt by the Party to wipe away any perverse 'bourgeois' element from its 
organisation - and in 1936 the Party launched a campaign against the rich, 'who ate the 
bread of the workers'. 3 
As a result of this ouvrieriste orientation, an increasingly larger number of French 
workers started seeing the Party as the sole defender of their economic and social 
interests, the only organisation to frame and shape their lives, and the only po litical party 
they could call their own. They started seeing it as a party worth fighting for - and for 
good reasons. The FCP not only promised them des lendemains qui chantent4 at the 
image of the USSR, the socialist heaven.5 The FCP also swore that 'defendre les 
1 The creation of the FCP, then called the SFIC, resulted from the scission of the SFIO at the Tours 
Congress of December 1920 over the adhesion to 21 conditions of the Third Communist International; 
cf., among others, Georges Lefranc, Le mouvement socialiste sous la troisieme republique (1975-
1940), (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963), pp. 228-35; see our ch. 1. 
2 At the time of the FCP's 5th Congress; cf. Stephane Courtois, 'PCF: Ie parti de Moscou'. L 'Histoire, 
July-August 1998, p. 43. 
3 8e Congres du PCF, Quatre annees de lutte pour I 'unite, pour Ie pain, fa liberte et fa paix (rapport 
d'activite du Comite Central), (Villeurbanne, 22-25 January 1936). 
4 Expression used by Paul Vaillant-Couturier in the 1930s. Vaillant-Couturier was a French journalist 
and a politician who joined the Central Comm ittee of the FCP in 1921; see our ch. 3. 
5 See ch. 6. 
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travailleurs est la raison d'etre du Parti communiste,6 and granted workers a leading role 
in its policy-making process.7 
In this context, French communist intellectuals did not hesitate to recognise that 
workers deserved to occupy 'rune] place preponderante,g within the FCP and 
consequently to remain in the shadow of communist workers - out of guilt at being too 
'bourgeois', out of pure esprit de sacrifice, or simply in order to feel more at home in 
the Party of the working class. Roger Garaudy, the communist intellectual who became a 
pariah within his own Party in 1970,9 justified this position in 1945. He wrote then that 
[la] classe ouvriere a prouve [ ... ] qU'elle avait Ie sens Ie plus aIgu des 
responsabilites nationales. II lui incombe une responsabilite spirituelle: 'La releve 
historique de la lumiere et de la grandeur. ' 10 
At that time, this view could only have pleased the leaders of the French Communist 
Party and if, from a non-communist point of view, it seemed both too extreme to be 
completely genuine and too religiously phrased to be taken seriously, Garaudy's view 
was nonetheless broadly shared by communist intellectuals - that is, until the 1970s. 
In the 1970s, communist intellectuals like Louis Althusser and Jean Elleinstein 
started reproaching the FCP for going too far in its ouvrierisme. For the~ the Party fell 
into the pit of miserabilism by associating workers with paupers, and consequently made 
6 Georges Marchais quoted in 'Renforcer notre Parti en qualite et en quantite - Les reponses de G. 
Marchais aux journalistes', L 'Humanite, 22 June 1978. 
7 Isaac Aviv, 'The French Communist Party from 1958 to 1978: Crisis and Endurance', Western 
European Politics, 2, no. 2 (1979), 179. 
8 Expression used in 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour fa France (rapport du Comile Central presente 
par Georges Marchais), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
9 In 1968, Garaudy criticised the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia which was approved by the FCP. 
10 Roger Garaudy, 'Une c1asse montante exige la grandeur nationale', Cahiers du Communisme (August 
1945), quoted in Winock, 'L'age d'or du communisme', L'Histoire, July-August 1998, p. 61. 
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the mistake of running an extreme ouvrieriste policy which, ahhough adapted to an 
industrial era, had become anachronistic in the post-industrial 1970s. 
In this context, the first part of this chapter will define the social role of the 
French Communist Party as a counter-society and as a protector of the interests of the 
working class. The second part will examine the criticisms expressed by Althusser and 
Elleinstein in relation to the Party's extreme ouvrierisme. 
In the 1970s, the French Communist Party played an important social role in France 
insofar as it was the only political party which incarnated the working class. I I This 
representation of the popular class could be found at two levels. First, the FCP's internal 
structure and satellite organisations allowed its members to evolve in a world dedicated 
to them and seemingly created in the image of their communist idealism. Second, the 
Communist Party marked itself out from other French political parties, insofar as it was 
the Party which always placed itself in the forefront when it came to protecting and 
defending the interests of the working class. 12 
First, French communist society formed a world which was apart from the rest of 
society, structured, and organised into a hierarchy. Communists were involved in this 
counter-society as much in their daily lives as professionally for some of them. 
Daily, the FCP was the party of the camarades13 who had to stick to the 
obligatory tu form, who joined various communist clubs,14 distributed propaganda 
leaflets, put electoral posters up and sold L 'Humanite. It was the party of workers, of 
II Regis Debray, Lettre ouverte aux communistes .fran~ais et a quelques autres (Paris: Seuil, 1978), pp. 
44-5; Etienne Fajon, L 'Union est un combat (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975), p. 45; Jean Dru, 
'Perspectives sociales et politiques', Politique Aujourd'hui, February 1979, p. 67., 11' ' 
12 22e Congres, Ce que veulent les communistes pour la France (document adopte par Ie "-_ Congres) , 
(St-Quen, 4-10 February 1976); Georges Marchais, Vers Ie changemen~ democratique (rapport au 
Comite Central des 31 mars et rr avril 1977) and in L 'Humanite, 1st Apnl 1977. 
I3 The term 'camarade' has been replaced by 'copain' in the last few years. 
14 Winock, 'L'age d'or du communisme fran~ais', p. 61: FCP's clubs included among others 'les 
Vaillants et les Vaillantes,' for teenagers, 'les Jeunesses Communistes' and women's clubs. 
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those living in council houses or in deprived areas, and of those who were members of 
the CGT.15 Being communist meant belonging to a tightly knitted, and admittedly very 
cocooning family. 
This picture of the commuru'st counter-society was very rosy for some 
communists - but for others, it had a darker side. Indeed, it ostracised those 
communists who did not want to live in a purely communist world, those who rejected 
this form of marginalisation from the rest of French society, and those who preferred to 
move in broader circles. It ostracised those communists who legitimately asserted their 
independence of thought and actionl6 precisely because the FCP associated the harmony 
of its counter-society with uniformity of thought and action among its members when, by 
contrast, it should have based this group harmony on an enriching and more forward 
looking diversity. Indeed, only a diversity of communist thought and action could have 
opened up the Party to the rest of French society and led it to break with the rigidity of 
its structure and of its ideology.17 However, FCP leaders would never have allowed this: 
a closed-up communist counter-society was easier for them to manipulate and to mould 
according to their own changes in strategy. 
Professionally, the FCP represents the working class at every single grade of its 
organisation, including at the highest levels of its decision-making body.18 Georges 
Marchais, who himself took advantage of that system as both a former metal worker and 
15 Ariane Chemin, 'Intimites communistes', Ie Monde, 19 December 1996, p. 13: Gerard, a communist 
and a formeur metal worker/tool-maker, declared that in the 1970s he gave everything to the Party: 
'Pour la CGT, pour Ie parti, Gerard a garde toutes ses soirees. Quand il voulait prendre une joumee 
pour aller a la peche, Ie parti disait non. ' . .. 
16 Patrick Apel-Muller, Pierre Barbancey, Dominique Begles and Alain Raynal.' 'S~x commuOlstes: SIX 
opinions', I 'Humanite, 26 June 1996, p. 3: Jean-Michel Turmel, a commuOlst SInce 1978, admItted 
having a right-wing friend, '[mais] je n'ai pas toujours ete comme cela', he declared, 'j'avoue que j"ai 
parfois fait du suivisme, un peu ecrase par les adherents plus experimentes'; see our ch. 3. 
17 See previous chapters. " 
18 Ronald Tiersky, French Communism, Eurocommunism and Soviet Power, In Eurocommumsm and 
Detente, ed. by Rudolf L. Tokes (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978), pp. 146-7: Hughes Portelli, 'La 
voie nationale des PC fran9<lis et italien', Projet, no. 106 (June 1976),667. 
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the General Secretary of the Party,19 justified this situation by declaring in his report to 
the Central Committee meeting of 1976: 
C'est dans Ie Parti communiste que se retrouvent les ouvners, et qu'ils y 
occupent a tous les echelons la place preponderante qui correspond a leur role 
dans la societe, a leur responsabilite d'avant-garde dans Ie combat pour Ie 
socialisme, a leur fermete dans la lutte de classe. 2o 
Viewed from that angle, it is certainly true that in contrast to other French political 
parties, which had a more elitist form of representation, and to French society, in which 
the social mobility of the working class was relatively limited/1 the Communist Party's 
organisational ladder had the merit of being both meritocratic and upwardly mobile for 
workers. 22 However, viewed from a different angle, what looked like a very attractive 
system presented two problems. 
On the one hand the FCP's promotional system was flawed: the communist who 
wanted to go up the Party's ladder had to fit in like a piece in a jigsaw. Ideological 
conformism was the price to pay for that. In that sense, an ambitious conformist worker 
had excellent chances of going high up in the Party's organisation, whereas any 
independently minded worker - notwithstanding any white collar employee or 
'bourgeois' intellectual for that matter - had no chance of going anywhere at all. In all 
19 It is also worth noting that Marchais' predecessors, Thorez and Waldeck-Rochet, had respectively 
occupied the posts of employee in a mining company and of market garden worker before leading the 
FCP. 
20 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France; Portelli, 'La voie nationale des PC fran~ais et italien', 
667. 
21 Claude Thelot, Tel pere, te/fils? (Paris: [no pub.], 1982), p. 46, in Robert Gildea. France since 1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 116: in 1977, 58% of sons of workers became workers, 14% 
became white-collar employees, 11 % middle-managers, 7% became artisans or shopkeepers, 6% 
worked as senior managers, 2% were in liberal professions and 1 % became farmers; Serge Bernstein 
and Pierre Milza, Histoire de la France au XX" siecle.· de 197-1 a nos jours, vol. 5 (Brussels: Editions 
Complexe, 1994), p. 2 I 6. 
22 Aviv, 'The French Communist Party from 1958 to 1978: Crisis and Endurance', 179; Maurice 
Goldring, L 'accident (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1978). p. 165. 
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accounts, the consequences of such a system, which tended to clone its leaders over and 
over again, and then stereotyped their attitudes and reactions towards the 'outside' 
world, were negative for the long-term evolution of the Party. Indeed, even if communist 
leaders could call this self-reproducing system a 'consistent', or even a 'constant" Party 
line over the years, the fact remains that in order for the FCP to be 'plus fort' and 'plus 
influent'23 in the French society and political scene, it had to create a 'new breed' of 
leaders able to rejuvenate its ideology and its practice - and in the 1970s, this was not 
the case. 
On the other hand, by granting '[une] place pn!ponderante,24 to the workers 
within its organisation, the Party ironically reproduced on a smaller scale the inverted 
class structure of the capitalist society it kept denouncing as being class ridden, and thus 
unequaL As Althusser put it, in a rather bold and unexpected manner for a communist, 
'Ie parti est, dans sa structure et son fonctionnement hierarchique, exactement calque sur 
l'Etat bourgeois. ,25 Indeed, the social fragmentation of the capitalist system - which 
relegates the working class to the bottom end of the social ladder while placing 
intellectuals in the middle, or even in the upper strata - was inverted in the FCP's 
world, thus creating a two-speed communist counter-society, and even a 'regime of 
castes,26 within its organisation. In this context, the worker was the Party's 'worthy' 
who was served by 'valets' /7 as Althusser put it when referring to the other communist 
white collars and intellectuals like himself 
Second, in the 1970s, the French Communist Party made the defence of working 
23 Expression used by Andre Vieuguet in 'Pourquoi un parti communiste plus influent, plus fort, plus 
actif?', Cahiers du Communisme, February-March 1976. 
24 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France. .' 
25 Louis Althusser, Projet de texte de la cellule Paul LangeVin, Pans, IMEC, fond Althusser, 
ALT2.A27-01.05, unpublished manuscripts " A 
26 Louis Althusser, Projet de livre sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee de la mam ~eut etre Ie 
communisme, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, AL T2.A28-03.0 I to .07. unpublished manuscripts. . 
27 Expression used by Althusser in Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, unpublished 
manuscripts. 
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class interests its Trojan horse. This decision was motivated by two factors. On the one 
hand, under the leadership of Franyois Mitterrand, the Socialist Party forced the 
Communist Party to move towards the left by biting into its middle-strata voters.28 The 
CP was, therefore, cornered into an ouvrieriste entrenchment which, from a communist 
point of view, both protected the Party's specific identiry29 and guaranteed that the Tours 
Congress of 1920 would not be reversed - meaning that the SP and the CP would 
remain distinctly different. On the other hand, the French economic crisis which resulted 
from the 1973 oil crisis, allowed the Party to strengthen its position as the defender of 
the working class.30 Indeed, if Marx had written that 'when society is in decline, the 
workers suffer most severely,'3l the Party was ready to come to their rescue. In that 
sense, it can be argued that if, as from 1973-74 onwards, the 1970s looked both socially 
and economically dark for France in general, for the FCP, by contrast, these were golden 
times - and for a good reason. The Party's rhetoric was perfectly adapted to a situation 
of crisis, which meant that it did not have to adapt its strategy to a new or unknown 
situation. It just had to apply the Marxist analysis and discourse to the then 
contemporary period. Besides, this also explains why the Party could avoid looking for 
diversity of thought among its members and its leadership. Everything was pre-
established in Marxist texts, and consequently the Party's ideology was perfectly in step 
with France's economic situation in the 1970s, and with its social condition. 
On economic grounds, the Party took the view that workers were crashing 
headlong into industrial restructuring - and in a context of delocalisation, development 
28 See ch. 7. 
29 Ibid. . M ·d lEd·· 
30 Jacques Chambaz, Realites et strategie: Ie PCF, une demarche nouvelle (Pans: eSSI or ltlons 
Sociales, 1990). p. 45. . . 
31 Karl Marx. Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 18-1-1. English translatIOn (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart. 1970). p. 71. 
85 
of automated production lines and computerisation of tasks/2 this was a perfectly 
legitimate observation. Indeed, this was the case, for instance, in traditional sectors such 
as the textile industry, and in motor industries like car manufacturing and building trade, 
in which the FCP had a stronghold33 - and thus, from a rather cynical point of view, a 
strong interest in keeping these workers going as they fed the Party's numerous cellules 
d' entreprises as well as its agitator on the ground for the workers' social and economic 
claims, that is to say the CGT trade-union. However, one has to admit that, by fighting 
for the creation of jobs, the reduction of working hours and the improvement of working 
conditions, the Party played a positive role in French society.34 Indeed, the section of the 
working class, which was the most threatened by industrial restructuring, could find a 
legitimate voice in the FCP. The Party provided their only voice on the French political 
scene. It was the only resort they had to make themselves heard on a national level, for 
right wing parties were not interested in them and the Socialist Party had left this 
ouvri£~riste comer to the CP. 
On social grounds, the French Communist Party based its strategy on the 
proietarisation and the marginalization of the working class in the 1970s. Arguably, at 
that time, this conception was correct, for on the one hand the economic crisis threw a 
section of the working class into the innermost depths of unemployment, 35 
underemployment and low breadwinning/6 while on the other, the modernisation of 
production systems created new job demands for specialised workers. Forgotten by 
32 Jean Elleinstein Une certaine idee du communisme (Paris: Julliard, 1979), p. 86; cf. Emmanuel 
Todd's analysis' of the 1970s economic crisis in Arnaud Spire, 'Emmanuel Todd: revolte et 
decontraction', L 'Humanite, 26 June 1996, p. 6. 
33 Bernstein and Milza, Histoire de fa France au xr siecie, p. 206; E~manuel. Todd, La ~~uvell~ 
France (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988), p. 190; Jean Om, 'Perspectlves soclales et pohtIques , 
Politique A ujourd'hui, no. 7-8 (1979), 67. . . " . , 
34 Alain Duhamel, in 'Un nouveau communlsme, est-ce pOSSible? , L Humanrte Hebdo, 25-26 March 
2000. . bo 6')0 f II 
35 Bernstein and Milza, Histoire de fa France au XX" siecie, p. 218: workers made up a ut ~ 0 0 a 
unemployed. 
36 Jean Fabre 'La crise de la societe fran~ise, la crise de l'imperialisme' (report to the Party conference 
on 'La cris~ de la societe fran~ise et la crise dans Ie monde capitaliste'), L 'Humanite, 24 May 1975. 
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traditional parties, which preferred to centre their strategy on a more numerous middle 
class,3? and marginalized by a capitalist society basing its values on money and on the 
possession of material goods, the workers would have fallen through the net of the 
system
38 
if the FCP had not drawn attention to their daily problems.39 The French 
Communist Party fulfilled, therefore, a useful function for the working class. It was 
indeed thanks to the Party that those who were at the bottom of the social ladder had 
access to the political world.40 It was thanks to the Party that a certain balance was 
reached in terms of political representation, whether it was within the Union of the 
Lefi,41 that is to say by contrast to a non ouvrieriste SP, or at the level of the general 
parliamentary spectrum. 
In this 1970s context, communist intellectuals found the FCP's role, as defender 
of the economic and social interests of the working class, perfectly justified: as 
communists first and foremost, they were in complete agreement with their Party - and 
this was even the case between the Party's left and right guard, meaning between the 
Marxist Althusser and the Eurocommunist Elleinstein. Althusser - who was all too 
happy to be given the opportunity to expand on Marx's ideas, to attack the 'bourgeois' 
state and to show why the notion of dictatorship of the proletariat should have been kept 
by the partl2 - thus wrote in 1977 that 'les travailleurs font chaque jour l' experience 
concrete de l'intervention de l'Etat bourgeois dans l'exploitation economique [ .. .].,43 As 
37 Sofres survey mentionned by David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, The French Communist Party in the 
Fifth Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 208: in 1978, the FCP's electorate was made up by 
49% workers, 20% unemployed, and 19% white-collar employees; Franyois PI atone, 'Les electorats 
Iegislatifs sous la Cinquieme Republique', Revue Franc;aise de Science Politique, no. 42 (1992),301-
14. 
38 Duhamel 'Un nouveau communisme, est-ce possible?'. 
39 Report of Rene Piquet to the Central Committee, L 'Humanite, 30-31 March 1976; Georges Marchais, 
Pour gagner et changer vraiment, un seul moyen, votez commu~iste Ie 12 mars (rapport p,:esente ~ la 
conference nationale des 7 et 8 janvier 1978), p. 27; Marchals, Vers Ie changement democratlque 
(rapport au Comite Central des 31 mars et rr avril 1977). . 
40 Duhamel, 'Un nouveau communisme, est-ce possible?'; Jean BurIes, Roger MartellI and Serge 
Wolikow, Les communistes et leur strategie (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1981), p. 213. 
-tl Duhamel, ibid 
42 See ch. 5. 
43 Louis AlthusseL :! :!" Congres (Paris: Maspero. 1977). pp. 40-1. 
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for Elleinstein, he explained, with directness, in 1981 that 
[Ie PCF] est Ie porte-voix des travailleurs, la caISse de resonance de leur 
mecontentement. lIs ne votent pas pour qu'il gouverne, mais pour affinner leur 
volonte de voir s'ameliorer leurs conditions de vie. lIs ne sont ni marxistes ni 
communistes, mais ils votent pour Ie Parti qui les defend. 44 
Elleinstein's statement was blunt and risky for a communist, but as a well-established 
intellectual dissident, he had nothing to lose by putting the Party's patience to the test 
one more time - and he certainly did that. The FCP leadership could only disagree with 
Elleinstein's statement for, as far as it was concerned, the Party had done everything in 
the past ten to fifteen years to be perceived by the general public as a future party of 
government. Its slow, but secure acceptance of the institutions and practices of the Fifth 
Republic,45 as well as its involvement in the Union of the Left46 and its Programme 
Commun de Gouvernement proved this. However, Elleinstein's point was well founded. 
Part of the communist vote was a protest vote47 against economic and social conditions, 
as well as against the established institutional power - and this vote was volatile,48 thus 
unreliable. 
Anyway, whatever these points of contention were in the 1970s, the fact remains 
that at that time, Elleinstein and Althusser did agree in general terms with the communist 
44 Jean Elleinstein, lIs vous trompent, camarades! (Paris: Belfond, 1981), p. 159. 
45 The FCP officially accepted political pluralism in 1964, political aItemance in 1972 and democratic 
passage to socialism in 1976; cf. Jean Baudoin, 'L 'assimilatio~ progress.i~e de la Constitution de 1958 
par Ie Parti Communiste Fran~ais', Revue franc;aise de sCience pohtlque (1986), 802-3; see our 
introduction. 
46 Baudoin, ibid., 805; see our ch. 7. 
47 It is also worth noting that protest votes can also go to the French National Front; cf. Todd, La 
nouvelle France: 'Le Front National est certainement la droite la plus proletarienne jamais observee 
en France', p. 269. 
48 In 1926 Pierre Semard already called the FCP 'un parti-passoire'; quoted in Ann ie Kriegel, Les 
communistes franc;ais (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968), p. 32: Kriegel also wrote in her book that 'Ia 
fluctuation des effectifs [ ... ] est [ ... ] particulierement forte dans Ie parti communiste', p. 32. 
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leadership's analysis of the economic crisis and with the importance of the Party's social 
role on the French political scene. However, when it came to the way the Party acted 
towards the working class, the pattern was completely different: Elleinstein and 
Althusser were no longer in tune with their Party leadership. 
For Elleinstein and Althusser, the Party leadership made two fatal mistakes, first by 
adopting an extreme ouvrieriste attitude towards the working class, and second by failing 
to recognise the state of deproietarisation, or even relative embourgeoisement, of the 
working class in the 1970s. 
First, for Elleinstein and Althusser, the ouvrieriste attitude of the French 
Communist Party was illustrated by its campaign 'against the poverty of the working 
class' .49 This campaign was officially launched at the Party's 22nd Congress of 1976 by 
Georges Marchais who did not hesitate to assert, in front of his fellow delegates, that 'les 
travailleurs ont Ie sens de la dignite. Ils n'aiment pas ''tendre la main." Pour eux, la 
misere, la pauvrete ne s' affichent pas. Elles se cachent'. 50 
Marchais' statement was blunt, it sounded heartfelt, and in all accounts it was 
correct to some extent. Indeed, as we have seen previously, in the 1970s, certain 
categories of workers were pulled down the social ladder both by industrial mutations 
and by the economic crisis which hit France as from 1973-74. However, Marchais' 
statement had to be put in perspective. Considering Mittterrand's strategy of cornering 
the FCP in the left of the political spectrum, by biting into a large section of its middle of 
49 This campain was coupled with another one aimed at 'f~ire p~yer les ~iches': c~. Geo:~es Mar~hais, 
Parlons franchement (Paris: Grasset, 1977), p. 53 and L espOir au present (Pans: EdItIOns Soclales, 
19~O), p. 77; L 'Humanite, 27 January 1978. e' ". 
50 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France; cf. 23 Congres, Pour une avancee democral1que (rapport 
du Comite Central presente par Georges Marchai~),. (St-Quen, 9-13. May 19~9); Paul Lauren~. 
'Regards pour 1977', France Nouvelle, 1977, p. 7: It IS also worth notmg that, m 1976, Marchals 
contradicted himself. On the one hand, he associated the working class with the 'proletariat' in his 
campaign against poverty. On the other hand, he partly justifi~ t~e abandonment of the .dictatorshi~ 
of the proletariat by stating that the 'proletariat' ~as far too hmlted a tenn to be kept msofar as It 
referred exclusively to the poorest core of the workmg class; see our ch. 5. 
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the range electorate, the French Communist Party had no other alternative but to adopt 
an ouvrh?riste policy. Marchais' statement was, therefore, far from being gratuitous. On 
the contrary, it was a very interested act. Indeed, in order to promote its ouvrieriste 
policy, the Party had to make the workers believe that French society and the other 
political parties vilified them whereas, by contrast, the FCP praised them and was their 
natural representative. But whatever the motivations of the Party leadership, Elleinstein 
and Althusser strongly disagreed with its ouvrieriste policy, and they did not hesitate to 
voice their criticisms. 
On the one hand, the criticisms expressed by Elleinstein and Althusser were based 
on the fact that in the 1970s, there was not one working class, which was so-called 
'poor' for that matter, but that there were rather several different working classes. 
Althusser thus asserted in 1978 that 'la c1asse ouvriere n'est ni un tout, ni homogene, ni 
depourvue par on ne sait quel miracle de contradictions internes,51 - a statement 
ElIeinstein expanded on in 1979 by writing: 
II faut distinguer naturelIement les differentes categories d'ouvriers [ ... ]. Or, 
pendant la campagne electorale de 1978, on a entendu Georges Marchais 
denoncer avec force les dix-sept millions de pauvres, c'est certain, mais ce n'est 
pas Ie cas des ouvriers qualifies ni meme la plupart des ouvriers specialises. 52 
The remarks expressed by Althusser and ElIeinstein were, by all accounts, correct. 
Indeed, contrary to what the FCP leadership thought, not all communist workers could 
be considered as being 'poor,.53 If some of them did live below the poverty line, most of 
51 Louis Althusser. Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie Parti Communiste (Paris: Maspero, 1978), p. 98. 
_'2 Elleinstein. Une certaine idee du communisme, p. 29. .. _ 
53 Fran~ois Hincker, Le Parti Commllniste au carre/our: essai sur quin~t' ans de son h,stOlre. 1<)0)-1981 
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1981). p. 156. 
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them did not. Consequently, communist leaders made the mistake of putting all workers 
in the same basket. They considered that the working class was united54 and uniform -
meaning that it formed one single homogeneous group - when, in reality, it was 
heterogeneous. In the 1970s, there was, broadly speaking, a lower working class -
whose members could, admittedly, fall through the poverty trap at any time, even more 
so in a period of recession like the one which hit France after the 1973 oil crisis - a 
middle and an upper working class which was relatively close to the bottom end of the 
middle classes in terms of income and behavioural patterns. 55 
On the other hand, the criticisms expressed by Elleinstein and Althusser were 
based on the Party's parallel between the workers and 'the poor' - an association they 
found both irrelevant, from a 1970s perspective, and detrimental to the workers' dignity. 
Elleinstein thus wrote in Le Nouvel Observateur that 'la composition de la classe 
ouvriere n'est plus celle du proletariat [de] Marx [ ... ] ni celui [de] Lenine,56 and 
Althusser asserted in Le Monde that 
la classe ouvriere [ ... ] ne se reconnait pas spontanement dans la 'pauvrete', notion 
qui vient du XIXe siecle et en deya, avec sa surcharge de philanthropie ou 
d'· 57 aSSIstance. 
Their remarks were, again, correct. By referring to the workers as the 'poor', and by 
lowering them to the rank of the down-and-outs, communist leaders made the mistake of 
54 Chambaz, Realites et strategie: Ie PCF, une demarche nouvelle, p. 124; A. Insel, 'La prise du pouvoir 
par les travailleurs', Luttes et Debats, March 1979, p. 25; Guy Hermier, 'Rapport introductif, in Les 
intellectuels, la culture et la revolution, ed. by Conseil National du PCF (Bobigny, 9 and 10 February 
1980), (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980). 
55 Such as, among others, consumption habits and hobbies. 
56 lean Elleinstein, 'Un communiste juge les communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 6 September 1976, 
p. 64 and lis vous trompent, camarades!, p. 212; lean-Marie Domenach, Enquete sur les idees 
contemporaines (Paris: Seuil, 1981), pp. 25-6. 
57 Louis Althusser, Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste, pp. 63-4; cf. letter written by a 
worker to his federal section in Michel Cardoze, Nouveau voyage a I'interieur du PCF (Paris: 
Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1986), p. 149. 
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looking at the 1970s from a late nineteenth century point of view. They fell back on a 
Marxist analysis which not only turned the clock back nearly a century, by viewing the 
workers as an industrial proletariat, but which was also incompatible with the 
deprolitarisation,58 or even the relative embourgeoisemenf9 of the working class in the 
1970s. Consequently, the French Communist Party remained a party of the past, a 
dinosaur of ouvrieriste politics, precisely when it should have tried to become a more 
modern, flexible and adaptable party. Arguably, this was in some ways a more 
comfortable, and rather less risky, position for communist leaders than trying to keep up 
to date with the social transformations that were being experienced by the working class. 
Indeed, in order to keep up to date with the depro/etarisation and the subsequent 
embourgeoisement of the working class, communist leaders would have had both to put 
the ouvrierisme behind them and to move towards the right, meaning where most of its 
voters could be found, and also where the Socialist Party was looming. This strategy 
would have been risky for the FCP - but, in the 1970s, communist leaders were neither 
ready to confront the SP on that ground, nor willing to move away from their ouvrieriste 
policy. 
Second, in the 1970s, both Althusser and Elleinstein criticised the passeiste 
attitude of the French Communist Party. Althusser warned communist leaders that 
you have to pay the most careful attention to what the masses [ ... ] have in their 
minds as a result of their material, ideological and political conditions of existence 
[ ... ] the masses [must be] able to recognise their own will in the line proposed to 
them.60 
58 Ronald Tiersky, 'Le peF, parti du passe ou parti d'avenir?', in Olivier Duhamel and Henri Weber, 
Changer Ie PC? (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1979), pp. 236, 238. 
59 Domenach, EnqUl?te sur les idees contemporaines, pp. 25-6. 
60 Letter from Louis Althusser to the Italian communist Maria Macciocchi, in Maria Antonietta 
Macciocchi, Letters from inside the Italian Communist Party to Louis Althusser, English translation 
(London: [no pub.], 1973), p. 300. 
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and Elleinstein wrote: 
Le PCF [ ... ] a adopte une attitude de defense immediate des travailleurs touches 
par Ie ch6mage [ ... ]. [Mais] ce n'est pas en sautant sur place et en criant 'De 
l'emploi! De l'emploi!' qu'on reussit it en creer et it resoudre les problemes qui se 
posent aux travailleurs. En fait, trop nombreux sont les militants de gauche qui 
adoptent face aux problemes des transformations technologiques une attitude 
passeiste et volontariste, fondee en fait sur Ie refus de les prendre en 
consideration. Intellectuellement et moralement, ils se mettent dans la situation 
des employes des societes de transports it cheval qui, dans les annees 1820-1830, 
cassaient les voies ferrees parce que l'essor des chemins de fer les privait de leur 
il 61 trava . 
In all accounts, Elleinstein was right as it can be argued that what was true at the time of 
Marx and Lenin, during the golden age of industrial mechanisation, Fordism, Taylorism 
and the breakdown of production work into individual operations, no longer reflected 
reality in the 1970s. Indeed, at that time, France was entering a post-industrialist era 
which was marked both by the phenomenon of de-industrialisation to the benefit of the 
service sector, and by the development of a leisure and mass-consumer society.62 On the 
one hand, de-industrialisation created a need for specialised workers63 and the expansion 
of the service sector created some precarious, if not poorly paid, jobs in areas such as 
tourism and large retailing. On the other hand, the development of leisure activities and 
61 Elleinstein, lis vous trompent, camarades!, p. 147. 
62 Domenach, Enquete sur les idees contemporaines, pp. 25-6; Alain Amicabile quoted in Cardoze, 
.Vouveau vOJ'age a I 'interieur du peF, p.150. , 
63 Gildea, France since 1945, p. 103; Bernstein and Milza, Histoire de fa France au X.X'" siecle: de 1974 
a nosjours, p. 207. 
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mass-consumption contributed to a narrowing of the gap between the working class and 
the other strata of French society,64 as life styles became more and more homogenous. 
Consequently, the working class became less and less ouvrieriste, which of itself severely 
threatened the very identity and the electoral base of the Party of the 'exploited' working 
class.65 Even the term 'working class' became an anachronism, as society divided itself 
more and more into two camps: a small upper class made up of. among others, 
businessmen and Enarques, and a large middle class, ranging from the supermarket 
cashier to the 'petit-bourgeois' cadre d'entreprise. In that sense, instead of narrowing its 
strategy to 'the poor workers', the FCP could have broadened its horizon to include all 
elements of the classe moyenne who, after all, shared the same concerns about 
employment, social welfare and purchasing power as the old working class. 
In the 1970s, therefore, the Party's misfortune was its inability both to keep up 
with the times and to ask communist intellectuals to adapt a Marxist-Leninist theory, 
based on the exploitation of industrial workers, to a society which was richer, more 
bourgeois as a whole, and less and less proletarian. As we have seen previously, this 
misfortune was consistently identified by communist intellectuals like Althusser and 
Elleinstein in the 1970s - but at that time, the FCP could not listen to these 'bourgeois' 
and furthermore dissident intellectuals. Moscow would not have allowed it.66 Althusser 
and Elleinstein were, consequently, preaching in the Party's wilderness, which gave 
64 Georges Lavau, A quoi sert Ie Parti Communiste Franr;ais? (Paris: Fayard, 1981), p. 79. 
65 George Ross, 'Party Decline and Changing Party Systems - France and the French Communist 
Party', Comparative Polities, 25, no. 1 (October 1992),47. 
66 In the 1970s, the FCP and its General Secretary, Georges Marchais, were under Moscow's grip. On 
the one hand the FCP depended on the Soviet Union to finance its activities, and on the other hand, as 
Chistopher Andrew has observed, 'Ie KGB a serieusement envisage de faire publier les documents sur 
Ie passe de Marchais en Allemagne pendant la guerre' if Marchais had gone 'too far' in opening up 
the FCP; Christopher Andrew, interview of, 'Le KGB en France', Le Nouvel Observateur, 23-29 
September 1999, p. 145; cf. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive 
(London: Penguin, 1999); Althusser acknowledged this in Sur fa mort du PCF (;\fort et survie du 
PCF). (J 982-83?), Paris, lMEC, fond Althusser, AL T2.A29-01.05, unpublished manuscripts: 'Tout ce 
beau monde vit sous la direction d'un Georges Marchais tenu par les sovietiques et ses propres 
camarades pour avoir eu un jour vingt ans et avoir commis la bevue de partir dans la production de 
guerre allemande'; see our ch. l. 
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them, arguably, a certain leeway: they could push their train of thoughts even further by 
demanding that the Party make major changes not only to its general conception of 
French society, but also to its internal ouvriiristes practices. Althusser thus wrote: 
Le parti communiste doit changer. Non seulement dans ses pratiques internes 
(rendre Ie centralisme democratique enfin democratique) mais aussi dans ses 
pratiques politiques externes, c'est-a-dire dans sa ligne. Car il ne sutEra pas de 
beaux discours pour gagner a l'union du peuple de France, et a plus forte raison 
au parti, les gens [des] couches intermediaires, aussi ebranlees soient -elles par 'la 
crise' .67 
To which Elleinstein, who fully agreed with Althusser's point of view, replied: 
La fonction tribunitienne du Parti communiste fran9ais subsiste, mais elle ne peut 
suffir a assurer les bases de son pro pre developpement, dans la mesure OU elle ne 
se renouvelle pas en direction des nouvelles couches sociales, de ces millions de 
salaries que les transformations techniques ont fait naitre et prosperer. 68 
In the 1970s, however, it was easIer for the FCP to continue to follow the same 
ouvrieriste route, insofar as it knew it by heart, and insofar as it did not involve making 
major organisational readjustments. As the Party's ideology, internal organisation, and 
even daily routine evolved around the working class in the 1970s, it would have been 
indeed very difficult for the FCP to do away with an ouvrieriste discourse and replace it 
with a more moderate discourse. For the Party, it would have meant questioning the 
67 Louis Althusser, Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Le malaise du 22e congres), Paris, IMEC 
fond AIthusser, AL T2.A24-0 1.0 1 /02 to -02.01, unpublished manuscripts. 
68 Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme, p. 32. 
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validity of its entire ideological system - from its social role to its dedication to the 
working class, its conception of socialism and the role of its intellectuals. It would have 
also meant questioning the caste system of its internal organisation, which propelled, by a 
sort of 'communist divine right', a former worker like Georges Marchais to the very top 
of the Party. These changes were desirable, but unrealistic in the 1970s, even more so 
since this decade was marked by electoral battles not only against the Right, but also 
against a Socialist Party which was making ever increasing inroads into the communist 
electorate. 69 
To conclude, the French Communist Party was misfortunate in failing to adapt itself to 
social and economic change 70 precisely when communist workers and intellectuals 
pointed out these developments, and when some of them started openly criticising the 
Party's ouvrieriste attitude. Cornered in the ouvrierisme by the Socialist Party and 
ideologically contented by the 1970s economic crisis, the Party could not move away 
from its ouvrieriste retreat: it was an ambivalent situation to be in, but admittedly the 
Party managed to find a certain stability by harmonising its actions to its ideology. 
Nothing could question the Marxist-Leninist theory's emphasis on the exploitation of 
industrial workers. Nobody in the FCP could open the eyes of a communist Leadership 
which was at the mercy of Moscow - a fact that neither Althusser nor Elleinstein fully 
took into account in their criticisms of the Party. Althusser thus wrote rather unfairly that 
'quand on meprise a ce point et les travailleurs manuels, et les travailleurs intellectuels, il 
ne fait pas de doute qu'un jour on ne se casse les dents,.71 The Party's misfortune had, 
indeed, fateful consequences in the long-term - consequences which were already 
69 See ch. 7. 
70 Ironically, Andre Vieuguet, a communist official, stated at the Party's 22nd Congress that 'la classe 
ouvriere, par sa place dans la societe. est la plus apte a prendre en charge les idees de changement,' in 
Andre Vieuguet, 'Pourquoi un parti communiste plus influent. plus fort, plus actif?·. 
71 Althusser, Les vaches noires, unpublished manuscripts; cf. Philippe Robrieux. Histoire interieure du 
Parti communiste (1972-1982). vol. 3 (Paris: Fayard. 1981), p . . +3q. 
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visible in the late 1970s. As Elleinstein put it in 1979, 
Ie PCF n'a pas mordu sur les couches moyennes salariees ni sur les intellectuels, 
mais, au contraire, il a perdu tres nettement par rapport a 1973 [ ... ] il perd chez 
les ouvriers tres qualifies, et cela principalement dans les regions OU Ie 
developpement culturel est Ie plus grand [ ... ]. C'est Ie retard mis par Ie PCF a se 
transformer et a prendre en compte les problemes poses par l'evolution de la 
societe franvaise depuis vingt-cinq ans qui [ ... ] [en] est la cause.72 
Elleinstein's comment was right in general term, but he overestimated the Party's margin 
of manoeuvre: Moscow called the tune until 1984. 
In this context, one might have thought that after its opening up in the early 
1990s - which was an encouraging sign - the French Communist Party would have 
wiped away its reflexes ouvrieristes and opened itself to other classes. However, 
although the Party was, in the 1990s, conscious of the urgency to review its class 
position73 - as concentrating on the working class no longer paid electoral dividends -
it still went on focusing on the 'poor' workers in the same manner as in the 1970s. This 
situation was reflected by the Party's 30th Congress, which was held in Martigues at the 
end of March 2000. 
On the one hand, this Congress marked a crucial step forward in the history of 
the FCP by stating in its conclusions that: 
Parmi les ouvriers eux-memes, Ie sentiment d'appartenance de classe a beaucoup 
72 Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme, pp. 81-2; Bell and Criddle, The French C ommunisl 
Party in the Fifth Republic, p. 202: at the 1978 legislative elections the FCP got 20.7% of the votes, 
16.1% in 1981,9.6% in 1986, 11.4% in 1988, and 9.1% in 1993. 
73 Francette Lazard wrote in 1993 that '[Ie PCF] ne se definit plus a priori par son rapport a la classe 
ouvriere ou a la theorie marxiste' in Rapport introductif au Comite Central des 28. 29 et 30 
septembre 1993 (L 'Humanite, 29 September 1993). 
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recule. [Le monde du travail] est aujourd 'hui marque par la diversite, 
l'intellectualisation, y compris du travail ouvrier, la feminisation, Ie poids plus 
important de la recherche et des activites creatives. Ce mouvement appelle une 
autre conception du rassemblement et de notre regard sur les classes sociales [ ... ]. 
La lutte des classes est une realite [ ... ]. Elle s'etend a de nouveaux terrains et 
acteurs.74 
F or the first time, a communist Congress emphasised both the imperatives for the Party 
to be fully integrated into French contemporary society and the diversification of the 
working class - imperatives which were identified by Althusser and Elleinstein back in 
the 1970s, and which were finally acknowledged by a Party still refusing to mention its 
sources. Anyway, these decisions were warmly received by the Congress delegates, who 
saw in them not only a reversal of the eulogy of the workers,75 but also a broadening of 
the FCP's social role to other strata of French society.76 But it was not counting on what 
could have been perceived as a small 'detail'. 
If the document of the 30th Congress seemed to close an era defined by class 
struggle, and if it allowed the FCP to further integrate itself into French society, it 
nonetheless kept a firm foot in the past. Indeed, when addressing itself to the destitute, 
the Party kept the same 'miserabiliste' 77 discourse which was denounced as being both 
patronising and inappropriate by Althusser back in the 1970s,78 thus proving that not all 
criticisms expressed by Althusser and Elleinstein had made a positive impact on the 
74 301: Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites (textes adoptes par Ie 3ri 
Congres), (Martigues, 23-26 March 2000), L 'Humanite, 27 March 2000. 
75 Franyois Perrine, a delegate from the Essonne to the 30th Congress, quoted in Alain Beuve-Mery and 
Beatrice Gurrey, 'Le 301: congres du PCF prend ses marques avant de sauter Ie pas du ''nouveau 
communisme"", Le Monde, 25 March 2000, p. 12. 
76 Dominique Gador, an organiser of the 30th Congress' debate on the mutation of the communist 
organisation, in 'Un nouveau communisme, est-ce possible?', L 'Humanite Hebdo, 25-26 March 2000. 
77 Word used by Althusser in Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, unpublished manuscripts. 
78 '''Le retard de notre parti a se mettre a jour ne saurait, sans grave dommage, s'accroitre", dec1arent 
plus de trois cent communistes' (Petition d'Aix-en-Provence signed, among others, by Althusser and 
Elleinstein), Le Monde, 20 May 1978. 
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Party's strategy. In this context Robert Hue, the same one who succeeded Georges 
Marchais as leader of the FCP in 1994, the same one who embodied the opening-up and 
the destaIinisation of the Party, as well as its insertion into modem French society, went 
back in time when talking about '[Ie] respect de la dignite de celles et ceux qui sont 
prives de droits [ ... f9 [face ala] dictature de l'argent'.8o The same sentence could have 
been pronounced at the 22nd Congress of the Party in 1976 or at its 23rd Congress of 
1979. 
One has to judge the actions of the French Communist Party as a whole, 
however, in order to assess the impact made by Althusser and Elleinstein's criticisms on 
their Party's ouvrierisme and lack of adjustment to social change. The facts are that the 
Party replaced its regimented and ouvrieriste type of internal organisation by a pluralistic 
representation which took into account the different characteristics of the whole 
spectrum of its grassroots, and this not only in class terms, but also on age, sex and 
religious grounds.81 The Party substituted its ouvrierisme by an opening up to all social 
strata. It wiped away its passeistes habits by adapting both its discourse and its strategy 
to the mutations of the economic and social landscape. 82 We can, therefore, argue that 
the Party's endorsment of Althusser's and Elleinstein's suggestions demonstrate that 
their analysis of the situation was correct. However, in the 1970s, anyone free to analyse 
the situation would have reached a similar conclusion. 
79 30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegaiites. 
80 30e Congres, ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
at the time of the 22nd Congress (1976): reality or caricature? 
In 1976, the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, sparked off an 
unprecedented and most meaningful controversy within the Party. It was indeed on this 
precise issue that Althusser and Elleinstein not only drew closer together on certain 
points, but also opposed each other the most - thus revealing the flexible mechanism of 
attraction and distancing of tendencies which evolved inside the Party in the 1970s. I The 
controversy over the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat centred around 
three main axes: the Party's decision-making system, 2 the question of Soviet practices,3 
and the role of the state. 
First, according to Althusser and Elleinstein, the abandonment of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat was made unexpectedly and unilaterally by the leadership of the French 
Communist Party. It was unexpected because the decision to drop 'the dictatorship of 
the proletariat' from the FCP's official literature was announced by Marchais on national 
television on 7th January 1976, a month before the forthcoming 22nd Congress which 
should have drawn up future Party orientations.4 It was unilateral because the decision 
was imposed by the Party leadership upon the communist base without any preliminary 
consultation or vote. This blatant lack of internal democracy at the decision-making level 
I See ch. 2. 
2 See ch. 1. 
3 See ch. 6. 
~ Marchais made his decision official on Antenne 2, at the current affairs programme C 'est-a-dire and at 
the FCP's 22n Congress, which took place in St Ouen, from 4 to 10 February 1976; 1500 delegates 
approved the decision to abandon the dictatorship of the proletariat: cf. Philippe Robrieux, Histoire 
interieure du Parti communiste (1972-1982), vol. 3 (Paris: Fayard, 1982), p. 254; Jean Elleinstein, Ils 
vous trompent, camarades! (Paris: Belfond, 1981), p. 86; Elleinstein, 'Ce qui dure encore dans Ie PC 
fran~is - Le temps des glaciations', Le Monde. 23 February 1979. 
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thus prompted Elleinstein and Althusser to react with anger. Elleinstein spoke of an 
abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat which the Party leadership made 'a la 
sauvette'S and 'dans des conditions politiques pitoyables, sans meme ouvrir un debat de 
fond,,6 to which Althusser added bluntly in one of his manuscripts: 
Sous pretexte d'une opinion personnelle [de Marchais], c'est en fait une directive 
politique destinee a l'ensemble du Parti qui se trouve ainsi exprimee: en l'espece, 
par-dessus la tete du Co mite Central et du Bureau Politique [ ... ] [empechant 
ainsi] les nombreuses cellules [ ... ] qui avaient delibere avant l'intervention de G. 
Marchais, de prendre position sur la question de la dictature du proletariat.7 
The conclusion reached by Althusser and Elleinstein was thus both right and beyond 
reproach: by refusing to open a large and in-depth debate on the abandonment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat - the central theme of Marxist-Leninist theories - and by 
jamming the cogs of an already too rigid, too vertical and too compartmentalised 
democratic centralism, the leaders of the FCP behaved in a dogmatic, if not despotic 
manner. 8 The criticisms expressed by Althusser and Elleinstein, regarding the lack of 
internal democracy, therefore started taking shape and germinating in activists' minds as 
from the 22nd Congress of 1976. However, at that time, this was a minor point 
compared to the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was a bigger 
bone of contention. On the one hand, the Eurocommunist historian Elleinstein was 
pleased with the Party's decision to abandon a concept he judged both inadequate and 
5 Elleinstein, lis vous trompent, camarades!, p. 87. 
6 Elleinstein, ibid., p. 86; it is also worth pointing out that the abandonment of the term and concept of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat was proposed by Elleinstein in the communist weekly magazine 
France Nouvelle as far back as 1975, cf. Elleinstein, ibid., p. 86. 
7 Louis Althusser, Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Le malaise du 22" congres), Paris, IMEc, 
fond Althusser, AL T2.A24-0 1.0 1/02 to -02.01, unpublished manuscripts. 
8 See ch. l. 
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anachronistic - a decision which in the end allowed him to run with the pack and by the 
same token to set himself up against Louis Althusser and his disciple Etienne Balibar. 9 
Talking about the two althusseriens who dared to refuse to comply with a decision taken 
supremely by the Congress, Elleinstein wrote: 
Critiquer Ie rejet du concept de 'dictature du proletariat', comme Ie font L. 
Althusser et E. Balibar, depuis Ie 22e Congres du PC, c'est bien evidemment aller 
contre une decision politique du Congres, contre une ligne politique. lo 
On the other hand, marginalized by the lack of any internal debate - which, if it had 
been opened, would have given them a much stronger voice and support - the 
althusseriens stood up against the abandonment of the term 'dictatorship of the 
proletariat', for the concept remained in any case present, the philosophical Marxist 
theory commanding a preliminary passage to the dictatorship of the proletariat before 
reaching socialism. However that may be, the problem raised by the abandonment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was not merely restricted to the non-use of a term and/or a 
concept. The implications were much deeper. As Althusser wrote soundly, 'on peut 
"abandonner" la dictature du proletariat: on la retrouve des qu' on parle de l'Etat et du 
socialisme.' And on that precise point, Elleinstein was in complete agreement with 
Althusser. II 
Second, according to Elleinstein and Althusser, the French Communist Party 
symbolically dropped the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in order to distance itself 
9 Balibar studied under the supervision of Althusser at the Ecole Normale Superieure (Paris) and 
subsequently became not only Althusser's disciple, but also a fervent althusserien along with other 
intellectuels such as Guy Bois and Georges Labica. 
10 Jean Elleinstein, Le PC (Paris: Grasset, 1976), p. 149. 
II Jean Elleinstein, 'Eurocommunism and the French Communist Party' (lecture given at Oxford 
University in 1978), in In search of Eurocommunism, ed. by Richard Kindersley (London: Macmillan, 
1981), pp. 72-3. 
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both from the dictatorial fonns taken by the dictatorship of the proletariat in so-called 
'socialist' countries, and from the all too poor Russian model of 'socialist' society.l2 
Indeed, to a violent, anti-democratic and single party road to socialism, the French 
Communist Party substituted a new passage to socialism which was pacific, 
parliamentary and pluralist with the Union of the Left. \3 To the Soviet model of 
'socialist' society, the Party substituted a socialism 'in the colours of France' which was 
both original and adapted to French national characteristics. 14 Consequently, the French 
Communist Party chose to move away from the path traced by the Soviet model and to 
follow a road which was pioneering, independent,15 but also full of theoretical pitfalls. 
Third, the concept of • dictatorship of the proletariat' automatically brings back 
the role of the state. Abandoned, the concept left a theoretical vacuum which the Party 
leadership and Elleinstein intended to fill with a new communist conception of state 
power implying that the French state should be democratised at all levels before 
disappearing. Preserved, it implied a withering of the state leading ultimately to the 
creation of a free and egalitarian society, a communist society - the thesis sustained by 
Althusser and Balibar. 
In this context, the first part of this chapter will establish the position adopted by 
the Party and Elleinstein regarding the abandonment of the terminology and concept of 
12 See ch. 6; Louis Althusser, 22e Congres (Paris: Maspero, 1977). 
13 Althusser, ibid, p. 25-6. 
14 Althusser, ibid, p. 33; Jean Kanapa, 'Une voie originale, une voie nationale', L 'Humanite, 27 October 
1976; Marchais quoted in L 'Humanite, 22 October 1976. 
15 This strategy was fully inserted into the Eurocommunist movement which was advocated, among 
others, by the French, Italian and Spanish Communist Parties; broadly speaking, Eurocommunism 
can be defined as 'a trend or process leading to an independent, pluralistic concept of socialism, 
embracing respect for individual liberties', cf. Jiri Valenta, 'Eurocommunism and the USSR', 
Political Quaterly, 51 (1980), 127; see also, among others, Carl Boggs and David Plotke, eds., The 
Politics of Eurocommunism: Socialism in Transition (London: Macmillan, 1980), Kevin Devlin, 'The 
Challenge of Eurocommunism', in 'Communism in Europe', Problems of Communism, 16 (January-
February 1977), 1-20, Richard Kindersley, ed., In Search of Eurocommunism (London: Macmillan, 
1981), Hughes Portelli, 'La voie nationale des PC fran9ais et italien', Projet, no. 106 (June 1976), 
659-72, George Schwab, ed., Eurocommunism: the Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundations 
(London: Al dwych , 1981); joint declaration (or 'Eurocommunist manifesto') issued by Georges 
Marchais and Enrico Berlinger, the General Secretary ofthe ICP, in Rome on 15 November 1975, and 
published in 'PCF-PCI: la declaration commune - "Toutes les libertes devront etre garanties et 
developpees"', Le Monde, 19 November 1975. 
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dictatorship of the proletariat. The second part will throw into relief the criticisms 
expressed by Althusser, for whom the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
was a pure caricature. 
According to the French Communist Party and Jean Elleinstein, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat was formally abandoned at the 22nd Party Congress of 1976 for both 
terminological and conceptual reasons. Indeed, the Party considered that if the Marxist 
concept of dictatorship of the proletariat had firm grounds in 1917-18 Russia - as at 
that time the Bolsheviks had no other option but to assert their precarious authority by 
resorting to a 'popular' dictatorship which abolished the previous tsarist regime and 
stamped on any opponent - it had become both inadequate and antiquated in 1970s 
France. 16 But in order to reach these conclusions, the Party had to proceed to the 
dissection of the dual expression 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. 
First, at its 22nd Congress of 1976, the FCP - adopting Elleinstein's and 
Althusser's points, and contradicting its own ouvrieriste strategy based on the 
proietarisation of the working class l7 - worked on the principle that the 'proletariat' 
was far too limited a term insofar as it referred exclusively to the poorest core of the 
working class, and not to all workers, white-collar employees and intellectuals who were 
proietarises by the 1970s crisis,18 and in whose interests the Party and its allies of the 
Union of the Left should take the reins of state power.19 For what the FCP contemplated 
16 Jean Elleinstein, 'The Skein of History Unrolled Backwards', in Eurocommunism, its Roots in Italy 
and Elsewhere, ed. by George Urban, (London: Temple Smith, 1978), p. 76; Marchais quoted in 
L 'Humanite, 20 January 1976; 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central 
presente par Georges Marchais), (St-Quen, 4-10 February 1976). 
17 See ch. 4. 
18 See ch. 3; Georges Marchais, 'In order to take democracy forward to socialism, two problems are 
decisive' quoted in Etienne Balibar, On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, English translation 
(London: NLB, 1977), p. 184; Marchais at the FCP's 22nd Congress and quoted in Le Monde, 5 
February 1976; Bernard E. Brown, 'French Communism', in Eurocommunism: the Ideological and 
Political-Theoretical Foundations, ed. by George Schwab (London: Aldwych, 1981), p. 98. 
19 Elleinstein, lIs vous trompent, camarades!, pp. 212-3; 'Un communiste juge les communistes', Le 
Noul'el Observateur, 6 September 1976, p. 64; M. Adereth, The French Communist Party: a Critical 
History (J 920-8-1) from Comintern to 'the Colours of France' (Manchester: Manchester University 
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for France was a state power which would be shared, consensual, democratic and 
adapted to the French social and economic environment, and no longer a state power 
despotically dominated by a Communist Party representing only a restricted section of 
the population. Therefore, the FCP's decision to abandon the term 'proletariat' came 
directly within the scope of the 'plural' policy paved by the Common Programme as from 
1972, when the term 'proletariat' effectively lost all the meaning Marx and Lenin had 
attributed to it. The restricted core of the 'proletariat' was enlarged to include other 
social strata covered commonly or separately by the FCP and by the Socialist Party. The 
commanded hegemony of the sole 'proletariat,' which was dictated by the Marxist-
Leninist code of conduct, gave way to a will of domination expressed by a greatly 
enlarged working class through its Party. In these conditions, the heretical French 
Communist Party could only be warned by the Soviet Mother Church. The Russian 
historian Zarodov thus reminded the FCP in 1975, that 
the hegemony of the proletariat emerges in Lenin's analysis as a factor of 
constant, profound and all-round influence exerted by the working class on the 
development and prospects of revolutionary process [ ... ].20 
In 1976, however, in the middle of the debate sparked by the abandonment of the 
dictatorship of this 'proletariat', newspapers like Pravda remained silent, limiting 
themselves to the broad description of the 22nd Congress of the FCP, for the CPSU had 
more contentious issues to deal with: the dissection of the term 'dictatorship' and the 
Press, 1984), p. 210; Jean Fabre, Fran90is Hincker and Lucien Seve, Les communistes et I 'Etat (Paris: 
Editions Sociales, 1977), p. 146; Jean Kanapa, 'Les caracteristiques de l'eurocommunisme' (speech 
delivered on 18 November 1977 for the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales of the 
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), France Nouvelle, 18 September 1978, pp. 43-4. 
20 K. Zarodov, 'Lenin: Democratic to Socialist Revolution - Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the 
Democratic Revolution', Pradva, 6 August 1975; Manfred Spieker, 'How the Eurocommunists 
Interpret Democracy', Review of Politics, no. 42 (1980), 433. 
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evacuation of the whole concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
As far as the term 'dictatorship' was concerned, the analysis made by the French 
Communist Party was unambiguous and legitimate. As Georges Marchais asserted at the 
22nd Congress of 1976, in a tone which was admittedly categorical, but also relatively 
reassuring for the non communist electorate - which could potentially be won over by 
the FCP, 
la 'dictature' evoque automatiquement les regimes fascistes de Hitler, Mussolini, 
Salazar et Franco, c'est-a-dire la negation meme de la democratie. Ce n'est pas 
ce que nous [communistes fran9ais] voulons. 21 
For the facts were clear: by accepting political pluralism/2 and consequently electoral 
rules of power alternation, the French Communist Party definitely turned the page on a 
dictatorial method of passage to socialism in order to step :firmly onto a road which was 
both democratic23 and 'plural' with the Socialist Party at its side.24 However, for the 
21 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais) , (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976); Marchais at the 22nd Congress quoted in Le Monde, 5 
February 1976; it is also worth noting that the reactionary communist magazine Proletariat wrote that 
'[Marchais] se sert crapuleusement de I'Histoire pour assimiler Ie mot "dictature" ainsi tronque it 
"l'evocation automatique" des regimes fascistes', May 1976, p. 5. 
22 The FCP accepted political pluralism in 1964, at the 17th Congress of the FCP which was held in 
Paris from 14 to 17 May; c£ Annette Stietbold, The French Communist Parti in Transition: PCF-
CPSU Relations and the Challenge to Soviet Authority (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 67. 
23 Elleinstein, who agreed with Enrico Berlinger's statement at the 15th Congress of the Italian 
Communist Party, in lIs vous trompent, camarades!, pp. 200, 209; Elleinstein, interview of, 'L'apport 
de Trotsky au Marxisme', Critique Communiste, no. 25 (25 November 1978), 71; Elleinstein, 'Ce qui 
dure encore dans Ie PC francyais - Deux pas en arriere', Le Monde, 21 February 1979, and Histoire 
du phenomene stalinien (Paris: Grasset, 1975): Thorez declared to Times, on 19 November 1946, that 
'[on peut] envisager pour la marche au socialisme d'autres chemins que celui suivi par les 
communistes russes', pp. 127-8, and Khruschev said that 'les formes de passage au socialisme seront 
de plus en plus variees', p. 238; Kautsky, Enrico Berlinger and Marchais are also quoted by John H. 
Kautsky, 'Karl Kautsky and Eurocommunism', Communist and Post-communist Studies (1981), 4; 
Marchais quoted in L 'Humanite, 20 January 1976; Marchais, 'La bonne voie', Cahiers du 
Communisme, no. 2 (February 1977), 9. 
24 A pacific and pluralistic passage to socialism was suggested by the FCP at the beginning of the 1960s: 
cf. George Ross, 'The PCF and the End ofthe Bolshevik Dream', in The Politics of Eurocommunism: 
Socialism in Transition, ed. by Carl Boggs, Carl and David Plotke (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 31; 
joint FCP-ICP declaration (Rome, November 1975), quoted in Devlin, 'The Challenge of 
Eurocommunism', 9-10. 
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Communist Party, this path was relatively adventurous insofar as, in the declarations 
made by the General Secretary to the 22nd Congress of 1976, democracy was 
incompatible with the dictatorship of one party and of one person, on the assumption 
that it would be from the extreme-right, but which in fact could well be communist. 25 
Georges Marchais did not say so explicitly, but he did not exclude it either, for he had 
good reasons not to make any link between socialist popular 'democracies' and 
dictatorships. His margin of manoeuvre was indeed both narrow and full of pitfalls. In 
public, he could not risk characterizing the Soviet system as a dictatorial regime -
insofar as the Russian bear could call him back to order by pulling the right strings in a 
rather cynical way.26 In private, by contrast, he could freely condemn the very negation 
of democracy in countries advocating 'socialist' civil liberties under the Red Flag.27 
In this context, it was Elleinstein - the public man, and more to the point the 
bete noire of Moscow since the serialisation of his book Histoire de I' URSS 8 - who 
could allow himself to go further than the FCP in criticising the 'dictatorship of the 
proletariat' as a concept. And it was with an implacable intransigence that the communist 
historian dealt with it, for as far as he was concerned, there was not any shadow of a 
doubt about it: in the Eastern Bloc, the dictatorship of the proletariat merged with the 
dictatorship of the Communist Party in power, and 'socialist' countries were in fact 
'states-parties' practising fervently a semblance of Marxist religion. Elleinstein thus went 
much further than the FCP in his criticisms of the Soviet regime. In 1978, he wrote: 
[Le modele sovietique] c'est la voie d'un mouvement de masse debouchant sur la 
25 Pierre Daix, 'Marchais n'est pas maItre de ce qu'il fait bouger', Le Quotidien de Paris, 8 October 
1976. 
26 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (London: Penguin, 1999), ch. 18 
on Eurocommunism. 
27 Andrew and Mitrokhin, ibid.; see our ch. 2 and ch. 6. 
28 Jean Elleinstein, His to ire de I 'URSS , 4 vols (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975)~ 
see our ch. 3. 
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prise de pouvoir par la force, sur la guerre civile et sur l'exercice d'une dictature 
du proletariat fondee sur l'absence de legalite, et sur des methodes repressives. 
C'est une voie dictatoriale au sens pro pre du terme.29 
Then in 1981, when he had nothing to lose as an incurable enemy of the USSR, an 
'antisovietique' and an 'anticommuniste,30 in the eyes of Moscow, he hammered it in by 
attacking the exercise of state power in 'socialist' countries directly. He wrote: 
La dictature du proletariat s'y [les pays socialistes] est exercee par 1'intermediaire 
du Parti co mmuniste , parti unique ou dirigeant qui s'identifie avec l'Etat. Le 
marxisme y est devenu philo sophie d'Etat.3l 
The statements made by Elleinstein had a strong mearung, for more than a simple 
criticism of an antidemocratic exercise of power in so-called socialist regimes, it was the 
very preservation of the Soviet model within the French Communist Party which lay 
behind the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The decision taken at the 
Party's 22nd Congress of 1976 went much further than the mere rejection of a 
terminology deemed maladjusted to 1970s France. Symbolically, it was a way for the 
Party to reject a road to socialism which proved contrary to its democratic aspirations. 32 
Concretely, it was a way for the Party to imply that if there could be a democratic route 
to socialism - which would be different from that of the Eastern Bloc - there was 
nevertheless a dictatorial route to socialism. But more importantly, for the French 
Communist Party, it was a way to show itself under a good light to the left-wing 
29 Elleinstein, 'L'apport de Trotsky au marxisme', 71. 
30 Youri Sedov, 'Revenir a Eduard Bernstein? Elleinstein decouvre son jeu', Temps No uveaza , May 
1978, p. 14. 
31 Elleinstein, lis vous trompent, camarades!, p. 210, and 'Un communiste juge les communistes', Le 
Nouvel Observateur, 6 September 1976, p. 61. 
32 Elleinstein quoted in France Nouvelle, 19 January 1976, p. 20. 
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electorate in anticipation of the 1978 legislative elections, to insert itself even more into 
the political life of the French nation, and consequently to go astray from Moscow. In 
that respect, the Russians were not mistaken: they got the message and they reacted 
swiftly. 
In 1976, the Soviet press was relatively calm. Newspapers such as Pravda in 
Russia and Temps Nouveaux in France made do with reminding readers of the 
importance of the dictatorship of the proletariat,33 while underlining the fraternal links 
which united the FCP and the CPSU. However, behind the scenes, the game which 
started in 1976 was completely different, as the Mitrokhin Archives have demonstrated. 
From angry letters to slanderous allegations, and references to a shameful past, the 
CPSU used its heavy artillery in order to bring Marchais back into line.34 Moscow indeed 
judged the step made by the FCP to be intolerable, contrary to Soviet interests, and 
potentially contagious to East European countries in search of a milder form of 
. li 35 SOCIa sm. 
Faced with this display of weaponry, the French Communist Party reacted in a 
way which was inevitably diplomatic, but nevertheless firm. The FCP's official Paul 
Laurent courageously reiterated the position of his Party in the middle of Soviet land, at 
the CPSU's Central Committee held in November 1977. He declared: 
In our decision of the 22nd Congress, our party offered the French people a 
democratic, original and independent path [ ... ] toward socialism that accords with 
our country specific features [ ... J. [At the same time] we have not forgotten a 
33 Fran<yois Hincker, Le Parti Communiste au carre/our: essai sur quin::e ans de son histoire, 1?65-1981 
(Paris: Albin Michel, 1981), p. 161; cf. the Russian Zagladin quoted in Leonard SchapIro, "The 
International Department of the CPSU: the Key to Soviet Policy', International Affairs, no. 32 (1976-
77),52. 
34 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin archive, ch. 18 on Eurocommunism. 
35 Pierre Hassner, "L'Eurocommunisme, stade final du Communisme ou de l'Europe?", Commentaire, 
no. 2 (1978), 135. 
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single task of the international solidarity [ ... ]. Fraternal ties have always existed 
and continue to exist between the CPSU and the FCP. Granted, on certain 
questions our views differ. But this in no way diminishes our desire to develop 
our relations both on the basis of independence in opinions and actions and on the 
basis of co-operation [ ... ].36 
The attitude adopted by the French Communist Party after the 22nd Congress was, 
therefore, resolute and constant in the long term. Having been abandoned, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat would never appear again in the FCP's official literature. 
Nothing could make the FCP go back on its decision, not even the generous arguments 
- embellished with rosy pictures such as 'the interests of the people we hold to our 
heart' - which the CPSU put forward in 1978 in order to show the major advantage of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat.37 The divorce between the CPSU and the FCP on such 
a central point of Marxist-Leninist theory definitely strengthened the 'independence in 
opinions and actions,38 of the French Communist Party, and thus widened its margin of 
manoeuvre. But more importantly, launched on its own trajectory, the FCP could 
readapt, or even reinvent the conception it had of the role of the state - an approach 
which could only please Jean Elleinstein. 
The Party had to rebuild its conception of the state around an observation which 
was shared by Elleinstein, and which was certainly obvious, but also relatively foolhardy 
insofar as it threw away Lenin's view on state power and the very base of Soviet state 
36 Paul Laurent quoted in Pravda, 3 November 1977; cf. Rene Andrieu, Lettre a ceux qui se niclament 
du socialisme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978), p. 85; Marchais' speech at the pan-European conference of 
East Berlin (29 June 1976) quoted in Victor Leduc, 'The French Communist Party: between Stalinism 
and Eurocommunism', Political Quaterly, 49 (1978), 404, and in B.A. Ozadczuk-Korab, 'Brezhnev's 
Pyrrhic Victory: the Pan-European Conference of the Communists in Berlin', International Affairs, 
no. 32 (1976-77), 191; Neill Nugent and David Lowe, 'The French Communist Party: the Road to 
Democratic Government?', Political Quaterly, 48 (1977), 270-1. 
37 L. Brejnev quoted by the historian Vsevolod Ejov in 'Dictature et democratie', Temps Nouveaux. 
1978, p. 19. 
38 Paul Laurent quoted in Pravda, 3 November 1977. 
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power: 
[L 'Etat] n' est plus seulement cet Etat embryo nnaire , instrument pour l' essentie1, 
de repression et de domination qu'il etait a l'epoque de Marx et encore a celie de 
Lenine [ ... ]. Briser l'Etat, au sens ou Lenine utilisait l' expression il y a soixante 
ans [ ... ], ya n'a pas grand sens dans la France contemporaine [ ... ] notamment 
parce que l'Etat et la societe civile ont noue des rapports nouveaux, tres etroits.39 
The implications of such an observation were enormous. For the party, the state _ 
meaning the French state - should no longer be destroyed in a Leninist way, by the use 
of violence, but rather pushed to wither away by the use of popular reforms. The state 
should no longer be viewed only as the instrument of repression and exploitation of the 
bourgeoisie, but rather as an actor of liberalism and a social benefactor.4o 
The 'liberal' state was deemed by the Party to play the game of wildcat capitalism 
by bending to free-market rules and by being 'truffe de representants directs des 
monopoles,41 within its apparatus. Under these conditions, it could only exercise a 
constraint on the working class, which as a consequence could fear '[ une] regression 
sociale', ' [ un] recul de civilisation', 42 all in all, a return to the feudal Middle-Ages, with 
heads of large corporations exercising their right of serfdom over their workers. 
The 'social' state was deemed by the Party to be the guarantor of public interests 
and social rights such as pension benefits, health care and education. It could have been a 
39 Elleinstein, 'Un communiste juge les communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 6 September 1976, pp. 
64,67. 
40 Robert Hue, Le communisme: un nouveau projet (Paris: Stock, 1999), p. 119; Jean Elleinstein, 'Un 
communiste juge les communistes', ibid., p. 64; it is also worth noting that this was a contradictory 
situation for Christine Buci-Glucksmann, in 'Pour un eurocommunisme de gauche: in Olivier 
Duhamel and Henri Weber, Changer Ie PC? (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1979). pp. 136-7. 
41 22" Congres, Le socialisme pour fa France (rapport du Comire Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976): 'On ne compte plus les anciens ministres et leurs 
"conseillers" qui occupent des fonctions de direction dans des groupes prives.' 
·e Hue. Le communisme: un nouveau projet, p. 119. 
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rather optimistic vision of France's social situation if the communist argument had not 
been level-headed: as far as the Party was concerned - and still is, as Robert Hue 
follows Marchais' steps in that matter - there was no question of a welfare-state in 
France. The Keynesian theory43 could only be a mere social-democratic adjustment of 
capitalism, and in any case the state never made any 'gifts,44 to anyone, its social and 
interventionist side being dangerously outweighed by its liberal and non-interventionist 
side of 'laissez-faire, laissez-passer. ,45 
On balance, the Party's view of the state certainly improved as from the late 
1970s, but it was still not very flattering. The communists needed to retain ideological 
terrain on which to fight, to assert their project of society and to avoid any confusion of 
identity with the Socialist Party. At the end they did manage to achieve this. As a 
consequence, the Party's discourse remained the same, its dual and unbalanced vision of 
the role played by the state allowing it to draw on an all too well-known catastrophic 
picture of France's situation. From 'la domination toute puissante d'une mince caste de 
milliardaires sur l'economie et sur l'Etat' denounced in L 'Humanite in 1976,46 to the 
'crise du systeme capitaliste' proclaimed by Marchais at the 1978 Eurocommunist 
conference in East Berlin,47 and to the inauguration of a campaign against the poverty of 
'16 millions de travailleurs' exploited by the rich 'profiteurs et gaspilleurs, ,48 there was 
not a shadow of a doubt left for the Party: the French state should be democratised.49 In 
43 'La profession de foi de John Maynard Keynes', in 'Mille ans de croissance economique', L 'Histoire, 
January 2000, p. 77. 
44 Hue, Le communisme: un nouveau projet, p. 125. 
45 Expression ofthe 18th century economist Vincent de Gournay. , 
46 Georges Marchais quoted in L 'Humanite, 5 February 1976; 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour fa 
France (rapport du Comile Central presente par Georges Marchais), (St-Quen, 4-10 February 1976). 
47 Marchais quoted in Jacques Denis, 'Sur l'eurocommunisme et les relations europeennes', Cahiers du 
Communisme, no. 4 (April 1978), 92-108; see among others Georges Marchais, L 'espoir au present 
(Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980), p. 20; rapport Mitten by Jean Fabre, :La crise de 1~, s~iete fr.an<yaise. 
la crise de l'imperialisme' (report to the Party conference on 'La cflse de la societe fran<yalse et la 
crise dans Ie monde capitaliste'), L 'Humanite, 24 May 1975. 
48 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976); see our ch. 4 . 
.t9 Jean Kanapa, 'Les caracteristiques de I 'eurocommunisme' , France Nouvelle. 18 September 1978, p. 
43; Marchais, 23e Congres, Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comire Central presente par 
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that context, the French Communist Party considered that the economic, po litical and 
social democratisation of France, which should lead to socialism, had to go through an 
active and growing participation of the workers in the country's affairs, meaning through 
self-management. 
Imposed with difficulty on the communists by the Socialist Party at the time of 
the signature of the Common Programme on 27th June 1972,50 the notion of self-
management consistently appeared in the FCP's lexicon soon after the abandonment of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat in 1976. Whether it was a mere coincidence, or a late 
recognition of the Socialist Party's good reasoning, or a simple adjustment of 
vocabulary: the question was open regarding the FCP's real intentions.51 However, the 
concept of self-management could only suit the French Communist Party. It fitted the 
Party's desire to give more power to the workers once at the head of the French state. It 
would guarantee the democratisation of all political, economic and social institutions. It 
would make the working class the central decision-making force of the country. And 
finally it would ensure that the power of the working class and its Party would lead to 
socialism. In this context, in 1978 the communist Gerard Belloin from France Nouvelle 
explained that 'il s'agit que les travailleurs, les citoyens exercent reellement Ie pouvoir, 
puis sent reellement organiser leur vie a tous les niveaux et dans tous les domaines' ,52 and 
in 1990, the former head of the Party's Intellectual Section, Jacques Chambaz, 
concluded: 
Georges Marchais), (St-Ouen, 9-13 May 1979); cf a telephone conversation between Marchais and 
Brejnev (8 January 1980) reported in Jean Fabien, Les nouveaux secrets des communistes (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1990), p. 55. 
50 Franryois Mitterrand, Iei et maintenant (Paris: Fayard, 1980), pp. 172-3; Jean Elleinstein, Histoire 
mondiale des socialismes, vol. 6 (Paris: A. Colin, 1984), p. 203. 
51 Mitterrand, ibid, pp. 172-3, referred to the 'griot [Marchais] qui s'habillait en chevre pour mener son 
troupeau. ' . . 
52 Gerard Belloin, who was responsible for the cultural section of the weekly commuOlst magazme 
France Nouvelle in the 1970s, 'Autogestion et rOle des intellectuels', France Nouvelle, 13 February 
1978, p. 36; cf. Anicet Le Pors, Marianne a I 'encan (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980), p. 220; Georges 
Marchais, Le deji democratique (Paris: Grasset, 1973), p. 66; Marchais at the meeting de fa fratemifL; 
and quoted in L 'Humanite, 4 June 1976. 
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La liberte, la democratie, une liberte et une democratie accordees aux exigences 
contemporaines, sont ainsi devenues l'objectif et Ie moyen d'un socialisme 
autogestionnaire. Cette idee cle [ ... ] a justme l'abandon de la dictature du 
proletariat. 53 
Against this background, the 1970s were of particular significance for the French 
Communist Party, as it was during that decade that it renewed its conception of state 
power and launched itself on a new road towards socialism, a self-managerial road which 
was fully compatible with the concept of the state. However, if the concept of self-
management became increasingly popular among workers, if we believe Party o fficials, 54 
it was nonetheless true that Jean Elleinstein made his dissonant voice heard. 
Elleinstein considered that the advanced democratisation of the state had to go 
through a Third Way, meaning a project of society which would be both inserted into the 
left-wing workers' movement, and distinct from Western social-democracy and from 
Soviet socialism. He explained: 
11 ne s'agit aucunement de renforcer l'Etat, malS bien au contraire de Ie 
democratiser [ ... ].55 Ce qu'il nous faut, c'est un projet qui ne doive rien aux 
erreurs du communisme traditionnel ni a celles de la social-democratie [ ... ] [car] 
historiquement, la social-democratie a gere Ie capitalisme. Eile a pu faire, ici et la, 
des reformes utiles pour les travailleurs, mais eile a constitue une digue contre 
53 Jacques Chambaz, who was was a member of the FCP's Central Committee, Realites et strategie: Ie 
PCF, une demarche nouvelle (Paris: Messidor/Editions Sociales, 1990), p. 79; cf. Philippe Herzog, La 
societe au pouvoir: pour depasser capitalisme et communisme (Paris: Editions Julliard. 1994). 
54 Pierre Juquin, 'Democratisation et voie fran~aise au socialisme', Cahiers du Communisme, no. 6-7 
(June-July 1978), 42. . . 
55 Jean Elleinstein, Lettre ouverte aux fran<;ais sur fa Repub/ique du Programme Commun (Pans: Albm 
Michel, 1977), p. 82. 
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des transformations plus importantes [ ... ]. 11 faudrait [donc] que [ ... ] Ie PS se li'vTe 
it une critique rigoureuse des experiences social-democrates [ ... ] ret que] Ie PC 
commence it Ie faire pour les experiences communistes.56 
The argument put forward by Elleinstein was convincing. A Third Way would indeed 
allow the FCP and the SP to break: out of their traditionalist shackles - Soviet shackles 
for the former and social-democrat for the latter - to overstep the Common Programme 
by putting forward a truly pioneering project of society, and to create a powerful and 
coherent counterweight to the Right. However, the Party leadership saw things under a 
different light. 
According to FCP leaders, the Socialist Party strengthened itself to the detriment 
of the Communist Party in the middle of the 1970s. The Socialist Party broke the Union 
of the Left in 1977 by refusing to modifY the Common Programme on the FCP's terms.57 
And on top of that the break: up of the Common Programme led to the defeat of the Left 
at the legislative elections of March 1978. Under these conditions, the leaders of the FCP 
could not bring themselves to contemplate any dialectic between the two parties. 
Georges Marchais was categorical about it: '11 n'est pas question d'une troisieme voie. ,58 
He thus wiped away Elleinstein's idea and closed an important debate on the kind of new 
road to socialism the FCP should take - a debate he did not even bother opening 
broadly within the Party, preferring to reduce Elleinstein' s arguments to ' [ des] 
contreverites, [ des] falsifications et it I' ignorance' 59 rather than taking the risk of facing a 
large confrontation of ideas, which could potentially have overthrown the Party's project 
56 Jean Elleinstein, 'L'avenir des communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 25 September 1978, p. 51. 
57 See ch. 7. 
58 Georges Marchais interviewed on France Inter, Journal de 13 heures, 17 August 1978, and quote~ in 
'Repondant Ii M. Elleinstein - M. Marchais rejette riMe d'une '"troisieme voie" entre la soclal-
democratie et Ie socialisme sovietique', Le Monde, 19 August 1978. 
59 Marchais, ibid. 
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of self-management overboard in favour ofElleinstein's Third Way.60 
However, a strong opposition to Marchais' general scheme remained within the 
Party, an opposition that the General Secretary could neither controL nor eliminate with 
anonymous articles planted in L 'Humanite: 61 that of Louis Althusser. The Marxist 
philosopher was indeed completely opposed to the abandonment of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat in 1976 and to whatever would replace it, whether it was self-management 
or a Third Way. He thus made his voice heard, through his books and in the non-
communist press,62 first by denouncing the hypocrisy of the Party, and secondly by 
demonstrating why the dictatorship of the proletariat was an essential concept which 
could not be scrapped. 
From the '[chien abandonne qui] n'aboit pas [ ... ] [mais qui] mime la vie dure a ceux qui 
l'abandonnent',63 to the 'risque [de] jeter l'enfant avec l'eau du bain',64 these strong 
images used by Louis Althusser in his manuscripts showed his anger about the Party's 
decision to abandon the dictatorship of the proletariat - a decision which he deemed 
both inconsistent and hypocritical. 
Althusser judged the decision of the Party inconsistent, as according to him, it 
was the one and only foil-word 'dictatorship' which pushed the Central Committee to 
drop the whole expression of 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in 1976.65 Like the leper's 
bell, the word itself sent a warning signal to any non-communist who could hear it. It 
60 It is worth noting that the concept of Third Way was not fully defined by Elleinstein in the 1970s. 
61 Louis Althusser, A propos de certains themes developpes dans la conference collective sur fes 
intellectuels: lettre a Francette Lazard, lundi 28 juin 1976, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, AL T2.A43-
01.01, unpublished manuscripts; Althusser wrote to Francette Lazard: "'Attachement inj~stifie a la 
dictature du proletariat": tu sais que c'est la formule qui a ete employee contre mOl dans un 
communique anonyme paru dans L 'Humanite du 14 mai 76.' 
62 The communist press was closed to him. 
63 Louis Althusser quoted in Thierry Pfister, 'Les reactions au changement', Le Monde, 26 April 1976; 
Althusser, Notes de Louis Afthusser sur fa dictature du proletariat, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, 
AL T2.A24-04.02, unpublished manuscripts. 
M Althusser, Notes de Louis Althusser sur fa dictature du proletariat, ibid 
65 Althusser, Les vaches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
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evoked practices which were dictatorial, violent, contrary to the pacifist and democratic 
intentions of the Party. And it could only embarrass a FCP all too anxious to regain 
prestige with the left-wing electorate in order to dominate the Union of the Left. 
Consequently, the Party had to cut itself from dictatorial practices used in 'socialist' 
countries under the Red flag of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' - and Althusser 
could only endorse this decision. He explained: 
Declarer que Ie mot dictature est devenu aujourd'hui 'intolerable' [ ... ] et [ ... ] que 
Ie parti ne veut pas de 'socialisme made in URSS', c' est dissocier la dictature du 
proletariat des pratiques staliniennes: c'est done liberer Ie concept de dictature du 
proletariat de la tres lourde hypotheque historique et politique qui pese sur lui 
depuis 40 ans. 66 
However, for Althusser, it was not enough - and he was right on this point. The Party 
did not push the logic to its own conclusion by condemning the antidemocratic practices 
used in so-called communist regimes on an everyday basis unconditionally. The Party's 
efforts were mere window-dressing as it did not reject the Soviet model as a whole. 67 
Anyway, all this was a separate issue, as the central problem lay in the abandonment of 
the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. 
Althusser judged the decision of the Party to abandon the term 'dictatorship of 
the proletariat' as being hypocritical insofar as for him neither Marchais nor the 
documents of the 22nd Congress of 1976 spoke of a rejection of the concept of 
dictatorship of the proletariat.68 He thus concluded in all good faith that: 
66 Althusser, ibid.; cf. the althusseriens Etienne Balibar, Guy Bois, Georges Labica and Jean-Pierre 
Lefebvre, Ouvrons la !enetre, camarades (Paris: Maspero, 1979), p. 44. 
67 See ch. 6. 
68 Althusser, Les "aches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
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Le Secretaire General n'a pas parle de l'abandon du concept de dictature du 
proletariat, mais de l'abandon de 'la dictature du proletariat' [ ... ] Ie concept de 
dictature du proletariat n'ayant jamais ete abandonne, serait donc maintenu dans 
sa fonction theorique (et donc politique) par Ie parti. 69 
And yet, in a public reply to Althusser, Marchais wiped away the philosopher's 
argument. He spelled the Party's position out by reiterating that the concept of 
dictatorship of the proletariat had really been abandoned, and he finally concluded in a 
cutting way: 'Le marxisme n'est pas un dogme, c'est un guide. ,70 This should have put 
an end to the debate about the real or not-so-real abandonment of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. It should have cleared up any discussion about the matter. But this time, the 
trick did not work. No matter what Marchais could say, no matter if the General 
Secretary was right and if the premises of his argument were wrong, Althusser preferred 
to stick to his original position. For him, there was no doubt about it: the concept could 
only remain as such, for any Communist Party worth the name could not dispense with 
such a central and essential Marxist concept as the dictatorship of the proletariat - and 
he proved his point. 
According to Marxist-Leninist theory, 'general' state democracy does not exist in 
capitalist countries as it is not the people as a whole who exercise their sovereignty, but 
rather a bourgeois minority joined by the middle class.71 As a consequence, the state is a 
69 Althusser, ibid.; cf. Auguste Lecoeur, Le PCF: continuite dans Ie changement (Paris: R. Laffont, 
1977), pp. 85, 87. . . 
70 This answer was given by Marchais on Friday 23 April 1976, at a major sale of MarxIst books In the 
former Bastille railway station (Althusser was also there before Marchais arrived), cf. Pfister. 'Les 
reactions au changement'. . . 
71 Vladimir Ilitch Lenin, Lenin's Thesis on Bourgeois Democracy and Proletarian Dictatorship, EnglIsh 
translation (Glasgow: Socialist Labour Press, 1920), pp. I, 14; Lenin, Sel~cted Wo~ks.' \01. 3 
(Moscow: [no pub.]. 1964), p. 80, quoted in Henri Weber, 'Eurocommumsm, Soclahsm and 
Democracy', New Left Rt'l'it'li', no. 110 (July-August 1978). 
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mirror of 'irreconcilable' class conflicts which agitate society.72 The state is a tool of 
exploitation and alienation used by the bourgeoisie against the workers. 73 The state is. 
therefore, a class dictatorship dominated by the bourgeoisie. 74 In this context, workers 
only have one solution to overcome this power and win the class struggle: they must 
conquer the state in order to set up a dictatorship of the proletariat. But if in Russia in 
1917-18 Lenin and his Red followers had recourse to a civil war against the White tsarist 
Russians in order to impose what ought to have been a dictatorship of the proletariat, it 
is nonetheless true that no definite route to socialism was traced by either Marx or Lenin. 
The door was, therefore, left open to another passageway to socialism, which could be 
pacific and politically pluralist. 75 On that precise point, there was no problem. Althusser 
accepted the democratic road towards socialism taken by a FCP which was adamant 
about respecting the rules of the parliamentary game and keeping close ranks with the 
Socialist Party.76 The matter of discord lay somewhere else: at the level of the role 
played by the state. 
F or the FCP and Elleinstein, the state had a liberal side, and a social side which 
meant that it should be preserved, then democratised and consumed by the 
implementation of self-management or a Third Way. For Althusser, the state acted as an 
exploiter and as an alienator of the working class, which meant that it should be 
destroyed and, as the philosopher put it, '[remplace] par un autre appareil d'Etat qui soit 
un demi-Etat, un Etat qui soit un non-Etat',77 meaning the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
72 Vladimir Ilitch Lenin, On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, English translation (Glasgow: Socialist 
Labour Press, 1976), p. 14. 
73 Louis Althusser, Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, vol. 1 (Paris: StocklIMEC, 1994), p. 436; 
Balibar, On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, p. 170; Vladimir IIitch Lenin, Sur la route de 
I 'insurrection, French translation (Paris: Librairie de I'Humanite, 1924), p. 137; Brown, 'French 
Communism', p. 10 l. . . 
74 Althusser Notes de Louis Althusser sur la dictature du proletariat, unpubhshed manuscnpts. 
75 Althusser: 22" Congres, pp. 43, 446, 448, even if 'dans nombre de cas, Lenine lui-meme identifie la 
dictature du proletariat avec Ie gouvernement violent,' p. 443; Althusser, Ecrits philosophiques el 
politiques, p. 447: the road to socialism can also be pacific 'si les classes exploiteuses acceptent [ ... J 
une restructuration des rapports sociaux. ' 
76 Althusser, 2f' Congres, pp. 40-1. 
77 Althusser, Notes de Louis Althusscr sur la dictature du proletariat, unpublished manuscripts. 
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Anyway, whatever the debate, Althusser did not linger over it. For him, the answer was 
straightforward: even if the Party could evacuate embarrassing terms and replace them 
by a more attractive expression, theoretical and political facts remained as such. 78 
Whether it was a question of the dictatorship of the proletariat or self-management or the 
Third Way, the result would be the same. The counter-attack to the dictatorship of the 
bourgeoisie could only be a reversal of class domination - a rightful justice in a way _ 
a working class' seizure of political, economic and social power, meaning precisely a 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Althusser thus explained: 
[Le concept de dictature du proletariat] renvoie toujours a un autre concept: Ie 
concept de la dictature de la bourgeoisie. Les deux concepts sont identiques 
puisqu'ils prennent acte de la dictature de classe dans une societe de classe: ce 
qui change, c' est la classe qui domine. Mais ce qui ne change pas, c' est 
l'altemative: ou une classe, ou l'autre, ou la bourgeoisie, ou Ie proletariat. 79 
Althusser's argument appears at first sight relatively worrymg from a democratic 
perspective, insofar as a French dictatorship of the proletariat would be as constraining 
on the bourgeoisie as the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie was meant to be on the workers 
- practices which recall all too well early Soviet intentions. However, this sensitive 
point was quickly dispelled by Althusser. In the long run, far from settling in the 
bourgeoisie's former exploitative role, the working class would play another role: it 
would prepare the withering away of the state80 by taking democratic measures,8! by 
making socialism increasingly popular, and by paving the way for a class-free and 
78 Althusser, Les vaches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
79 Althusser, ibid.; cf. Etienne Balibar mentioned in Brown, 'French Communism', p. 99. 
80 Althusser, Notes de Louis Afthusser sur fa dictature du proletariat, unpublished manuscripts; also 
note that the phase of withering away of the state was also called 'somnambulism' by Marx and 
Lenin. 
81 Althusser, Les l'aches noires, unpublished manuscripts. 
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constraint-free society. As Althusser put it emphatically in his Barcelona parabol~ 
Ie socialisme [ ... ] c'est une riviere a traverser [ ... ]. Les travailleurs les plus 
conscients veillent sur la traversee en surveillant Ie groupe des capitalistes, pour 
qu'ils ne sabotent pas Ie voyage. Cela s'appelle dictature du proletariat [ ... ]. Une 
fois la riviere traversee, tout Ie monde descend. Et que fait-on? Ce qu'on veut 
[ ... ]. [Donc Ie communisme c'est] quitter definitivement la rive d'une societe de 
classe, pour aborder sur la rive de la societe sans classes. 82 
The argument presented by Althusser was intellectually very attractive - and the 
communist myth did tempt many intellectuals83 - but concretely it was inconceivable to 
even think of a classless society, free of any constraint, in a world where national policies 
and economies were increasingly interdependent.84 The communist project of society was 
a complete utopia, and Althusser was fully aware of it. 'Le communisme', he said, 'on en 
cause, mais c'est quoi? Un reve irrealisable [ ... ].,85 But by sticking to his logical Marxist 
approach, by aiming high and by pushing towards a communist ideal, the philosopher 
was expressing the achievable need for the workers to playa greater role in political, 
economic and social circles, meaning a need for more popular democracy - all in all. 
just like the Party and Elleinstein, which shows that it was more a theoretical debate than 
. I 86 a practlca one. 
To conclude, the abandonment of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was 
not a mere hypocritical tactic, as put forward by Althusser, but a real reversal of strategy 
82 Althusser, 'Parabole racontee a Barcelone' in Les vaches noires, ibid. 
83 See ch. 6. 
84 lean-Pierre Chevenement Les socialistes, les communistes et les autres (Paris: Aubier, 1977). p. 33. 
85 Louis Althusser, Projet'de livre sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee de la main ~eut etre Ie 
communisme. Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, ALT2.A28-03.01 to .07, unpublished manuscnpts. 
86 Brown, "French Communism', p. 109. 
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- the last word has to go the Party leadership which kept explaining again and again, in 
France and in the USSR, the 'whys' and 'hows' of its new political direction. In that 
sense, the final years of the 1970s, which were marked by the evacuation of both the 
term and the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat from official communist texts, 
were very significant for three reasons. 
First, it was on this precise point of the abandonment of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat that the tendencies, which were formed around the ideas put forward by 
Althusser, Elleinstein and the Party leadership, differed the most. For Althusser, the 
concept of dictatorship of the proletariat could only remain as such. For Elleinstein, the 
concept, having been abandonned, should be replaced by a Third Way. For the Party 
leadership, the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat was replaced by that of self-
management. 
Second, if these tendencies apparently seemed completely antagonistic regarding 
the form to be taken by a new transition to socialism, it was nonetheless true that they 
were fundamentally closer than previously thought. Indeed, they formed a bloc around 
central goals, such as the pacific, parliamentary and pluralistic conquest of power by the 
Fep, the democratisation of state institutions and the progressive withering away87 of the 
state. These tendencies parted primarily when it came to the intensity and the diversity of 
institutional reforms proposed. For Althusser, once the Fep attained power, political, 
economic and social reforms had to be radical and constraining for the bourgeoisie. For 
the Party leadership, they had to be gradual and flexible enough to enable workers to 
seize any decision-making power and also to placate the bourgeoisie. For Elleinstein, 
they had to be implemented by the Fep and the Socialist Party, both of which would 
have been fully reformed - an idea which in the long run would have proved to be the 
87 Elleinstein, 'Un communiste juge les communistes,' Le Nouvel Observateur, 6 September 1976, p. 67: 
cf. Henri Malberg quoted in France Nouvel/e, 6 February 1978, p. 4. 
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best, as it would have certainly helped the FCP to remain a strong and credible political 
force within a new left-wing entente. 
Third, it was the abandonment of the concept of proletarian dictatorship in 1976 
which allowed the Party to distance itself from the CPSU, to integrate itself into French 
institutions and to trace a pioneering route towards socialism. Even twenty years later. in 
1995 and 1999, this fierce claim of independence and innovation remained very vivid 
within the French Communist Party, for as Robert Hue declared, 
[il n'y aura] pas de retour au passe, mais refus des recettes liberales [ ... J. II faut 
donc inventer, explorer d'autres voies88 [ ••• J. [II faut qu'il y ait] affinnation 
resolue d'une conception neuve de la transformation sociale, qui reponde 
pleinement aux realites fran,(aises, qui soit conforme it l'originalite et au genie de 
notre pays, qui soit [ ... ] l'oeuvre de notre peuple, avan'(ant it son rythme, selon 
ses besoins, ses aspirations, ses decisions. 89 
88 Hue, Le communisme: un nouveau projet, p. 125. 
89 Robert Hue, Le communisme: fa mutation (Paris: Stock, 1995), p. 44. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Soviet myth 
The collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989, and more precisely that of the USSR in 1991. 1 
allowed the French Communist Party to free itself from Soviet tutelage and to start 
criticising the authoritarian nature of these socialist regimes. Launched by Georges 
Marchais/ who was perceived up to then as the last Stalinist choirboy of a FCP 
dominated by the Muscovite church,3 these criticisms were pursued as from 1994 by 
Robert Hue, who was regarded as being both more modern and more dynamic than his 
predecessor. 4 But the last General Secretary of the FCP was above all a man who was 
influenced by the discovery of the real face of socialism as from the 1970s,5 a man who 
was marked by Gorbachev's perestroika in 1985-86, a man who witnessed the 
subsequent fall of the Soviet empire and withering away of communist ideology in the 
early 1990s - meaning a man who had both to catapult his Party onto new tracks in 
order to preserve it and to look back on more than seventy years of Soviet history. For if 
this turbulent history was made in Russia, it also deeply marked the French Communist 
Party. 'Parti de l'etranger', 'Parti stalinien', 'Parti a la botte de Moscou' - all these 
colourful terms showed the kind of grip the USSR had on the FCP. Indeed, the Party's 
internal organisation stemmed from Moscow.6 Its national strategy was dominated by 
Moscow. Its international orientation was determined by Moscow. Its ideology was 
I See ch. 2. 
2 Robert Hue, Le communisme: fa mutation (Paris: Stock, 1995), p. 43. 
3 Hue, ibid., p. 102. 
4 Pascal Virot, 'Le Parti communiste a fait son autocritique en novembre, mais aucune victime de purge 
ne souhaite revenir. Les excIus du peF refusent la main tendue de Hue', Liberation, 30 December 
1998, p. 2~ see our ch. 2. 
5 Grigori Svirski, A History of Post-War Soviet Writing: the Literature of Moral Opposition (Michigan: 
Ann Arbor Ardis, 1981), p. 429: the author refers to 'documents-official records, open letters and 
records of min utes' . 
6 See ch. 1. 
114 
modelled on Moscow. 
In 1991, the caesura was therefore both brutaf and salutary for the French 
Communist Party. It was brutal, for the Party suddenly lost its ideological marks and its 
political references. It was salutary, for it allowed the FCP to act on its own accord and 
to modernise itself 8 Consequently, the Party's take off was not only long, difficult and 
painful
9 
for French communists, but also exhilarating for the whole Party as everything 
had to be redone, everything had to be reinvented. In 1995, Robert Hue thus asserted 
that 'Ie Parti [ ... ] n'a pas 'jete l'eponge". Au contraire, il releve Ie defi [face a la faillite 
du modele sovietique]'. 10 The FCP faced indeed a real challenge in the 1990s as, to 
transform its identity, II it had to dissect its own history, question its own practices and 
proceed to an unprecedented ideological upheaval. In this context, a text adopted ill 
March 2000 at the Party's 30th Congress admitted without reserve that 
les dirigeants [ du PCF] ont eu une responsabilite incontestable dans 
I' aveuglement, les non-dits, les erreurs et les retards [ ... ]. Mais il est vrai aussi 
que nous avons partage une meme culture politique [que l'Union so viet ique ] qui 
a conduit Ie Parti a se taire, puis a sous-estimer les crimes et les violations des 
libertes dans les pays socialistes et meme ales soutenir a certaines epoques. Nous 
avons ete sourds aux critiques meme quand elles venaient de communistes. 12 
7 Hue, Le communisme: la mutation, p. 42. 
8 See, among others, Declaration du Bureau politique du Parti communiste jranfais (27 October 1993); 
Francette Lazard, Rapport de la commission sur Ie projet de Statuts, report presented to the 28th 
Congress held from 25 to 29 January 1994 on the democratisation of the Party's internal institutions; 
30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites (textes adoptes par fe 3(/ 
Congres) , (Martigues, 23-26 March 2000) and in L 'Humanite, 27 March 2000, pp. ii to xxii, by 
reference to the rejuvenating, feminization and the multi-ethnicity of the Central Committee. 
9 Hue, Le communisme: fa mutation, p. 42. 
10 Hue, ibid., p. 10. 
11 Ibid., p. 12. . 
12 'Texte de discussion 2: est-ce Ie communisme qui a echoueT in 30e Congres, Un projet communiste 
pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites (textes adoptes par Ie 3(/ Congres). (Martigues. 23-26 March 2000), 
and in L 'Humanite, 27 March 2000, p. vii. 
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Some French communists did indeed express criticisms towards Soviet practices and a 
socialist myth which was both deformed and amplified by the FCP. It was deformed 
because Soviet practices sent back a sanitised picture of the USSR to Western 
Communist Parties. Gulags became mere camps where prisoners enjoyed relative 
freedom.
13 
Siberia 'enchanted' French intellectual communists who went to visit the 
region.
14 
It was amplified because the socialist myth reproduced the image of the 
prosperous and strong Soviet man who smiled in a gigantic com field or in an over-
productive factory. This distortion of the reality suffered no criticism and no doubt. 15 In 
the USSR, renegades and deviationists were either physically or mentally destroyed in 
gulags and psychiatric hospitals. In France, communist dissidents fell under the wrath of 
the FCP,16 the CPSU and its press. 
In the 1970s, this is precisely what happened to Jean Elleinstein - who ended up 
wondering ironically how many years he should spend in a psychiatric hospital1 7 - and 
what could have happened to Louis Althusser18 if personal circumstances had been 
different. The death of his wife, followed by his mental treatment at St Anne's hospital,19 
prevented him from publishing his manuscripts dealing with the Soviet question, that is 
to say Du bon usage des pays socialistes, Projet de texte sur Ie livre de Jean Elleinstein 
'Histoire du phenomene stalinien', Projet de livre sur Ie communisme. For if these 
13 BBC2, 'Tourists of the Revolution - The people's flag', 25 March 2000; see our ch. 3. 
14 Simone de Beauvoir referring to a postcard sent by 'L.' from lrkoutsk, in Siberia, in La force des 
choses (Paris: Gallimard 1963), p. 177. 
15 Lise London, quoted in 30th Congress, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites (textes 
adoptes par Ie 3d Congres), (Martigues, 23-26 March 2000), and in L 'Humanite, 27 May 2000, p. v. 
16 See ch. 8. 
17 Jean Elleinstein quoted in 'En reponse a un habdomadaire sovietique - M. Elleinstein: combien 
d'annees d'hopital psychiatrique dois-je subir?', Ie Monde, 27 May 1978, p. 10, in reply to the 
virulent attacks launched by Youri Sedov, who called Elleinstein an 'ennemi du socialisme' in 'Une 
falsification au lieu d'une etude objective', Temps Nouveaux, 1977, p. 14: also quoted in Daniel 
Vernet 'M. Elleinstein est devenu un "ennemi du socialisme"', Ie Monde, 26 May 1978. 
18 It is w~rth noting that Althusser considered that 'Elleinstein a eu Ie merite d'en finir avec les interdits 
[.,.] ridicules ret] [ ... ] nefastes [ ... ] ret] avec les mensonges et les .insultes de rigueur', in .Proje! de 
texte sur Ie livre de Jean Elle inste in, Histoire du phenomene stalimen (Grassel, 19'76), Pans, IMEC, 
fond Althusser, ALT2.A22-03.1 I, unpublished manuscript. 
19 Louis Althusser, L 'avenir dure longtemps, suivi de Les faits (Paris: StocklIMEC, 1992). On 16 
November 1980, after unconsciously strangling his wife, he left the Ecole Normale for St Anne 
hospital in Paris; see our introduction. 
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manuscripts had been published in the 1970s and 1980s, Althusser could also have 
exposed himself to severe criticisms from the Communist Party leadership. He could 
have tarnished the Soviet myth as well. He could have joined Elleinstein in the camp of 
'ennemis du so cialisme , .20 Therefore, in terms of analysis and subsequent criticisms of 
the USSR, these two intellectual communist dissidents were closer - if not 
complementary - to each other than previously thought. 
In this context, the first part of this chapter on the Soviet myth will deal with the 
French Communist Party's ambiguous attitude towards the USSR. As for the second 
part, it will throw into relief the criticisms of Ell einstein and Althusser towards the FCP's 
attitude. 
In the 1970s, the French Communist Party's attitude towards the USSR was that of a 
strategic waltz. Each step ahead, towards greater independence of the Party from 
Moscow, was followed by a step back which kept the mythical character of the Soviet 
Union intact. Thus, if the FCP rejected the Soviet model of socialism to launch itself into 
a 'socialism in the colours of France', the USSR still remained its ideological point of 
reference. If the Party condemned Soviet practices for being antidemocratic, its criticisms 
were too insipid to expose the dupery of the Soviet system. The mystification of the 
USSR was too deep rooted and established for far too long within the Party to be 
expurged, as for French communists the Soviet Union was the object of a whimsical 
idealisation which had nothing to envy to tales and popular stories. The USSR, the 
mother land of socialism, incarnated what was good. It was synonymous with equality, 
abundance for all, happiness and peace, whereas capitalist countries represented what 
was evil. They incarnated hell, social antagonisms, the oppression of workers and the 
20 Sedov, 'Une falsification au lieu d'une etude objective', p. 14. 
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culture of money-making. In this context, the Red Revolution of 1917,21 the liberation of 
1945, as well as Soviet society and the Soviet economy were lauded by the FCP because 
it was happy to be able to attach itself to elements of its ideal and to present a concrete 
work of socialism to the left-wing French electorate. 
First, the French Communist Party considered that if the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917 was of a violent and bloody nature, it was nonetheless mainly a humanistic act 
insofar as it completed an unfinished French Revolution by giving state power to the 
workers and their Communist Party. The 1917 revolution thus represented the 
overthrow of power based on the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie in favour of workers' 
power. It represented the dismantling of a system perceived by communists as being 
unequal in favour of a socialist regime claiming to be deeply egalitarian. As a 
consequence, Russian history was distorted by communists in order to strengthen Soviet 
power. The October Manifesto of 190522 was ignored, despite the fact that it had created 
a state Duma with consultative functions and thus ended a tsarist autocracy whose 
political structures were too antiquated, and too rigid to favour the take off of a 
relatively backward society. The capitalist style economic development of Russia, which 
started under the reign of Alexander JIl23 and was extended under Nicholas II,24 was 
wiped away when it had placed Russia among the four leading world powers between 
1900 and 1913.25 Consequently, what happened before 1917 did not count as much as 
what came after, for 191 7 was not only the 'year zero' of the socialist calendar, it not 
only marked the imposition of socialism in the former Russian Empire, it was also the 
starting point for what French communists hoped to achieve in France. 
21 Pierre Daix, Le socialisme du silence (Paris: Ie Seuil, 1976), p. 278. 
22 Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (London: HarperCollins: Fontana Press, 1992), pp. 42-4. 
23 1881-1894. 
24 1894-1917. British, Gennan and French capital (French capital came in after the signature of the 
Franco-Russian agreements in 1891-1894) allowed Russia to finance its investments. In 1913. 
predictions maintained that Russia could become the biggest economic power in the world b] c. 1950. 
25 William C. Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the pre-19l4 Balance', World Politics. 39, 
no. 3 (April 1987), 355. 
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Second, the Soviet myth was linked to the Second World War.26 The heroic 
battle of Stalingrad and the Bolshevik liberation of Eastern Europe, which was placed 
under Hitlerian domination, made the USSR a symbol of struggle against Nazism. In the 
French Communist Party, the image of the Soviet Union was, therefore, positive insofar 
as socialism became associated with peace. Everything was contained in what Gaston 
Plissonnier, the rather 'russophile,27 Party official, told Elleinstein in 1977: 'Le Parti 
sovietique, c'est un parti de heros, ils ont tant fait pour la liberation du monde .. .'28 The 
remark seemed narrow, but it was certainly well weighted and well targeted at 
Elleinstein, who was quick to reply that 'ils avaient pas mal fait egalement pour [ ... ] 
conquerir [Ie monde] et 1'0pprimer,.29 The Soviet Union was indeed an expert in 
contrasting actions. The efforts to defeat German forces from 1939 to 1945 were 
combined with the crushing of Soviet dissidents on the battlefields. The liberation of 
Eastern Europe by Soviet troops in 1945 led to the sovietisation of the region.30 The 
victorious Stalin, 'Ie petit pere des peupIes', the happy 'uncle Joe', established his 
authority over a NKVD31 which was comparable to the Hitlerian Gestapo when it came 
. f h . 32 to purgmg opponents 0 t e regnne. 
Third, Soviet society and the Soviet economy were also magnified by the French 
Communist Party whose interest it was to present, to the whole French left-wing 
electorate, a perfectly polished and rather attractive image of what socialism not only 
26 Louis Althusser, Projet de livre sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee de la main peut etre Ie 
communisme, Paris, lMEC, fond Althusser, ALT2.A28-03.01 to .07, unpublished manuscripts; 
Marie-Pierre Rey, 'L'URSS superpuissance: mythe et ft~alite', L 'His to ire , July-August 1998, p. 77. 
27 Plissonnier worked for the KGB, cf. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin 
Archive (London: Penguin, 1999), chapter 17 on 'The KGB and Western Communist Parties'. 
28 Jean Elleinstein, lis vous trompent, camarades! (Paris: Belfond, 1981), p. 48, by reference to a 
conversation Elleinstein had with Plissonnier in September 1977. 
29 Elleinstein, ibid, p. 48. .. . 
30 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became Soviet Republics in 1944 after bemg occupied by the Soviet 
Union from 1940 to 1945. 
31 The NKVD replaced the OGPOu (or GPOu in 1922 and Tcheka in 1917) in 1934. This service took 
the name of KGB in 1954; cf. Remi Kauffer, 'L'ABC du KGB' in 'Les secrets du KGB', Historia, 
August 2000, p. 45. 
~2 Alan Bullock, Hitler and Staline: Parallel Lives (London: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 563. 
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appeared to be in the Soviet Unio~ but also could be in France. Each remark made by 
the FCP was, therefore, carefully calculated, weighted and counter-balanced by the 
socialist antithesis. If the French Communist Party denounced the crisis which plagued 
capitalist countries in the 1970s, Georges Marchais did not hesitate to expand on the 
healthy economic situation which the socialist countries seemed to enjoy by declaring 
that 'la croissance economique des pays socialistes [ ... ] demeure largement plus rapide 
que celIe des pays capitalistes en crise' .33 If the Party asserted that France was socially 
divided and that French workers had a low standard of living,34 the communist 
intellectual Antoine Spire brushed up a bright portrait of Soviet workers' situation by 
certifYing that 'l'Union sovietique [ ... ] c'est [ ... ] la presence de milliers de travailleurs en 
bleu it partir de 17h it I' opera'. 35 All in all, as a FCP official publication stated, 'les 
realisations obtenues dans [les] pays [socialistes] constituent un bilan demonstratif [ ... ] 
unprogres humain sans egal dans l'histoire,.36 According to Marchais, it was even 'rune] 
demonstration de la superiorite du socialisme,.37 
In this context, Moscow could only approve this perfectly subordinated and tidy 
attitude from the FCP, as it strengthened the socialist ideal the USSR wished to promote 
abroad. In 1977, Temps Nouveaux, the Soviet magazine which was published in France, 
even took the opportunity to refine its Soviet propaganda, to elaborate on the Soviet 
myth and to rebuff the 'antisovietique,38 Jean Elleinstein by borrowing the grandiloquent 
33 Georges Marchais at the 23rd Congress of the FCP, quoted in Le Monde, 10 May 1979; 23e Congres, 
Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges Marchais), (St-
Ouen, 9-13 May 1979); cf. Rapport de Jean Fabre, 'La crise de la societe fran~aise, la crise de 
I'imperialisme' (report to the Party conference on ',La crise de la societe fran~aise et la crise dans Ie 
monde capitaliste'), L 'Humanite, 24 May 1975; 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapp~rt 
du Comire Central presente par Georges Marchais), (St-Quen, 4-10 February 1976); Jacqu~s Oems, 
'Sur I'eurocommunisme et Ies relations europeennes', Cahiers du Communisme, no, 4 (Apnl 1978), 
104. 
34 See ch. 4. 
35 Antoine Spire, Profession: permanent (Paris: Seuil, 1980), p. 52. _ 
36 Les principes de la politique du Part; Communiste Fran~ais (Paris: E?itions Social.es, 1:75), p., :-.0. 
37 23e Congres, Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 9-13 May 1979). 
38 Youri Sedov, 'Revenir a Eduard Bernstein? Elleinstein decouvre son jeu', Temps Nouveaux, May 
1978, pp. 12-5. 
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declaration made by the writer Romain Rolland: 
Ce pays [ ... ] n'a pas seulement cree des usines et des machines geantes. II a 
encore cree ce qui [ ... ] est plus beau que tout: des milliers d'hommes nouveaux. 
des generations de gens sans peur, sains, forts, desinteresses, inspires et mus par 
une foi ardente dans un monde nouveau. 39 
Everything was included in this statement to brush up a perfect picture of the Soviet 
Union: Stakhanovism, gigantism, beauty, happiness and cultural elevation. Every word 
was here to blow the trumpets of a socialist regime which was seemingly glorious, but 
which was in reality deeply ill. In the 1970s, the agricultural and industrial productivity of 
the USSR was weak, its growth was slow and its funds were emptied by the cost of the 
Cold War as well as by the expansionist policy of the country.40 But the reality did not 
count as much for the Soviet Union as the preservation of its image as an ideal socialist 
regime and a powerful country. Socially, the Soviet ideal had to go on marvelling, 
charming and strengthening Western communists' faith in socialism. Politically, the myth 
was used as a back up for Western Communist Parties. 
However, for the French Communist Party, even if '[1'] oeuvre' of the Soviet 
Union was 'gigantesque' ,41 and 'Ie bilan des pays socialistes' was 'globalement po sit if ,42 
it was nonetheless true that in the 1970s, the Party was far from being completely tricked 
by the trompe-l 'oei! image presented by the USSR. Indeed, the FCP considered that if 
there was a matter on which it could not compromise, it was that of Soviet anti-
39 Sedov, 'Une falsification au lieu d'une etude objective', p. 15, article mainly directed against Jean 
Elleinstein's Histoire de /'URSS, 4 vols (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975). 
40 Rey, 'L 'URSS superpuissance: mythe et realite', p. 78. 
41 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchaisj, (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
-12 23': Congres, Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchaisj, (St-Ouen, 9-13 May 1979). 
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democratic practices. 
Pushed by the Solzhenitsyn scandal of 197443 and by the broadcast of television 
. fl· 44 pIctures 0 gu ags m the mid-1970s, won round by the accounts of Soviet dissidents 
who took refuge in Western countries,45 the French Communist Party launched into a 
caustic denunciation of Soviet Stalinism from 1975 onwards.46 Siberian camps, Stalinist 
crimes and Soviet censorship were condemned by the FCP. Breaches of individual and 
collective freedoms were denounced by the Party. In that sense, the steps taken by the 
French Communist Party were both laudable and genuine, but the fact remains that it 
helped the Party to brush up its image. The Party's intentions suddenly appeared to be 
fully democratic. The Party's values became even more humanistic. And the Party's link 
with the USSR seemed to be weaker and weaker, even more so as the Common 
Programme pressed the FCP to assert more strongly its will to work in favour of 
France's interests. This strategy would have worked if it had arrived years earlier, and 
not at the last minute, as a matter of adaptation to external circumstances. For a doubt 
remains: had Solzhenitsyn stayed silent, had French television not shown pictures of 
gulags, the FCP would certainly not have risked weakening its ideological support from 
the Soviet Union by denouncing the USSR's anti-democratic practices. But whatever 
precipitated the French Communist Party's decision to make a U-turn on its idealistic 
vision of the USSR, the fact was that the Party did distance itself from the USSR from 
43 See ch. 3. 
44 George Ross, 'The FCP and the End of the Bolshevik Dream', in The Politics of Eurocommunism: 
Socialism in Transition, ed. by Carl Boggs and David Plotke (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 32. 
45 Svirski, A History of Post-War Soviet Writing: the Literature of Moral Opposition, p. 429; Neill 
Nugent and David Lowe, 'The French Communist Party: the Road to Democr~tic .G~vemment~', 
Political Quaterly, 48 (1977), 278: in relation to the arrival in France of the SovIet dISSIdent Leomd 
Plioutchtch. 
46 These criticisms were acknowledged by Elleinstein in 'Un communiste juge les communistes', Ie 
Nouvel Observateur, 6 November 1976, p. 64; cf. George Ross, 'The Fep and the end of the 
Bolshevik dream', p. 32; 23e Congres, Pour une avancee democrC!tique (rapport du Comite Central 
presente par Georges Marchais), (St-Ouen, 9-13 May 1979); 2S e Congres, Espoir e~ combat pour 
I 'avenir (rapport presente par Georges Marchais), (St Ouen, 8-\ 0 February 1985); Juhus W. Fnend, 
'Soviet Behavior and National Response: the Puzzling Case of the French Communist Party', 
Communist and Post-communist Studies, no. 3 (1982), 225. 
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1975 onwards. 
In this context, freedom became the FCP's prerogative. Democracy became the 
Trojan horse of the party.47 As a consequence, in 1976 Jean Kanapa denounced '[les] 
atteintes aux libertes' as well as 'la substitution trop frequente de la censure ou de la 
repression a la lutte d'idees [en URSS),.48 At the Partis 22nd Congress of 1976, 
Georges Marchais declared with considerable directness that 'l'ideal communiste [ ... ] 
[est] entache par des actes injustes et injustifies'. 49 At the 23rd Party Congress of 1979, 
the FCP's General Secretary even toned down his 'bilan globalement positif des pays 
socialistes' by talking about 'les crimes qui ont endeuille l'histoire du socialisme a 
l'epoque de Staline' and 'les ecarts serieux et graves qui existent aujourd'hui dans des 
pays socialistes entre la realite et ce que pourrait, ce que devrait d'ores et deja etre la 
democratie socialiste'. 50 
However, if it was certain that the French Communist Party ventured on a 
slippery slope by denouncing the USSR's anti-democratic character - as the Russian 
bear was always very prompt to react - it was nonetheless true that the criticisms 
expressed by the FCP remained limited. They were limited insofar as it was mainly the 
Stalinist era which was criticised, and not the whole history of the Soviet Union. From 
Lenin to Brezhnev, and even from Brezhnev to the first years in office of Gorbachev/' 
Soviet dissidents were crushed by being sent to prisons, camps and psychiatric hospitals. 
Police surveillance, cross-examinations, searches and repression were common practices. 
The FCP's criticisms were limited insofar as an extensive and objective analysis of Soviet 
47 See ch. 5. 
48 Jean Kan ap a, 'Les caracteristiques de l'Eurocommunisme', Recherches Internationales. no. 88-89 
(1976), 12. 
-l9 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour fa France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), CSt-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
50 23e Congres, Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comite Central pnisente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 9-13 May 1979). 
51 Background Brief on Soviet Union: Continued Repression of Dissent (London: Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1985). 
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practices would have broken the myth of the USSR and questioned both the very 
existence of real socialism in the Soviet Union and the possibility of creating another kind 
of socialism in France. The FCP's criticisms were also limited for it was its whole 
history, its whole past and present practices52 that the Party would have had to examine. 
from its relations with the totalitarian Soviet regime to its own treatment of dissidence 
and its democratic centralism. 53 In the 1970s, the French Communist Party was not ready 
to do this. Superseded by the Socialist Party from 1974-75 onwards as the main left wing 
party,54 and incessantly tested by the various elections which marked the decade, the 
Party could not have renewed itself fully without provoking too big a swirl of internal 
dissent, without falling under the wrath of Moscow, without risking an electoral disaster 
and without putting at stake the already too fragile Union of the Left. However, if the 
FCP denounced the USSR's anti-democratic practices in too weak a manner, if it 
deliberately chose to preserve a Soviet myth which proved impossible to cleanse of all its 
crimes, it was nonetheless true that its criticisms led the Party onto a more independent, 
and certainly more 'French' road. 
At its 22nd Congress of 1976, the French Communist Party officially announced 
its decision to refuse to apply Soviet socialism to France if or when the Party took 
power, and consequently to adopt 'socialism in the colours of France,.55 Georges 
Marchais thus declared categorically that 'aucun parti ou groupe de part is ne peut 
legiferer pour les autres, proposer des recettes universelles,56 - an assertion which he 
repeated in 1979, at the Party's 23rd Congress, by proclaiming that 'nous [communistes 
52 Helene Parmelin, Liberez les communistes! (Paris: Editions Stock, 1979), pp. 313-4. 
53 See ch. 1 and 8. 
54 See ch. 7. 
55 Annette Stiefbold, The French Communist Parti in Transition: PCF-CPSU Relations and the 
Challenge to Soviet Authority (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 91-3. 
56 22C Congres, Le socialisrne pour la France (rapport du Cornite Central presente par Georges 
Marcha is) , (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976); cf Marchais quoted in L 'Humanite, 9 June 1976; J~an 
Kanapa, 'Une voie originale, une voie nationale', L 'Hurna~ite, ~7 October 1976: Rene A~dneu, 
Letlre a ceux qui se reclament du socialisrne (Paris: Albm Michel, 1978), pp. 83-4: Georges 
Marchais, Avancer sur la voie du 22''. Congres (rapport presente au Comite Central des 26, 27 et 28 
avril 19 78). 
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fran9ais] ne saurions accepter ni pour nous, ill pour les autres, qu'une grande puissance 
dicte sa loi,.57 The tone was strong and the intention unshakeable. For the FCP, there 
would not be any socialism 'made in the USSR' in France, but rather a new kind of 
socialism which would be both independent and adapted to France's political, economic 
and social environment. 58 
In the long term, the strategic line adopted by the Party proved to be constant: 
the FCP never endorsed Soviet socialism again, preferring to concentrate on its own 
project for a socialist society. There is, therefore, no doubt that Georges Marchais did 
push his Party towards a new kind of socialism, which was in contrast to the existing 
one. In that respect, the CPSU was not mistaken about the FCP's intentions. On stage, 
the French Communist Party was called to order in a rather diplomatic way. Brezhnev 
contented himself with implying that it would be better for the FCP to keep its Soviet 
guide: 'Un bon chef d'orchestre ne se plaint pas de la diversite de ses instruments,,59 
declared the First General Secretary of the CPSU, thus echoing the possibility of 
'deployer la banniere nationale' which was put forward by Stalin in 1952.60 However, 
behind the scenes, Marchais was strongly blamed by the CPSU - he even risked being 
57 23e Congres, Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Duen, 9-13 May 1979). 
58 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Duen, 4-10 February 1976); Georges Marchais, Le deft democratique (Paris: Grasset, 
1973), p. 180; 'Georges Marchais a Antenne 2: changer et changer vraiment', L 'Humanite, 19 May 
1977, p. 3, by reference to Antenne 2's Cartes sur tables, 18 May 1977; 'Joint Statement of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the French Communist Party', Pravda, 6 July 1971 and 
Izvestia, 7 July 1971; 'French Communists Hold a Meeting', Pravda, 6 February 1976, 'Conference of 
European Communists and Workers' Parties: Speech by Comrade G. Marchais of the French 
Communist Party Delegation', Pravda, 3 July 1976; Paul Laurent, 'The Beginnings of a Brighter 
Future', World Marxist Review, no. 3 (March 1975),6. 
59 Brezhnev at the conference of European Communist Parties, 1976, quoted in Auguste Lecoeur, Ie 
PCF: continuite dans Ie changement (Paris: R. Laffont, 1977), p. 59; cf Heinz Timmermann, 'Soviet 
Treatment of Western Communists: a Comparative Analysis', Communist and Post-communist 
Studies (1982), 290: the plurality of forms taken by socialism was tolerated by Moscow as long as its 
content did not change. 
60 Staline at the 19th Congress of the CPSU (quoted in Cahiers du Communisme, November 195~. 69). 
in Lecoeur, Le PCF: continuite dans Ie changement, p. 38; cf. the declaration made by Andrei' 
Kirilenko, a Politburo member and the General Secretary of CPSU's Central Committee, in :::2 c 
Congres, Salutations aux soirees internationales (St-Duen. 4-10 February 1976); 'Joint Communique 
ofCPSU and French Communist Party Delegations', Pravda, II January 1980. 
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openly condemned and losing his place within the FCP61 - but he nevertheless 
whispered in Brezhnev's ear, in 1980, that the FCP and the CPSU had '[des] differences 
de positions et [des] divergences,62 regarding their conceptions of socialism. And it was 
not without good reason. Socialism was neither a predetermined nor a fixed system of 
government which had to be set up as such. It could indeed vary not only according to 
countries, but also according to the international context.63 
First, the First World War of 1914-18 contributed to the creation of a lasting 
Communist regime in the USSR and a Nazi German power64 which had completely 
different ideologies, but which were based on relatively similar mechanisms. State power 
broke radically with the past: for the Nazis, the past was linked to the defeat of 1918, to 
economic problems such as a soaring unemployment; for the Soviets, the past incarnated 
the grandeur of the Tsarist court and the exploitation of poor subjects made to fight for 
their Tsar in 1914.65 As a consequence, the regimes in place in Germany and in the 
USSR created new kinds of society which depended on the authority of charismatic and 
supreme chiefs backed by dedicated officials, powerful armies and secret services able to 
h f h . . 66 crus opponents 0 t err regnnes. 
61 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, chapter 18 on Eurocommunism; see our ch. 1 and 5. 
62 Jean Fabien, Les nouveaux secrets des communistes (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990), p. 58: in relation to a 
telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Marchais, 8 January 1980. 
63 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais) , (St-Quen, 4-10 February 1976); Georges, Marchais, Rapport du Comite Central, 22nd 
Congress, 1976; Marchais, Avancer sur la voie du 22e Congres (rapport presente au Comite Central 
des 26, 27 et 28 avril 1978); Marchais, Le deji democratique, p. 177; Vivre fibre! (Projet de 
declaration des libertes soumis II la discussion des fram;ais, 1975); it is also worth noting that this 
thesis was accepted by Elleinstein who spoke of 'pluralite de communismes' in Lettre ouverte aux 
franr;ais sur fa Republique du Programme Commun (Paris: Albin Michel, 1977), p. 75. 
64 The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 was judged as being unfair by the Germans who considered that its 
terms were punitive (by reference to reparations, loss of territory and limitations on the size of the 
armed forces; cf Matthew S. Seligmann and Roderick R. McLean, Germany from Reich to Republic, 
1871-1918 (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 172; Wilhelm II's Reich was replaced by the Weimar 
Republic, which was opposed both by right-extremists and by communists. Thus in January 19 I 9, in 
Berlin, an insurrection attempt led by German communists, or Spartacists, was crushed. The 
communist revolutionaries Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, who had both created the 
Spartakist League in 1916, were executed. 
65 Krzysztof Pomian, 'Communisme et nazisme: les tragedies du siecle', L 'Histoire, July-August 1998, 
pp. 100-5. 
66 Pomian, ibid, pp. 100-5. 
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Second, the post-Second World War period was marked by the collapse of right-
extremist regimes up to 197567 and by the loss of steam of the gerontocratic socialist 
regime of the USSR in the 1970s.68 As a result, any form of totalitarian regime _ 
whether of the extreme-right or communist - became more and more impracticable in a 
Europe which was relatively peaceful, united by EEC treaties, economically strong, and 
democratically stable as a whole. This is why the French Communist Party had to reject 
the model of Soviet socialism which proved both despotic and impracticable. This is why 
the Party had to create democratic socialism. 
If in the 1970s the French Communist Party did launch itself towards a "socialism in the 
colours of France', which would be both original and independent from Moscow, Jean 
Elleinstein and Louis Althusser nevertheless did not hesitate to play down the 
significance of the Party's new stance. For these two communist intellectuals, there was 
not the slightest shadow of a doubt in their minds: as the Soviet socialist regime had 
proved to be totalitarian and tyrannical, the FCP should have broken the Soviet myth 
which still existed within the Party in the 1970s, and it should have then started 
rebuilding its identity on new foundations. 
In the 1970s, and at the beginning of the 1980s, the criticisms expressed by Jean 
Elleinstein towards the Soviet regime reached a crescendo. Whether this radicalisation of 
ideas was due to the surge of more and more damning historical facts about the USSR, 69 
or to the condemnation of his Histoire de I 'URSS by the CPSU's press,70 the fact 
remained that Elleinstein's analysis became more precise over the years. From a 
mitigated declaration shelling the problems of a Soviet socialism "bureaucratique et 
67 The regimes of Hitler and Mussolini collapsed in 1945. The Greek colonel~' regime fell i~ 197-+. In 
Portugal, Salazar died in 1970 and his successor, Caetano, was overthrown m 1974. In Spam, Franco 
died in 1975 and as a consequence his regime was peacefully replaced by a monarchy. 
68 Rey, 'L'URSS superpuissance: mythe et realih~', p. 78. . . ") 
69 Svirski, A History of Post- War Soviet Writing: the Literature of Moral OpposlllOn, p. ·L 9. 
70 See eh. 3. 
137 
despotique, donc [ ... ] inacheve et elementaire'/1 he went on to assert in a radical way 
that 'il est impossible de parler de democratie a propos de l'Union sovietique [ ... ] 
l'Union sovietique est une dictature'. 72 But whatever the choice of the words and the 
nuances of the criticisms, Elleinstein's condemnation was beyond the pale as far as the 
CPSU leadership was concerned. In this context, the Soviet press reacted promptly in 
order to counter-act the potential influence Elleinstein's ideas could have on other 
French communists, who might be eager to listen to the points made not only by a 
communist like themselves, but also by a prominent historian. As a consequence. 
Elleinstein became the object of direct attacks in Temps Nouveaux. It was thus possible 
to read in 1977 that 
Ie pays de soviets est Ie pays de la liberte, de l'egalite en droit et du plein pouvoir 
des travailleurs [ ... ]. C'est la liberte vis-a-vis de l'oppression sociale et nationale 
[ ... ]. La verite sur Ie socialisme, sur l'Union sovietique, sur la politique du peus 
gagne les coeurs et les esprits, en depit de tous les efforts de 1. Elleinstein et de 
ceux avec qui il fait chorus.73 
However, the propaganda efforts made by Moscow were in vain. Too many revelations 
from Soviet dissidents came to support Elleinstein's declarations. Too many television 
pictures came to illustrate his point of view. Too many French communist activists 
started believing the historian74 who had managed to bring Soviet reality out into the 
open, to make the mythical mask of the USSR fall, and to shake the ideological 
credibility of the USSR. 
71 Jean Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme (Paris: Jul\iard, 1979), p. 45. 
72 Elleinstein, Ils \'(Jus trompent, camarades!, pp. 175,177. 
73 Sedov 'Une falsification au lieu d'une etude objective" pp. 14-5. 
H Spire, Prc~ll!ssion: permanent, p. 136. 
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The wrath of Moscow could also have fallen on Louis Althusser if he had been 
able to publish his manuscripts, for the Marxist philosopher did not shirk from criticising 
the Soviet Union in his papers. Like Elleinstein, he did not hesitate to break all taboos. 
Althusser thus spoke of '[les] pratiques repressives de style stalinien qui existent encore 
en URSS,.7S He wrote that 'les pays socialistes sont malades [ ... J de la democratie,/6 and 
he pushed his French comrades not to fall into '[Ie J piege du socialisme existant'. 77 
As a consequence, the criticisms expressed by Elleinstein and Althusser had 
considerable impact within the French Communist Party. First, they broke the Soviet 
myth insofar as they shed light on a Soviet regime which, if it was socialist in its political, 
economic and ideological form, was nonetheless totalitarian at the level of its daily 
practices. Second, they created a definitive rupture with the intellectual vision of a deeply 
human socialism and the violent reality of Soviet socialism. The concrete application of 
socialism in the USSR merged into the Terror, repression, gulags, and crushing of any 
person perceived as being an 'enemy' of the regime.78 The concrete application of 
socialism became synonymous with the de-humanisation and the ill-treatment of a whole 
society in the name of Marxist social socialism. As a consequence, contrary to what the 
FCP thought in the I 970s, it was not only the Stalinist era which had to be questioned on 
the ground of an extreme dictatorial violence, but the whole history of the USSR - a 
history to which the FCP was tightly linked at the levels of its own internal 
organisation, 79 its treatment of internal dissidence,80 its relations with the French state 
and it ideology. However, it is possible to understand why the French Communist Party 
only contented itself with criticising Stalinism, and why its condemnation of Soviet anti-
75 Louis Althusser, Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Le malaise du 2i! congres), Paris, [MEC, 
fond Althusser, AL T2.A24-01.01l02 to -02.01, unpublished manuscript. 
76 Louis Althusser, Du bon usage des pays socialistes, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, ALT2.A26-03.0I, 
unpublished manuscript. 
77 Althusser, Projet de livre sur Ie communisme. 
78 Althusser, ibid. 
79 See ch. 1. 
80 See ch. 8. 
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democratic practices were toned down by a 'bilan globalement positif des pays 
socialistes' . For the FCP, an extensive analysis of the whole of Soviet history would have 
amounted to a demystification of a country which was both anti-democratic and 
impossible to emulate, but which nonetheless still fed the dreams of most French 
communists. An objective analysis of the Soviet Union would also have pushed the Party 
to examine its own past and present internal practices and hence to de-sovietise itself 
completely. However, if this move would have completed the Party's renovation at a 
time when it was embarking on its own road towards socialism81 and elaborating its own 
project of socialism, it was nonetheless the case that the Party was not ready to 
transform itself in the 1970s. As Althusser put it, 
il faut bien voir qu'un des grands profits que nos partis tirent du 'bon usage' des 
pays socialistes, est Ie plus souvent de se dispenser de s'examiner eux-memes [ ... J 
l'un des grands profits que tirent nos partis de la reconnaissance de la 'maladie' 
des pays socialistes c'est de faire Ie silence sur eux-memes, et de prendre ce 
il d I ' 82 S ence pour e a sante. 
Arguably, by rejecting the Soviet model of socialism and by criticising the political 
regime of the USSR, it was its own identity that the French Communist Party started 
questioning. The USSR was no longer the ideological mirror it used to be before the 
1970s. It was no longer the identity mark that the FCP could brandish in front of a 
French electorate which was generally aware of Soviet exaction. Elleinstein 
acknowledged this by writing: 
81 See ch. 5. 
82 AlthusseL Du bon usage des pays socialistes, unpublished manuscripts; cf. Althusser, 'Marx dans ses 
limites' (1978), Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, vol. I (Paris: StockiIMEC, 1994), pp. 360-1. 
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Ie Roi etait nu, c'est-a-dire que Ie PCF ne pouvait plus s'adosser a l'experience 
sovietique jusque-Ia sacralisee. Des lors, il n'y avait plus de point d'ancrage, plus 
d'utopie sovietique, plus de reference.83 
In this context, he concluded that, 'Ie PCF etait condamne a se transformer 
profondement,.84 Indeed, the French Communist Party only had one option: it had to 
rebuild its communist identity. 
In that regard, Elleinstein's ideas were both decisive and logical. French socialism 
should in no way be inspired by the negative Soviet experience.85 The USSR should on 
the contrary become a counter-model for the FCP's future action.86 Consequently, the 
Party should create a 'new socialism,87 which should be pioneering and adapted to the 
French political, economic and social environment - meaning a 'socialism in the colours 
of France'. Elleinstein's approach seemed, therefore, to meet that of the FCP. But the 
Party did not quite see matters from the same angle. For the Party, if socialism in France 
should be adapted to the country's specificity, it should nonetheless take into account the 
so-called 'achievements' of the Soviet Union, such as those in the economic domain. As 
Jean Kanapa asserted, 'il est indispensable de tirer enseignement des experiences deja 
realisees, de leurs succes et de leurs erreurs'. 88 
However, the Party's picture of the USSR was too rosy and its conception of 
French socialism was not convincing enough to be fully acceptable - and this is 
precisely what Althusser noted. For this dissident communist intellectual, it was not a 
83 Jean Elleinstein 'L'avenir des communistes', Le Nouvel Observateur, 25 September 1978, p. 51. 
84 Elleinstein 'L'avenir des communistes', ibid, p. 51. 
85 Jean Elleinstein, 'Ce qui dure encore dans Ie PC fran~ais - Deux pas en arriere', Le Monde, 21 
February 1979; Elleinstein, 'Du xxne Congres du PCF a I'echec de la gauche - La revolution n'est 
plus cequ'elle etait', Le Monde, 13 April 1978; 'Les accusations contre Ie PC de Jean Elleinstein', Le 
Matin,4 December 1979. 
86 Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme, p. 84; 
87 Jean Elleinstein, 'The Skein of History Unrolled Backwards', in Eurocommunism, its Roots in Italy 
and Elsewhere, ed. by George Urban, (London: Temple Smith, 1978), p. 84. 
88 Jean Kanapa, 'Une voie originale, une voie nationale', L 'Humanite, 27 October 1976; words 
underlined by myself. 
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matter of mere 'errors', or slight mistakes which could be easily rectified in France. It 
was instead a matter of unforgivable and unrectifiable Soviet horrors. As Althusser put it, 
on dira sans doute qu'en politique les drames peuvent etre consideres comme une 
suite d'erreurs d'appreciation, et que toute erreur peut etre rectifiee. Ce n'est pas 
faux, sauf qu'on se heurte a une limite absolue: quand une erreur aboutit a [ ... ] 
des centaines de milliers de supplicies et de morts, voire a une seule mort 
physique ou morale, c' est un point de non retour. 89 
In this context, the French Communist Party did not push the logic to its own 
conclusions in the 1970s: it did not go far enough with its project of French socialism, 
just as it did not go far enough when criticising the Soviet Union. The Party should have 
by contrast extricated itself completely from Moscow's influence, set-up a truly 
pioneering and independent socialist counter-policy, and renovated itself entirely. In that 
respect, Pierre Daix declared that 'il faudrait [que Ie PCF] definisse avec tous ses 
militants une politique independante, c'est-a-dire, face a I'URSS, une contre-politique,.9o 
As for Althusser, he wrote with anger in his manuscripts that 
nul ne pretendra que nos partis communistes puissent se rejouir d'avoir desormais 
'accroche au cuI' [ ... ] cette epouvantable casserole [ ... ] ret] a defaut d'exemple, 
desormais impossible a promener en plein air, [les pays socialistes] servent du 
moins de faire-valoir negatif: nous ne ferons pas comme eux, nous sommes 
differents d'eux, nous ferons un autre socialisme: 'aux couleurs de la France,.9\ 
[Mais] Ie parti ne s'en tirera pas en avan9ant [cet] argument [ ... ] qui reporte tout 
89 Althusser, Projel de livre sur Ie eommunisme, unpublished manuscripts. 
90 Pierre Daix, l'ai eru au malin (Paris: R. Laifont, 1976), p. 457. 
91 Althusser, Du bon usage des pays socialistes, unpublished manuscripts. 
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simplement sur les 'couleurs de rUnion sovietique' [ ... ] [sur] les pratiques 
repressives qui existent encore en URSS [ ... J et que Ie parti n'est pas capable 
d' exp liquer. 92 
The arguments presented by Althusser and Daix were certainly convincing, but the task 
set for the FCP seemed rather ambitious - perhaps too ambitious to change the face of 
the Party before the 1978 and 1981 elections, and too big to make the FCP the dominant 
force of the Union of the Left in such a short period of time. However, in the 1970s, the 
challenge should have been taken up by the French Communist Party, even if Moscow's 
wrath would have fallen on the Party, even if it risked declining for a while under the 
weight of the 'revelations' promised by the USSR.93 The French Communist Party could 
have won in terms of prestige and support in the long run - and in any case it could 
have prevented Georges Marchais from regretting in 1985 that 
nous [les communistes fran<;ais J avons pris du retard a degager notre retlexion sur 
Ie socialisme pour la France d'un 'modele' exterieur et a definir une perspective 
adaptee aux conditions de notre pays et de notre temps.94 
However, in the 1970s, the French Communist Party did not perceive things from this 
angle. Classified as 'dissidents', critical communist intellectuals were considered wrong 
whatever they said. Their proposals were inevitably unacceptable. For only the Party was 
right and knew where to lead its activists, even if it was at the cost of an hesitant 
92 Althusser, Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Ie malaise du 22e congres), unpublished 
man uscri pts. 
93 Unlike the ICP, which was to a large extent financed by its members, the FCP was financially 
dependent on the USSR in the 1970s. The FCP was also financed, to a lesser extent, by some 
businessmen, like Jean-Bapiste Doumeng, and by its communist members. 
94 25t! Congres, Espoir et combat pour /'avenir (rapport prf!sente par Georges Marchais), (St Ouen, 8-
10 February 1985). 
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strategic waltz - a 'socialism in the colours of France' taking the FCP away from 
Moscow, and a 'bilan globalement positif bringing the Party closer to the Russian bear, 
namely one step forward and one step back. 
To conclude, in the 1970s, the French Communist Party found itself in an awkward 
position with regard to its relation with the USSR. On the one hand, the Soviet myth 
helped the Party to project a positive image of what socialism could be in France, and 
therefore helped it to strengthen the communist ideology around key ideas such as, for 
instance, the nationalisation of the means of production and betterment of the masses 
through culture. On the other hand, the ideological and financial grip the USSR had over 
the FCP prevented the Party from embarking on an extensive and objective examination 
of Soviet history, as well as from asserting a new project of socialist society which would 
not merely be an adjustment of Soviet socialism, but rather a truly pioneering project. 
As a consequence, the French Communist Party's action was too hesitant to have 
a decisive impact on the Party's political sphere of influence in the long term - which 
meant that the Party was caught unaware by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and 
ultimately lost out. As Robert Hue explained in 1995 and 1999, 
on s' est, en fait, des annees durant refuse a voir la realite, a la dire, et a en tirer 
toutes les consequences [ ... ]. Tout cela, nous l'avons paye tres cher. Dans Ie 
domaine politique. Mais aussi dans celui de la pensee, de la culture. Par vagues 
successives [ ... ] beaucoup d' intellectuels proches du Parti communiste s' en 
eloignerent, beaucoup de ceux qui etaient communistes nous quitterent [ ... ].95 Le 
Parti communiste [ ... ] a beaucoup perdu [d'adherents] en vingt ans. Au point 
d' atteindre en maints endroits une taille critique ne lui permettant pas d' apparaitre 
95 Hue. Le communisme: la mutation, pp. 122, 128. 
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. d' . ffi 96 ill ·agrr su samment. 
However, warning signals had been sent by Party members, notably in the 1970s by Jean 
Elleinstein and Louis Althusser. Indeed, both agreed that the FCP had to condemn 
unconditionally the Soviet leadership, then turn its back on the USSR and go its own 
way. Both knew that if the FCP's influence within French society was to remain strong, 
the Party had to change, meaning that it had to wipe away the Soviet myth and de-
sovietise its internal practices. The present analysis made by the French Communist Party 
of its past links with the USSR would suggest that they were right. 
96 Robert Hue. Communisme: un nouveau projet (Paris: Stock, 1999), p. 382. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Union of the Left: 
a rank and file union or a union at the top? 
The Common Programme of Government was officially concluded on 27th June 1972 
between the French Communist Party of Georges Marchais and the relatively new 
Socialist Party of Franvois Mitterrand, I then ratified two weeks later by the left-wing 
Radicals of Robert Fabre. Fused by a contract covering a large part of the competence 
areas of the French State/ the Union of the Left set itself a precise objective: to pave the 
way to socialism.3 The implication was of great significance. Far from aiming at a mere 
re-arrangement of the capitalist system in place, the strategy of the Union of the Left was 
to break with capitalism in the long run - a strategy which was based on the democratic 
conquest of state power not only thanks to the backing of the united left-wing masses, 
but also thanks to the polarisation of ' to us ceux que revolte l'inegalite profonde des 
conditions so ciales, ,4 of all those who wanted to put an end to the domination of a 
pompidoulienne,5 then giscardienne Right6 impregnated by the powerful Gaullist 
movement. In that sense, the constitution of the Union of the Left around the Common 
1 The Socialist Party was created in June 1971 at the Congress of Epinay-sur-Seine. 
2 The Common Programme covered first some aspects of daily life such as employment, health, 
education and leisure; second France's economy, like company management, industrial, agricultural 
and budgetary policy, and third France's institutions and fourth international relations; cf. 'Le 
Programme Commun de Gouvernement - Parti Socialiste, Parti Communiste, Radicaux de Gauche', 
in Changer fa vie - Programme de Gouvernement du Parti Socialiste et Programme Commun de fa 
Gauche (Paris: Flammarion, 1972), pp. 253-340. 
3 'Le Programme Commun de Gouvernement', ibid., p. 255; cf. 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la 
France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges Marchais), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976); 
Georges Marchais interviewed in 'Cartes sur tables', Antenne 2, 18 May 1977 and quoted in "Georges 
Marchais a Antenne 2: changer et changer vraiment', L 'Humanite, 19 May 1977, p. 3; Les principes 
de fa politique du FCP (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975), pp. 67-8. 
4 'Presentation de Fran90is Mitterrand', in Changer la vie - Programme de Gouvernement du Parti 
Socialiste et Programme Commun de la Gauche, p. 8. 
5 Pompidou became President on 15 June 1969, after General de Gaulle resigned; see our introduction. 
6 Giscard d'Estaing was President from May 1974 to May 1981; see our introduction. 
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Programme harked back to three events which marked the social history of France, that 
is to say the Paris Commune of 1871, the Popular Front of 1934-38 and the revolt of 
May-June 1968. 
If the Paris Commune was born as a result of France's defeat by Bismarck's 
Prussia and a republican jolt against an Assembly dominated by the monarchists,7 if the 
Commune died in blood,8 it nonetheless remained vivacious enough in the long term to 
mark left-wing formations. The Communard insurrection was, first and foremost, a 
proletarian revolutionary movement9 which was opposed to a relatively new capitalist 
system10 and which did not hesitate to put forward pioneering reform projects. One 
talked about workers' emancipation, about their participation in the management 
committees of workshops - these were the first fruits of self-management. 1 1 However, 
the communard insurrection was regrettably, according to the Russian revolutionary 
Lavrov, a movement which was on the road to ruin from the outset due to the lack of 
structured organisation, propaganda, and attraction for the peasantry and the whole of 
the working class. 12 Robert Hue acknowledged this too, in 1999, when he wrote that, oil 
y a necessite, pour etre efficace au service de la transformation revolutionnaire de la 
societe, d'une inscription des [partis] revolutionnaires dans cette societe, et tout 
7 Jacques Zwirn, coordinated by L' Association des Amis de la Commune de Paris, La Commune de 
Paris aujourd'hui (Paris: Atelier, 1999), p. 9. Aldophe Thiers (1797-1877) was then at the head of the 
executive. 
8 25,000 persons were massacred and 40,000 others were arrested; c£ Robert Gildea, Barricades and 
borders - Europe 1800-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1987), p. 223. 
9 Zwirn, La Commune de Paris aujourd'hui, p. 10: 84% of communards were manual workers and 30% 
of workers had a seat in the Conseil de la Commune; cf. Robert Gildea, Barricades and borders. ibid., 
p. 223. Karl Marx, 'The Civil War in France', adress to the General Council of the International 
Working Men's Association (written in London on 30 May 1871), in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
Selected Works in One Volume, English translation (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), p. 295. 
10 Robert Hue, 'Remarque sur l'actualite de la Commune', in Zwirn, La Commune de Paris aujourd'hui, 
p. 125. 
11 Zwirn, La Commune de Paris aujourd 'hui, p. 11. Self-management was advocated by left-wing trade-
unions in May-June 1968, imposed by the Socialist Party at the time of the signature of the Common 
Programme in 1972 and embraced by the FCP towards 1976; c£ Antoine Prost, 'Sept millions de 
grevistes', L'Histoire, February 1998, p. 91; 'Programme de Gouvernement du Parti Socialiste', in 
Changer fa vie - Programme de Gouvemement du Parti Socialiste et Programme Commun de fa 
Gauche, p. 69; see our ch. 5. 
12 Gildea, Barricades and borders, p. 224. 
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particulierement dans Ie jeu politique qui s'y deroule.,13 And this was precisely the 
strategy adopted by the FCP in the Popular Front era. 
For the French Communist Party, the Popular Front was a key period. It was 
indeed the first time since the FCP broke away from the SFIO at the Tours Congress of 
December 192014 that the Party found itself on a common platform with the Socialist 
Party of Leon Blum. IS It was also the first time that the FCP was no longer set apart 
from the other French political forces, as a result of the assertion of its revolutionary 
Bolshevik character, but was rather at the forefront of the French political scene. 
Besides, the unitary experience proved to be conclusive in terms of materialisation of 
social demands: 16 it was an encouraging sign for the future. As Robert Hue put it when 
talking about the FCP, 
Ie Front populaire [est] [ ... ] marque par son immersion dans la societe, son role 
essentiel dans la definition et la mise en oeuvre d 'une strategie de rassemblement 
des forces de gauche, qui [a permis] l'entree de la classe ouvriere, pour la 
premiere fois, sur la scene politique et les grandes conquetes sociales et 
democratiques que l'on sait. 17 
However, despite the FCP's intentions to play an active role on the French political scene 
in the 1930s, it did not take part in the Popular Front government. One had to wait for 
the events of May-June 1968 for the Party to decide to become a party of government. 
During the 1968 events, a certain desire to change government, or even regime 
13 Hue, 'Remarque sur l'actualite de la Commune' in Zwim, La Commune de Paris aujourd'hui, pp. 
129-30. 
14 The Tours Congress took place from 25 to 29 December 1920; cf.. among others, Ronald Tiersky, 
French communism, 1920-1972, (New York: London Columbia University Press, 1974). 
15 Daladier's Radical Party joined the Popular Front movement in January 1936. 
16 By reference, among others, to wage increases and to the reduction of the working week: cf. Maurice 
Larkin, France since the Popular Front, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 45. 
17 Hue, 'Remarque sur l'actualite de la Commune' in Zwim, La Commune de Paris aujourd'hui, p. 130. 
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and society, was expressed l8 - a desire which could only find an opportunistic echo 
within the FCP. The Party called for the constitution of a 'popular government' with the 
FGDS, but Fran90is Mitterrand preferred to try to gather a government around himself 
As a result, these unilateral actions proved fruitless 19 - but they had the merit of making 
a union of the left-wing forces an imperative. As the FCP's Champigny Manifesto put it 
at the end of 1968, 
comme l' ont montre avec force les puissants mouvements populaires de mai-juin 
1968, les conditions mfuissent rapidement pour une action commune de toutes 
les couches atteintes ou menacees par les monopoles [ ... ] Ie Parti communiste 
fran9ais reaffinne [donc] la volonte des communistes de travailler it l'entente de 
toutes les forces ouvrieres et democratiques sur la base d'un programme commun 
avance, susceptible d'etre appuye par la majorite du peuple fran9ais et d'ouvrir la 
. d 20 perspectIve u renouveau. 
In this context, the first part of this chapter will establish the Party's conception 
of the Union of the Left - a position partly shared by Jean Elleinstein. As for the second 
part, it will shed light on Louis Althusser's criticisms towards its Leadership who, 
according to him, had merely exploited its base in a Union forged at the summit. 
Althusser's own perception of the Union will also be discussed. 
In the 1970s, the Leadership of the French Communist Party took note of the fact that 
the union of popular forces behind left-wing parties was not spontaneous/' despite their 
18 Prost, 'Sept millions de grevistes', pp. 91-2. 
19 Prost, ibid., p. 94. 
20 Pour une democratie avancee, pour une France socialiste! (Manifeste du Comite Central du parti 
communiste fran~ais), (Champigny, 6 December 1968), pp. 27,31. 
11 Jacques Chambaz. 'Aujourd'hui et demain, des voies nouvelles pour vaincre', Cahiers dll 
Communisme, no. 10 (October 1979),47. 
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convergence in terms of economic, social and political interests. The Paris Commune and 
the events of 1968 had proved this. Set against this historical context, for communist 
leaders, the solution to the problem was obvious. The Party had to stimulate the 
participative mobilization of its base in order to gather popular forces within the Union 
of the Left, in order to weld them around the working class and its natural party - i.e. 
the French Communist Party. 
First, in accordance with its ouvrieriste orientation, 22 the Leadership of the FCP 
considered that it was the communist working class which was the best placed to unite 
the lower classes.23 Middle-class, and even petits-bourgeois communist intellectuals were 
admittedly meant to elevate the cultural level of the population and win new adherents to 
the Partl4 - but when it came to creating the very ferments of socialism, there was not 
a shadow of a doubt in the minds of communist leaders. The communist working class 
could only occupy a position of supremacy because of its historical role in international 
revolutionary movements and its specific character. 
The working class had not only been at the forefront of the 1848 French, German 
and Italian Revolutions, but also during the 1871 Paris Commune and the 1917 Russian 
Revolution.25 Communist leaders thus considered that workers were the carriers of 
revolutionary seeds which, if they sprouted in more or less spontaneous and successful 
movements/6 had nonetheless to be catalysed by an 'alternative legitimacy,27 to present 
power in order for them to develop effectively - this 'alternative legitimacy' being 
incarnated by the French Communist Party. 
As far as the specific characteristic of the working class were concerned, FCP 
22 See ch. 4. 
23 Georges Marchais, 'Vers Ie changement democratique', L 'Humanite, 1 April 1977. 
24 See ch. 3. 
25 Allan Todd, Revolutions, 1789-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 51-7. 
26 Todd, ibid., pp. 51-3, 56-7: for instance, according to Todd, in 1917 some communist mass 
movements, which were independent from Lenin's control, sprouted during the March Revolution, the 
July Days, and the land and factory nationalisation campaign. 
27 Frederic Bluche and Stephane Rials, eds., Les revolutions franc;aises (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p. 23. 
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leaders did not hesitate to be grandiloquent. For them, '[la classe oU\Tiere incame la] 
force vive de l'economie moderne28 [ ••• J la force revolutionnaire29 [ ... J [et] joue un role 
moteur,.30 Whether it was a sign of egocentricity coming from some of these former 
workers,31 whether it was simply an excess of generosity from these persons dedicated to 
the communist cause, or whether it was a blunt acknowledgement of the truth - for 
Party leaders, the proof of their arguments was irrefutable. The working class was the 
only class to possess a global view of the exploitative perversity of the capitalist 
system. 32 It was the only class to be fully interested in the implementation of socialism in 
France, and it was the only class actively working towards a change of regime. 
This argument is relatively convincing. It is indeed natural to be willing to change 
one's condition in a society based on material values rather than moral and intellectual 
ones, just as it is normal to want to go from an exploited, and therefore submissive and 
uninfluential position, to a dominant and controlling status. However, what Party leaders 
failed to understand in the 1970s, was that the working class was not entirely determined 
to change a regime which had, broadly speaking, improved their life and working 
conditions,33 and which had, consequently, diminished the relevance of both a 
socialist/communist alternative and a communist revolutionary interpretation of the 
Common Programme. The loss of influence of the FCP, the parallel growing popularity 
of a Socialist Party more flexible in its approach to capitalism, and beyond it the 
acceptance of French capitalism and the globalisation of the economy, proved this in the 
28 231: Congres, L 'avenir commence maintenant (resolution adoptee par Ie 2i Congres), CSt-Ouen, 9-13 
May 1979) 
29 Georges Marchais, Vers Ie changement democratique (rapport au Comite Central des 31 mars et j'" 
avril 1977). 
30 Georges Marchais at the Partys' 'fraternity meeting', quoted in L 'Humanite, 4 June 1976. 
31 See ch. 3. 
32 231: Congres, L 'avenir commence maintenant (resolution adoptee par Ie 2i Congres), (St-Ouen, 9-13 
May 1979). 
33 See ch. 4. In March 1978, 37% of French workers voted for the FCP. In June 1981, this figure fell to 
24% and in March 1986 it bottomed out at 15%, in Fran'Yois Platone, 'Les electorats legislatifs sous la 
Cinquieme Republique', Rc\"Ue Franr;aise de Science Politique, no. 42 (1992), 310-2. 
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long run.34 But whatever the long-term implications, in the 1970s, Georges Marchais 
knew what all communists wanted: '[Us veulent] rassembler toutes les forces vives de la 
nation contre les barons du grand capital. ,35 
Second, for the FCP leaders, the participative mobilization of the communist base 
had to go further than the mere reunion of popular forces: it had to weld them around 
the communist working-class vanguard.36 This specification was important, for what was 
at stake was the strength of the Party's influence over decisions within the Union of the 
Left - and therefore its domination over the Socialist Party. However, for the Socialist 
Party, there was no question of accepting a communist vanguard. There was no question 
either of accepting that one specific class should dominate the others within the Union. 
Instead, what the Socialist Party wanted was a 'class front' promoting the common, 
egalitarian and concerted action of the various forces forming the Union, and setting up, 
as Jean Poperen put it, 'une "communaute fondamentale d'interets.",37 
The idea of a class front was good insofar as it strengthened the unitary dynamic 
of the Union as well as its ability to make an impact on the French political scene. The 
battle thus shifted. It was no longer a battle of classes which was fought within the 
Union, between communist workers and the 'other' elements of the Left, as advocated 
by the FCP. It was a battle which was fought by left-wing parties united under the flag of 
the Common Programme of Government, against the right-wing power in place. 38 It was 
a battle in which left-wing activists certainly played a major role on the ground, in term 
of ideological agitation, but also obeyed the orders launched by their leaderships on a 
common basis. Consequently, the formation of a class front embodied the idea of a 
34 Alain Duhamel and Dominique Gador, in 'Un nouveau communisme, est-ce possible?' L 'Humanite 
Hebdo, 25-26 March 2000, p. 9. 
35 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour fa France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
36 221: Congres, ibid 
37 Jean Poperen, Le nouveau contrat socialiste (Paris: Ramsay, 1985), p. 28. 
38 Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Les socialistes, fes communistes et fes autres (Paris: Aubier, 1977), p. 231. 
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Union forged around the contract of the Common Programme, but also at both its base 
and its summit, according to the socialists. 
In this context, if the leaders of the French Communist Party accepted that the 
Union should be 'loyale, claire, respectueuse du pluralisme [entre les partis]',39 it was 
nonetheless the case that they brushed aside the very idea of a class front40 - . [ce] 
fourre-tout dans lequel tous les chats sont gris' if we believe Marchais.41 For them, this 
idea was even more unacceptable since, from the mid-1970s onwards, it was no longer 
the FCP which was the strongest left-wing political force, as had been the case since 
1945: it was the Socialist party.42 Competition was in the air, and communist leaders 
acted accordingly: they interpreted the notion of 'loyalty' in a rather peculiar way - the 
dominant socialists doing exactly the same thing with their concept of 'equivalence des 
forces entre les deux composantes de la Gauche fran<;aise'. 43 
The leaders of the French Communist Party refused the strategy of class front for 
three reasons which were linked to the characteristics of the Socialist Party and to its 
leader, Fran<;ois Mitterrand. First, communist leaders considered that the social-democrat 
nature of the SP in general made it less willing to destroy capitalism, in order to replace 
it by socialism, 44 and more incline ' [ a] ceder a la "fascination" giscardienne 45 [ ... ] [et a 
39 23e Congres, Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 9-13 May 1979); Georges Marchais, Plus que jamais agissons pour I 'union et Ie 
changement (rapport presente a la session du Comite Central des 4 et 5 octobre 1977), quoted in 
L 'Humanite, 7 October 1977. 
40 Hughes Portelli, 'La voie nationale des PC fran~ais et italien', Projet, no. 106 (June 1976), 667. 
41 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
42 Jean Baudoin, 'Le declin du FCP', Regards sur I 'actualite (April 1991), 39; Victor Leduc, 'The 
French Communist Party: between Stalinism and Eurocommunism', Political Quaterly, 49 (1978), 
407; Neill Nugent and David Lowe, 'The French Communist Party: the Road to Democratic 
Government?', Political Quaterly, 48 (1977), 282; Colette Ysmal, 'Parti communiste: les raisons d'un 
durcissement', Projet, no. 121 (January 1978), 49; Fran~ois Mitterrand, Ici et maintenant (Paris: 
Fayard, 1980), pp. 23-4. 
-B Jean Poperen, L 'unite de la gauche (1965-1973), (Paris: Fayard, 1975), p. 5. 
-l-l Georges Marchais' 'secret' report to the Party's Central Committee of 29 June 1972 quoted in Rene 
Andrieu, Lettre ouverte a ceux qui se reciament du socialisme (Paris: Albin MicheL 1978), p. 101; cf 
Jean Elleinstein, 'PC: Jean Elleinstein s'explique', Politique Hebdo, 23-29 January 1978, p. 8; 
Elleinstein, 'Du xxne congres du FCP it l'echec de la gauche - La revolution n'est plus ce qu'elle 
etait', Le Monde, 13 April 1978; in 1959, Maurice Thorez already declared that 'nous sommes en 
presence [ ... ] d'une veritable entreprise de liquidation de toute conception socialiste', in IS" Congres 
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laisser] [ ... ] la porte ouverte a un replfttrage du pouvoir,.46 Indeed, as the intellectual 
communist dissident Maurice Goldring put it - thus proving that his loyalty to the Party 
was not in contradiction with his dissident outbursts - 'un Parti socialiste sans Ie 
contrepoids d'une influence communiste suffisante prend Ie sens des vents dominants 
aussi surement qu'un ballon dirigeable mal leste. ,47 Second, communist leaders 
considered that the grassroots of the Socialist Party were far too heterogeneous to make 
it bend leftwards. For them, if the socialist base did include 'some' workers, these were 
submerged by a real tidal wave of 'bourgeois' elements with right-wing tendencies.48 
However, this argument did not stand up to the fact that, by cooperating with the FCP, 
the SP actually took a left wing turn in the 1970s,49 rather than a right-wing one50 as it 
could have done with the centrists. Lionel Jospin confirmed this in 1991: 'Ni notre 
generation [ ... ] ni Fran<;ois Mitterrand [ ... ] n'avaient la tentation de servir d'appoint it la 
Droite. Notre objectif etait de la remplacer. ,51 Third, communist leaders considered that, 
at the summit of the SP, Mitterrand was a figurehead with rather questionable and 
destructive ambitions. 52 His promise to stamp on the Communist party53 by pumping it 
du FCP, L 'union des forces ouvrieres et republicaines pour la restauration et la renovation de la 
democratie (rapport d'activite du Comite Central presente par Maurice Thorez), (lvry, 24-28 June 
1959); in 1999, Robert Hue adopted the same discourse towards Jospin's SP, in Communisme: un 
nouveauprojet(Paris: Stock, 1999), pp. 141, 147. 
45 23e Congres, L 'avenir commence maintenant (resolution adoptee par Ie 23e Congres), (St-Ouen, 9-13 
May 1979); Guy Hermier, 'Rapport introductif, in Les intellectuels, la culture et la revolution, ed. by 
Conseil National du PCF (Bobigny, 9 et 10 fevrier 1980), (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980), p. 67. 
46 Georges Marchais, Plus que jamais agissons pour I 'union et Ie changement (rapport presente a fa 
cession du Comite Central des 4 et 5 octobre 1977) quoted in L'Humanite, 7 October 1977. 
47 Maurice Goldring, L 'accident (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1978), p. 51. 
48 Andre Vieuguet, 'Pourquoi un parti communiste plus influent, plus fort, plus actif?' Cahiers du 
Communisme, February-March 1976; Etienne Fajon, quoted in Andrieu, Lettre ouverte a ceux qui se 
reciament du socialisme, p. 101. 
49 Regis Debray, Lettre ouverte aux communistes jranc;ais et a quelques autres (Paris: Seuil, 1978), p. 
30: addressing himself to the communists, Debray declared: 'Vous [avez effectue] [ ... ] un assez 
serieux virage a droite (abandon de la dictature du proletariat, acceptation des mecanismes europeens, 
de la force de frappe etc.). ' 
50 As Elleinstein thought in 'pc: Jean Elleinstein s'explique', p. 6. 
51 Lionel Jospin, L 'invention du possible (Paris: Flammarion, 1991), p. 89. 
52 Ronald Tiersky, -French Communism in 1976', Problems of Communism, 15 (January-February 
1976),36. 
53 Fran~ois Mitterrand, Ma part de verite - De la rupture a I 'unite (Paris: Fayard, 1969), pp. 119-20; 
Jean Elleinstein, Le PC (Paris: Grasset, 1976), p. 135; Jean Elleinstein, Histoire mondiall' des 
socialismes, vol. 6 (Paris: A. Colin, 1984), p. 204. 
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"trois millions de voix' ,54 meaning by using it as a "reservoir a VOix,55 according to 
Marchais, proved this - a promise that Mitterrand kept56 by making a perfectly 
legitimate political calculation. 
Consequently, there was not a shadow of a doubt in the minds of the leaders of 
the French Communist Party. Only a communist working class vanguard could contain, 
at the base, the right-wing and social-democrat drifts of the Socialist Party. Only a 
communist working class vanguard could ensure a left-wing, or even a communist 
orientation to the Common Programme. In essence, the communist working class base 
was the magical key to all problems encountered when opening the Pandora's box of the 
SP. In this context, as the following analysis demontrates, in the 1970s the attitude of the 
FCP towards the Union of the Left could hark back first to the position of the Bolsheviks 
in 1905-1907 Russia, which was described by the Russian historian Zarodov, and second 
to the theory of union de combat which was developped by the French communist 
Etienne Fajon - a theory refuted by Jean Elleinstein. 
Zarodov addressed the question of left-wing alliances in 1981, in a book entitled 
The Political Economy of Revolution. Written from a revolutionary Soviet point of view, 
this book not only established the position of the motherland of Socialism towards what 
Zarodov called the "common front strategy' /7 it also demonstrated the extent of Leninist 
influence on the French Communist Party in the 1970s. In that sense, if Zarodov 
54 Georges Marchais, interviewed on France Inter, Petit dijeuner politique, 6 April 1978 and quoted in 
'Un debat positif et enrichissant, declare Georges Marchais sur France-Inter', L 'Humanite, 7 Apri~ 
1978: 'Cet objectif correspondait a celui de M. V. Giscard d'Estaing: ramener l'influence du Partl 
communiste a 15%'; Francrois Mitterrand at the International Socialist Congress, Vienna, 28 May 
1972, quoted in Andrieu, Lettre ouverte a ceux qui se ric/ament du socialisme, p. 103; cf. M. 
Adereth, The French Communist Party: a Critical History (1920-84) from Comintem to 'the Colours 
of France' (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 203. . ' . . 
55 Georges Marchais, 'Notre parti, ni son electorat, ne saurait accepter ce role nt cette SituatIOn , 
L'itincelle 70, April 1979; cf. Jean Elleinstein, 'Un communiste juge les communistes', Le SOllvei 
Observateur, 6 September 1976, p. 68; Andre Vieuguet, 'Un parti communiste influent. fort. actif, 
Cahiers du Communisme, no. 1 (January 1996), 16. 
56 Michel Winock, 'L'age d'or du communisme francrais,' L 'His to ire, July-August 1998, p. 58. 
57 K. Zarodov, The Political Economy of Revolution, English translation (London: Central Books 
Distributor, 1981), p. 177. 
expressed himseU'in favour of an alliance between the FCP and the SP, insofar as it could 
lead to a shared, but mainly communist political take-over, he nonetheless did not 
hesitate to send warning signals relating to the nature of the French Socialist Party _ 
warning signals which were based on Lenin's experience and which were directly 
addressed to the summit of the FCP. Zarodov thus reported that in the pre-Revolutionary 
Russia of 1905-1907, 
the Bolsheviks [ ... ] were prepared to cooperate with the democratic bourgeoisie 
in a broad people's political coalition58 [ ... ]. Proof of the Bolshevik pursuit of 
working-class political parties' solidarity lies in the Fourth (Unity) [ ... ] Congress 
(1906). They were the active organisers and participants in this Unity Congress, 
while the Mensheviks turned the fruits of their labours to naught, an agreement 
on paper only, calculated to undermine the Bolshevik party.59 
As a proof of his thesis, Zarodov quoted F. Dan, a Menshevik leader: "It is all over for 
the Bolshevik now; they'll flounder about for a few months more and then dissolve 
altogether into the party.'60 These declarations could not have hit the bull's eyes any 
better among French communist leaders. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1980s, they 
were the formal proof that history repeats itself, and they confirmed the most implacable 
suspicions of the FCP towards its socialist 'partner'. In the 1970s, the SP had acted like 
the Mensheviks, and F. Mitterrand revealed himself to be the very incarnation ofF. Dan. 
If the Mensheviks used the Bolsheviks to advance their own aims, French socialists "set 
their sights on boosting their own party at the expense of the Communists [ ... ] [and] 
58 Vladimir Hitch Lenin, Que faire? French translation (Paris: Librairie de I'Humanite, 1925). p. 14. 
59 Zarodov, The Political Economy of Revolution, p. 180. 
60 Zarodov, ibid., p. 180. The official Soviet historian Zarodov took his quote from A.V. Lunacharsky. 
Vospominan~l'a i vpechatleniya [Memories and Impressions}, (Moscow: [no pub.], 1968). p. 40. 
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planned to resume their right-wing social democratic tradition' .61 If Dan wanted to 
weaken Lenin's party, Mitterrand promised that 'sur les cinq millions d'electeurs 
communistes, trois millions peuvent voter socialiste! ,62 As a consequence, in the eyes of 
FCP leaders, all this confirmed the 'right' strategic choice they made in the 1970s: the 
Union of the Left was certainly essential to allow a left wing government to replace a 
right wing one and therefore create the ideal conditions for a passage to socialism, but, 
as Etienne Fajon wrote, this Union was above all a battle. 
The title of Etienne Fajon's book, L 'union est un combat,63 had a double meaning 
in the sense that, for French communist leaders, the battle for the Union of the Left and 
against the Right was also a battle within the Union64 - a battle led both by the 
communist base and by the FCP leadership against a SP endowed with so-called right-
wing tendencies.65 As Fajonjustified it sarcastically in 1975, in the middle of the take-off 
of the SP at the expense of the FCP, 'l'union n'est pas une idylle mais un combat'.66 
However, for the communist candidate but independently minded Jean Elleinstein, 67 this 
was a strategic error. If for him 'il n'est pas scandaleux qu'existe une certaine 
concurrence a l'interieur de l'Union [ ... ] un ecart trop grand entre Ie PS et Ie PC ne 
[pouvant] qu'affaiblir l' unite' ,68 he nonetheless condemned communist leaders for going 
too far in their battle69 - and on this particular point, Elleinstein was probably correct. 
61 Zarodov, ibid., p. 176. 
62 Franyois Mitterrand quoted in Andrieu, Lettre ouverte a ceux qui se rec/ament du socialisme, p. 103; 
cf. M. Adereth, The French Communist Party: a Critical History (1920-1984) from Comintern to 'the 
Colours of France', p. 203. 
63 Etienne Fajon, L 'union est un combat (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975). 
64 This was also true for the Socialist Party. 
65 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges 
Marchais), (St-Quen, 4-10 February 1976). 
66 Fajon, L 'union est un combat, p. 41; 22e Congres, Ce que veulent les communistes pour fa France 
(document ado pte par Ie 22e Congres), (St-Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
67 Jean Elleinstein was the communist candidate in the 5th arrondissement of Paris at the 1978 
legislative elections. . . 
68 Jean Elleinstein, Lettre ouverte aux fram;ais sur Ie Repub/ique du Programme Commun (Paris: .\Ibm 
Michel, 1977), pp. 56, 58. 
69 'Les accusations contre Ie PC de Jean Elleinstein', Le Matin, 4 December 1979; Auguste Lecoeur, rl~ 
FCP: continuite dans Ie changement (Paris: R. Laffont, 1977), p . .t2. 
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The battle led at the summit by communist leaders against the Socialist Party 
could only be counterproductive for the whole Union. Indeed, each time communist 
leaders criticised the SP, they gave additional arguments to the Right - arguments 
which were even more forceful and welcome because they came from the ranks of the 
enemy. Each time communist leaders attacked the SP, they demolished the unitary work 
of the base by promoting a secessionist strategy at the summit of the Union. Each time 
communist leaders tried to push the SP to adopt more revolutionary positions, they 
narrowed the electoral spectrum of the Union. As Elleinstein put it, 'nous [communistes] 
n'avons pas convaincu. Pis encore, nous avons decourage des bonnes volontes, et fait 
peur bien au-deli de l'electorat socialiste, jusque autour de nous' .70 As a consequence, in 
the 1970s, the Union of the Left should not have been une union de combat, stricto 
sensu,71 fought both at the base, thanks to the participative mobilization of communist 
activists, and at the summit by FCP leaders. It should have rather been a more moderate 
Union based on a constructive approach to political and ideological divergence, meaning, 
as Elleinstein proposed it at the end of the 1970s, a 'union of debate' forged both at the 
base and at the summit. As Elleinstein explained: 
La forme du combat pour l'union doit etre Ie debat [ ... ] il faut entre socialistes et 
communistes un veritable debat sur les grands choix strategiques, sur la 
conception meme du socialisme, sur les etapes des transformations qu'un 
d 1 . . 72 gouvemement de Gauche devrait mettre en route, sur les moyens e a vlctorre. 
[Mais] il ne s'agit pas seulement d'organiser l'union au sommet. L'union, pour 
etre durable et creer les conditions de la victoire, doit etre une union populaire 
70 Jean Elleinstein, 'Du XXIle congres du Fep a l'echec de la Gauche - La mutation necessaire', Le 
Monde, 14 April 1978. 
71 Elleinstein, ibid. 
72 Jean Elleinstein, 'Du XXIle congres du peF a l'echec de la Gauche - La revolution n'est plus ce 
qu' elle etait', Le Monde, 13 April 1978; Elleinstein, 'Pour une alliance historique entre Ie Fep et Ie 
PS', Le Monde, 24 August 1978. 
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[ ... ] [realisee] par les partis et en dehors des partis, a la base comme au sommet. 73 
However, for the leaders of the French Communist Party, there was no way a union of 
debate could be forged with the Socialist Party. The socialists proved it themselves: they 
refused to debate constructively with the CP in 1977 - they refused the communists' 
revision proposals for the Common Programme.74 For the leaders of the FCP, the only 
voice they could hear was that of a battle within the Union, against the Socialist Party-
a view Louis Althusser did not hesitate to challenge. 
In Althusser's mind, there was not the slightest doubt. The leadership of the French 
Communist Party did not try to cooperate closely with the communist base in order to 
strengthen the Union of the Left. The leadership of the FCP did not mobilize its base in a 
fully participative manner in order to bring the forces of the Left to victory in March 
1978. The Party leadership rather instrumentalized its base in order to assert its own 
decisional power within the Union. The action of communist activists, which should have 
been placed at the very heart of the unitary movement of the Union of the Left, was, 
therefore, pushed into the background, behind that of their leaders who directed the 
Union at the Summit. 75 Jacques Chambaz could swear that 'conscient que l'accord au 
sommet ne suffit pas [ ... ] [Ie PCF] en a toujours appele a la classe ouvriere, a l'ensemble 
des forces populaires pour qU'elles ne s'en remettent pas aux etats-majors,76 - for 
Althusser the conclusion remained the same. The Union of the Left was a contractual 
73 Jean Elleinstein quoted in Le Monde, 9 May 1979. 
74 The negociations which took place between the FCP and the SP on the updating of the Common 
Programme were suspended in the night of 22-23 September 1977; ct:, among others, Annie Kriegel, 
'PC-PS: les causes de la rupture', Commentaire, no. 3 (1978), 317. 
75 Etienne Balibar, Guy Bois, Georges Labica and Jean-Pierre Lefebvre, Ouvrons la Jenetre. camarades 
(Paris: Maspero, 1979), p. 123; Didier, an employee of the SNCF, in 'Entretien avec deux membres 
de comites de sections d'entreprise (SNCF)" Luttes et Debats, January 1979, pp. 8, 17; Raymond 
Jean, La singularite d'etre communiste (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979), p. 97; Raymond Jean, 'La 
gauche de la gauche', Le Monde, I November 1977. 
76 Jacques Chambaz, 'Aujourd'hui et demain, des voies nouvelles pour vaincre'. Cahicrs du 
Communisme, no. 10 (October 1979),44. 
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policy concluded at the summit, between the leaderships of the signatory parties of the 
Common Programme of Government. It was therefore a policy which was flawed for 
two reasons. 
First, for Althusser, communist leaders focused too much on the contractual 
aspect of the Common Programme - and on this ground, his criticisms were fully 
justified. Indeed, this contract became the pivot of the Party's strategy from 1972 to 
1977. In a first stage, the communist leadership focused on the need for the Socialist 
Party to respect the clauses of the Common Programme which had been defined in 1972. 
Then, in a second stage - when the Socialist party started dominating the Union of the 
Left from 1974 onwards - FCP leaders changed their strategy77 by starting to insist on 
the necessity of reviewing the clauses of the contract because the 1973 oil crisis had 
struck France, causing a change in the economic and social landscape,78 and thus 
changing the background against which the Common Programme had been originally 
defined.79 However, what should have constituted the pivot of the Party's strategy was 
not the contract in itself, but the Union of popular forces, for according to the 
communists only the Union could have ensured a victory at the 1978 legislative elections 
and the consequent successful implementation of the contract.80 The Party's priorities 
were, therefore, wrong. A contractual strategy, based on the respect or the non-respect, 
or even on the maintenance, or the modification, of such and such clause could only lead 
to a destructive polemic between the two leaderships, and thus to a secessionist policy 
within the Union. This was exactly what happened in 1977. The contract should have 
been kept in the background until after victory at the 1978 elections had been secured. 
After the victory of the Left, the contract could have been renegotiated. But the period 
77 Louis Althusser, Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste (Paris: Maspero, 1978), p. 51. 
78 See introduction. 
79 Paul Boccara, interview with, 'Le programme commun au present', France Nouvel/e, 1 ~77, p. 42. 
80 It is worth noting that, at that time, a majority of polls indicated that the French dId not WIsh to 
change society. 
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before the elections was not the moment for the FCP to feed the polemic with the SP not 
only on a contractual basis, but also on electoral grounds. 
Second, for Althusser, the attitude of communist leaders was too sectarian, too 
focused on electoral matters, and certainly rather hypocritical. Indeed, FCP leaders were 
poor preachers: their acts did not follow their sermons. While vituperating against 
Mitterrand's attempts to steal votes from the Party, they themselves tried to strengthen 
the FCP at the expense of a SP which was, admittedly, in Althusser's view, too social-
democrat and too bourgeois,81 but which was also able to bolster the Union with centrist 
votes.
82 Communist leaders thus divided the heart of the battleground into two fronts. 
The battle was not only fought between the Left and the Right - as communist activists 
thought, and as should have been the case in order to win the 1978 elections83 - but 
also between the allied forces of the Left,84 over the influential domination of one single 
class, which was not even fully representative of the whole Union, that is to say the 
communist working class. As Althusser explained in one of his articles published in Le 
Monde in 1978, by hinting at Fajon's expression L 'union est un combat, 
en fait, la direction [du PCF] a substitue au combat dans les masses85 [ ••• ] Ie 
combat entre organisations, so us couvert de la fidelite au programme commun. 
Elle a ainsi reussi a remplacer l'eIectoralisme unitaire [ ... ] par un electoralisme 
sectaire, qui pretendait faire passer la domination d'un parti sur un autre pour une 
hegemonie reelle, une 'influence dirigeante' de la classe ouvriere dans Ie 
I · 86 mouvement popu arre. 
81 Louis Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 25 April 1978. 
82 Althusser, Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste, p. 47; Althusser also wrote that 
'reduire l'audience du PS etait renoncer a la victoire de la gauche', in Projet de texte de la cellllie 
Paul Langevin, ALT2.A27-01.05, Paris, lMEC, fond Althusser, unpublished manuscripts. 
83 Althusser, Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, ibid. 
84 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 25 April 1978. 
85 Gerard Molina agreed on this notion in 'Se battre contre ce qui divise', Le Monde, ..1- November 1977. 
86 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 28 April 1978. 
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Althusser's criticisms were strong and rather cutting - but he did not express them 
without offering an alternative. For ~ if the Union of the Left should to some extent , , 
rely on a contract establishing future action plans, if the Union should inevitably be 
sealed at the summit by the signatory parties to the Common Programme, it should 
nonetheless be mainly based on the large scale action of the popular masses, on their 
unitary drive87 and on their revolutionary initiatives.88 Althusser thus explained in 1978: 
11 eut ete [ ... ] parfaitement possible de concevoir cette politique d'union comme 
une politique de masse et de lutte: comme une politique d'union populaire, 
associant Ie contrat signe 'au sommet' a une lutte unitaire a la base, dans laquelle 
Ie parti eut pu etendre son audience au-dela du 'butoir' [represente par la seule 
c1asse ouvriere] [ ... ]. On aurait [ainsi] cesse de [ ... ] manipuler [les masses] [ ... ] 
pour creer les conditions d'une politique ouvriere et populaire d'unite 
I · 89 popu arre. 
However, despite what Althusser thought, the Party leadership did not deny the 
importance of the masses: it kept emphasising it. In this context, in theory, Althusser and 
the FCP leadership seemed to agree on the unitary and core function the working class 
should play within the Union of the Left - but in practice, the pattern was completely 
different. For Althusser, a popular Union should not only extend to other social classes,9o 
it should also go beyond the frontiers of political parties91 - a strategy communist 
leaders could not bring themselves to implement. Their decision to fall back on 
87 Althusser, Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin, unpublished manuscripts. 
88 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 28 April 1978. 
89 Althusser, ibid 
90 Althusser, Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste, p. 98. 
91 Louis Althusser, 2:/ Congres (Paris: Maspero, 1977), pp. 44-5. 
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ouvrieristes positions proved this in the 1970s.92 However, in the context of the Union of 
the Left, this withdrawal to an ouvrieriste position was not completely unfounded. The 
French Communist Party had to mark its social and ideological difference with the 
Socialist Party while inserting itself into the unitary political dynamic of the Common 
Pro gramme. 93 The FCP had thus to find a balance between its role in the Union of the 
Left and its own identity. 
This position was uncomfortable and, little by little, the Party's assertion of its 
own distinctive identity took precedence over the need for coherent political, social and, 
to some extent, ideological unity within the Union of the Left. However, it would have 
been desirable if the Leadership of the FCP had been able to make the reverse choice -
a reverse choice which presupposed a transformation of the Party.94 Indeed, in the 1970s, 
a fully participative mobilization of the communist base and, broadly speaking, of the 
popular masses, could not be effectively implemented if the Party did not introduce a 
more flexible vertical organisation.95 Nor could it be effectively implemented if the Party 
did not change its strategy of union de combat with the Socialist Party, its political 
partner for better and for worse. However, in the 1970s, the leaders of the French 
Communist Party were not ready to accept these transformations. As Althusser 
concluded, 
Marx disait: 'La consCIence est toujours en retard.' La Direction du parti 
applique imperturbablement ce principe a la lettre, sans en soup90nner l'ironie: 
elle est sUre d' etre consciente parce qu' elle est en retard.96 
92 See ch. 4. 
93 Georges Marchais asserted that 'nous [communistes] tenons a notre originalite" in Parlons 
franchement (Paris: Grasset, 1977), p. 127. <' , 
94 Louis Althusser, Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Le malaise du]] Congres) , AL T2.A24-
01.01102 to -02.01, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, unpublished manuscripts. 
95 See ch. I. 
96 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 28 April 1978. 
163 
To conclude, by signing the Common Programme of Government in 1972. the French 
Communist Party assumed a new role of potential governmental actor. The momentum 
had been given. There was no question of the FCP retreating to the political margins. 
There was no question of the Party remaining the silent witness of a game played without 
its active participation. 
At the base of the Party, there was a real committment to cooperation with 
Socialists and Radicals in the Union of the Left. They worked with activists of the other 
left-wing parties on the basis of a Common Programme which they thought was theirs. 97 
They attracted new members who were seduced by the perspective of a political, 
economic and social revival. 98 They put all their efforts towards what they thought would 
be a victory of the Left in March 1978 - until the Union's defeat when the elections 
took place. The efforts of the rank and file proved to be in vain, and the summit of the 
FCP became a prime target. As a communist employee of the SNCF put it bluntly, 
l'echec [de mars 1978] reside dans la nature meme de l'union (union au sommet) 
[ ... ]. II faut [aussi] savoir que la moitie des membres du parti a adhere entre 1972 
et 1978 dans l'objectif d'une victoire electorale de la gauche.99 Frustres de cette 
victoire, sans aucune perspective rapprochee, les militants ne voient plus l'utilite 
de continuer a militer [ ... ]. Les directions PCIPS se sont foutus (sic.) de nOlls. IOO 
97 Debray, Lettre ouverte aux communistes franc;ais et it quelques autres, p. 24. 
98 Didier in "Entretien avec deux membres de comites de sections d'entreprise (SNCFr, p. 10. , 
99 Jean Elleinstein Une certaine idee du communisme (Paris: Julliard, 1979), p. 105. 
100 Didier in "En;etien avec deux membres de comites de sections d'entreprise (SNCF),. pp. 8, 10; it is 
also w~rth noting that Andre Lajoinie, who was a member of the FCP's Bureau Politique in the 
1970s, declared in 1979 that "cet accord [Ie Programme Commun] signe au sommet a ete "un facteur 
de demobilisation populaire'" quoted in Patrick Jarreau, 'Le FCP et la demobilisation populaire', Ll' 
Monde, 21 April 1979. This fact was also recognised by Georges Marchais in his report to the Party's 
23rd Congress of 1979 which was published in Le Monde, 10 May 1979. 
16.+ 
Pushed into a comer by mounting discontent, Georges Marchais admitted in 1980 that 
'avec Ie programme commun la forme "de sommet" dans laquelle s'est realisee l"union 
[ ... ] a [ ... ] favorise une confusion, des illusions, des faiblesses,.lol His words were 
carefully chosen, but they were mere hints compared to what he declared in 1985, at the 
Party's 25th Congress: 
Notre reflexion et notre action se sont orientees en fonction d'un accord au 
sommet, nous avons favorise Ie sentiment selon lequel la solution de to us les 
problemes viendrait d'en haut [ ... ]. La critique que nous [dirigeants communistes] 
effectuons de notre propre demarche, de nos propres actes po litiques, est sans 
complaisance. 102 
Georges Marchais therefore did not hesitate to blame the Party leadership for the failure 
of the FCP's policies in the 1970s. 
However, Marchais' utterances and actions in the 1980s arrived too late, for it 
was at the beginning of the 1970s that the Union of the Left should have been 
constructed at the base, around a contract signed at the summit. It was during the 1970s 
that the Party should have acknowledged the need for a fully participative mobilization of 
its base, which would have involved their systematic consultation and their regular 
approval for the Party's policies. But in the 1970s, the leaders of the French Communist 
Party were not ready to put this strategy into practice. Their mistrust of the masses, and 
even '[leur] reflexe de refus devant tout ce qui n'est pas controle par l'appareil, devant 
101 Georges Marchais, L 'espoir au present (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980), p. 51. 
IO~ 25t! Congres, Espoir ef combat pour I 'avenir (rapport presente par Georges Marchais), (St Ouen, 8-
10 February 1985). 
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les forces nouvelles qui peuvent inquieter les certitudes et l'ordre etabli',103 as Althusser 
put it, were far too deeply rooted for them to give power of action to the communist 
base. After all, 'une direction, c'est fait pour diriger' as Marchais asserted it in 1978. 111 -1 
Consequently, in the 1970s, Elleinstein could propose une union de debat and 
Althusser une union populaire combining, in both cases, a contract signed at the summit 
and a participative mobilization of the masses - with the difference that for Althusser 
the base should be the core element of the Union - but the leaders of the French 
Communist Party had no intention of listening to them. In the eyes of the Party 
leadership, they were purely and simply wrong, and in the long run, the French 
Communist Party ended up losing everything. It cut itself from its base and, as a result, 
as Althusser and his fellow althusseriens put it unambiguously, 'c'est, a terme, 
l'influence et l'existence meme du parti qui sont en cause'. 105 
In the 1990s, however, Robert Hue was determined not to repeat the same 
mistake as his predecessor: la Gauche plurielle would actively involve both the summit 
and the base of the Party,106 thus giving concrete expression to the ideas expressed by 
Elleinstein and Althusser back in the 1970s. \07 In 1995, two years before the start of 
communist participation in Lionel Jospin's government, Hue asserted: 
Nous voulons dialoguer avec Ie Parti socialiste. Dans un style nouveau. Je Ie 
103 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde, 28 April 1978. 
104 Georges Marchais interviewed on France Inter, Petit dejeuner politique, 6 April 1978, and quoted i~ 
'Un debat positif et enrichissant, declare Georges Marchais sur France-Inter', L 'Humanite, 7 Apnl 
1978. 
105 Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar, Guy Bois, Georges Labica and Jean-Pierre Lefebvre, 'D~s 
intellectuels signent une lettre demandant ''une veritable discussion politique"·. Le Monde, 6 Apnl 
1978. 
106 By reference to the actions citoyennes put in place by the Party in the late 1990s, and to the open ing 
up of its organisation to non communists. . . 
107 It is worth noting that in the 1980s, although the FCP took part in the government of the S~lahst 
Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy from 1981 to 1984, it very much followed the same strategy as III the 
1970s. The FCP continued to oppose the SP and to back the Soviet Union; cf., among others. Armen 
Antonian and Irwin Wall, 'The French Communists under Franyois Mitterrand', Political Studies. 
no. 33 (1985), 254-73. 
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repete: dans la clarte et la transparence. Sans esprit de querelle, mats sans 
'arrondir' artificiellement quoi que ce soit. En disant franchement a I'opinion ce 
sur quoi nous sommes d'accord, et ce sur quoi nous ne Ie sommes pas. Pour que 
chacun puisse etre juge. Pour sortir la poIitique d'entre les 'murs' des directions 
Ii . d d' ' . 108 po tIques et es secrets etats-maJors. 
. (P . St k 1995) P 319-"'0' my emphasis. 108 Robert Hue, Ie communisme: fa mutatIOn arts: OC, -,' ~, 
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CHAPTER 8 
On how to deal with internal dissent 
It was at the end of the 1970s that Jean Elleinstein and Louis Althusser fell under the 
wrath of the French Communist Party which considered them to be too free from 
communist ideological shackles, too inclined to contest the Party's political orientations. 
and too critical towards its Leadership.l Held tightly by the Party's 'diabolical tongs':~ 
and locked up in its dissent-crushing machine, Elleinstein and Althusser could have 
decided to tow the line. They could have renounced their critical writings and discourses. 
Instead, precisely the reverse happened. The sting of the Party Leadership only pushed 
them to denounce the attitude of the Party towards those who had simply dared to 
express themselves freely on subjects which mattered to them directly, towards all the 
communists who had refused to see their intellectual thought become sclerotic under the 
ideological grip of the Leadership, that is to say communist dissidents. In that sense, the 
methods which were used, as a way to deal with internal conflicts, by the French 
Communist Party recalled both the procedures employed by the former Soviet Union and 
the respect for the diversity of opinion which was recognised by the FCP in 1993. 
Stalin wrote in 1924 that 'the Party is strengthened by purging itself of 
opportunist elements,3 - an assertion that he put into practice as soon as he arrived in 
power, thus modelling his actions on Lenin's, who had emptied the towns and the 
countryside of any individual deemed opposed to the new Bolshevik regime, and set the 
I See previous chapters. 
2 Jean Elleinstein, lis vous trompent, camarades! (Paris: Belfond, 1981), p. 115. . 
3 Stalin quoted in Martin McCauley, Stalin and Stalinism (Harlow: Longman, 1995), p. 90; ct. Jean 
Buries, Le Parti communiste dans la societe franr;aise (Paris: Editions Sociales, ~ 979): he q~oted the 
13th condition of adhesion to the Communist International, p. 137: 'Les partls commumstes [···1 
doivent proceder a des epurations periodiques de leurs organisations, afin d'en ecarter les elements 
interesses et petits-bourgeois. ' 
168 
tone for his successors. In this context, the whole history of the Soviet Union was 
marked by a totalitarian socialist power exercised by CPSU dignitaries who feared the 
corruption of their closed system by the infiltration of so-called "enemies in the pay of the 
capitalists'. In 1973, the Soviet scientist Yury Orlov became one of these pariahs. After 
sending a letter to Brezhnev, in which he asked the General Secretary of the CPSU to 
consider proceeding to democratic reforms, and after backing the dissident Sakharov 
publicly,4 Orlov was crushed little by little by the Soviet system's repression of dissent. 
Dismissed from his job, unable to find another, and constantly warned against his 
continuing dissident activities, Orlov ended up being arrested in 1977.5 Consequently, in 
the Soviet Union, the end of the 1970s marked not only the quelling of Orlov's liberal 
ideas, but also the systematic crushing of dissident movements which proved to be too 
divided to push Brezhnev to democratise his regime,6 and too weak in front of the 
powerful system even to survive. 
Within the French Communist Party, if the treatment of dissent never assumed 
the Soviet Union's extreme forms of physical and moral liquidation, of imprisonment and 
internment in psychiatric hospitals, it nonetheless had a considerable impact on the life of 
those French communists who were labelled as 'dissidents'. The FCP officially 
recognised this at the end of the 1990s, after drawing its conclusions from a report 
established by an Arbitration Commission specially set up to examine the Party's past 
practices. As a result, in 1998, Francette Lazard spoke of '[Ie] tort fait aux personnes 
[ ... ] par des pratiques d' exclusion, de suspicion ou de mise a l' ecart qui ont ete utilisees 
comme mode de reglement du conflit politique', of 'blessures faites aux personnes 
4 Walter Parchomenko, Soviet Images of Dissident and Non Conformists (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 
ItO. 
-' Parchomenko, ibid., p. 110. 
6 John Gooding, Rulers and Subjects: Government and People in Russia, 1801-1991, pp. 162-3. 
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accusees it tort', and of '[un] gachis politique et humain considerabIe,.7 In March 2000, a 
document of the Party's 30th Congress admitted without reserve that "nous 
[communistes franvais] avons pratique dans nos rangs des mises it l'ecart et provoque 
des douleurs irreparables,.8 These declarations were clear-cut, unequivocal, and in any 
case fully justified. Indeed, until the 1990s, the Party's methods of dealing with internal 
conflicts were carbon-copied on the Soviet model. 9 The copy was certainly not 
completely accurate, but it was substantial enough to be denounced by Elleinstein and 
Althusser. 
In this context, the first part of this chapter on the Fep's approach towards 
internal conflicts during the 1970s will establish the Party's official and dual position 
towards communist dissidents, which was both that of tolerance and struggle against 
'free-minded spirits'. 10 As for the second part, it will underline Elleinstein's and 
Althusser's critical analysis of the situation. 
In the 1970s, the official position of the French Communist Party was that of tolerance. 
Indeed, for the Party, there were no strong critics within the revolutionary organisation 
of the working class. 11 There were instead communists who freely discussed at the base, 
in cells, sections and federations, and who thus opened a serious, but animated and 
fraternal debate on certain aspects of the Party's strategy.12 In this context, Paul Laurent 
7 Francette Lazard, Reflexion de la commission d'arbitrage sur la portee, au regard de I 'histoire, de la 
mutation des pratiques du debat dans Ie parti (rapport presente au Comile Central des 16 et 17' 
novembre 1998), (L 'Humanite, 19 November 1998). . 
8 30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites (textes adoptes par Ie 3(f ('ongres), 
(Martigues, 23-26 March 2000), (L 'Humanite, 27 March 2000). 
9 Jean Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme (Paris: Julliard, 1979), p. 71. 
10 'Avec les intellectuels communistes pour Ie 22e Congres', L 'Humanile, 3 May 1978. 
II Georges Marchais quoted in Thierry Pfister, 'La rete de L 'Humanite - M. Marchais: il 11\,a pas de 
contestataires au PCF', Ie Monde, 12 September 1978 (the "tete de L 'Humanite' was held ITom 9 to 
10 September 1978 in La Courneuve). . '
12 Georges Marchais interviewed on France Inter, Petit dejeu~er politique, 6 A~nl ~ 978 an? ~uoted l~ 
"Un debat positif et enrichissant, declare Georges Marchals sur France-Inter, L Humamte, 7 Apnl 
1978; see our ch. I. 
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could only express his joy to see 'une tolerance dans Ie de bat' ,\3 and Georges Marchais 
congratulated himself on the scope of the debate l4 by declaring, his hand on his heart. 
that 'la discussion nous rejouit [ ... ] ce qui me peinerait Ie plus, ce serait qu'il n\ ait plus 
de debat' .15 
For the Party, there was no atomisation of ideas into trends and tendencies 
fighting over French communist policy. There was rather a unity of thought which 
predisposed the Party to unity of action. 16 Communists were indeed deemed to be united 
around their Leadership, and fused together not only by the decisions supremely taken at 
Party Congresses, but also democratically by the Party's decision-making bodies. 
As a consequence, the French Communist Party certainly tolerated a profusion of 
discussions at the base, but it tolerated them only insofar as they remained subordinate to 
the decisions taken at the summit of the organisational ivory tower of the Party, and 
insofar as they did not cut a tendential fault in the ideological bloc of communist thought. 
In that respect, Georges Marchais declared in plain language that 
ceux qui ont emis un avis different ont Ie droit de conserver leur opinion, nous 
[dirigeants communistes] ne violons pas les consciences. Mais ils ont en meme 
temps Ie devoir de se conformer a la volonte de la majorite, ce qui est une regIe 
democratique elementaire. 17 En toute circonstance, c' est Ie parti qui doit 
conserver la maitrise du debat necessaire en son sein. 18 
13 Paul Laurent, 'Centralisme democratique: tenir les deux termes', La Nouvelle Critique, 19?7, p. 3. 
14 Marchais quoted in 'M. Marchais: il y a quelques contestations', Le Mo~de, 15 Apnl 1978, b~ 
reference to an interview given by Marchais at a press conference, French NatIonal Assembly. 3 AprIl 
1978. . '1' d 
15 Marchais quoted in Thierry Pfister, 'La rete de L 'Humanite - M. Marchals: I n y a pas . e 
contestataires au PCF', Le Monde, 12 September 1978; cf. Marchais, Le deji dbnocratiqllc (ParIs: 
Grasset, 1973), p. 202. 
16 See ch. 1 and 2. " , 
17 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour fa France (rapport du Comite Central presente par (ieorgl's 
Marchais), (St Quen, 4-10 February 1976). .. . 
18 Marchais quoted in oLe PCF et les intellectuels - M. Marchais: une veritable guerr~ Ideologlq~e ~t 
aujourd'hui conduite', Le Monde, 12 December 1978, by reference to the declaration made In hiS 
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For the Leadership, this attitude presented definite advantages. On the one hand. the 
internal debate could be both contained and mastered. Any dissent was dro\\ ned at the 
base, in the innermost depths of Party organisation. 19 Any criticism, which was deemed 
too caustic, or which touched too sensitive a cord of communist policy, was ignored on 
the ground of 'respect for decisions taken by the majority,.20 Any dissent was eradicated 
by the simple fact that the Leadership ignored dissidents in all good faith - in principle, 
what did not exist did not pose any problem. On the other hand, the Party could pride 
itself on a strong and coherent image which strengthened its credibility of action in the 
French political sphere. No external force could either divert it from its struggle against 
capitalisIl4 or prevent it from protecting the interests of the working class. No other 
political party, even the Socialists, could deter it from exercising a major influence within 
French society. 
However, if the Leadership of the French Communist Party did try to present a 
face tinged with tolerance and indulgence not only to all the communists, but also to the 
other French left-wing voters who the Party wanted to attract into its web, it was 
nonetheless the case that there was one issue on which it refused to compromise - that 
of the debate being brought into the public arena by what it called '[les] esprits libres,/1 
the communist intellectual dissidents. Minimised by the Party Leadership, the number of 
the dissidents' protests that were publicly revealed to the non-communist electorate was 
limited/2 thus giving these voters the false impression that the FCP was a homogenous 
'Infonnation' speech at the opening of the meeting held in Vitry with 400 communist intellectuals (9 
and 10 December 1979). 
19 'L'affaire du comite Lariboisiere', Luttes et Debats, January 1979, p. 28. .. , 
20 22e Congres, Le socialisme pour fa France (rapport du Comite Central presente par ve()rges 
Marchais), (St Ouen, 4-10 February 1976). 
21 -Avec les intellectuels communistes pour Ie 22e Congres', L 'Humanite, 3 May _1978: 
22 Marchais quoted in 'M. Marchais: il y a quelques contestations', Le Monde, \) Apnl 1978. 
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and united Party.23 Having been demonized, the destructive potential of the dissidents' 
actions took on enormous proportions within the Party, which did not hesitate to dissect 
their faults one by one. Georges Marchais therefore spoke in a rather straight manner of 
, ,24 f' 11 1 
meneurs , 0 mte ectua s who wrote ' [des] articles peremptoires qui trouveront 
facilement preneur [aupres de la bourgeoisie]'25 and of opponents to the 22nd Congress 
of 1976
26 
who weakened not only the Party's internal balance, but also its influential 
position on the French political scene. 
First, communist intellectual dissidents were considered to endanger the Party's 
internal balance insofar as their criticisms towards the Leadership's political orientations 
could snowball. Indeed, the dissidents' determined actions and their refusal to keep the 
debate at the base of the Party's organisation could only encourage other communists to 
express themselves freely too - which was precisely what a dogmatic Leadership 
feared, but exactly what communist intellectual dissidents desired. Reporting a 
conversation he had with Georges Marchais, Elleinstein wrote: '[II me dit] non sans 
logique que s'il me donnait la parole il faudrait la donner a des centaines d'autres. C'etait 
vrai et c'est precisement ce que je souhaitais.,27 But at the end, Elleinstein failed and 
Marchais won the match by playing a card - the legitimacy card - aimed at preventing 
communist intellectual dissidents' actions from snowballing both within the Party and 
outside its organisations. Any attempt from dissidents to infiltrate the Party with 
'subversive' ideas, any communist dissenting view expressed in the 'bourgeois' press, 
any criticism against decisions taken by democratically elected communist leaders and 
23 Michel Barak Fractures au PCF - Des communistes parlent (Aix-en-Provence: EDlSUD; Paris: 
Karthala, 1980), p. 125; Jean Baudoin, 'Les phenomenes de contestation au sein du Parti Communiste 
Fran9ais (avril 1978-mai 1979)" Revue Fran~aise de Science Politiq~~, no. 30 (1 :80). 100. 
24 Marchais quoted in 'Renforcer notre Parti en qualite et en quantIte - Les reponses de Georges 
Marchais aux joumalistes', L 'Humanite, 22 June 1978.. e ,.. . ...., . 
25 Marchais quoted in 'Georges Marchais: avancer sur la VOle du 22 Congres, L Humamte, _8 Apnl 
1978. . 
26 Marchais quoted in 'M. Marchais: il y a quelques contestations', Le :\fonde. 15 Apnl 1978. 
27 Elleinstein, lIs \'OUS trompent, camarades!, pp. 11-2. 
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any condemnation of strategic orientations supremely adopted at the vanous Part\' 
Congresses were deemed illegitimate, that is to say contrary to the rules of democratic 
centralism.
28 
For the Leadership, such acts could not be tolerated. Not only did they 
represent a blatant intellectual superiority over the working class and its representatives. 
but they were also an obvious attempt to jam the cogs of the Party's democratic 
centralism, to blow its unity of thought into a multitude of antagonist opinions, and 
therefore to cut to the bone the Party's credibility and freedom of action on the French 
political scene.
29 
The words were strong, but they were measured, and the warning 
signals were perfectly targeted. Consequently, any communist dissident could be 
identified, isolated30 and denounced as a heretic to the flock of -630,000,31 communists 
who, at least, made an effort to conform themselves collectively to the rules of 
democratic centralism. 32 
Second, communist intellectual dissidents were considered as striking a blow to 
the FCP's balance insofar as they expressed their anticonformist ideas out on the public 
stage.33 And for communist leaders, this kind of attitude was both unacceptable and 
dangerous. It was unacceptable, for any internal quarrel only concerned the Party, any 
friction should only be dealt with by the Party. It was dangerous, for any political and 
28 'Preserver et developper la vie democratique du parti - Resolution du Bureau Politique du PCF', 
L 'Humanite, 20 May ] 978, by reference to the resolution adopted by the Political Bureau regarding 
the petition signed by over 300 communists; cf. "'Le retard de notre parti it se mettre it jour ne sauraiL 
sans grave dommage, s'accroitre", declarent plus de trois cent communistes" (Petition d'Aix-en-
Provence signed, among others, by Althusser and Elleinstein), 20 May] 978; see our ch. 1. 
29 Marchais, interviewed on France Inter, Petit dejeuner politique, 6 April 1978 and quoted in 'Un debat 
positif et enrichissant, declare Georges Marchais sur France-Inter", L 'Humanite, . 7 ,April 1978; 
Marchais interviewed on Antenne 2, Question de Temps, 9 August 1978, and quoted m Com prendre 
pour construire I'union - Le texte complet des reponses de Geor?es Marcha!s it I'emissi~n 
d' Antenne 2, Questions de Temps', L 'Humanite, 11 August 1978; "Preserver et developper la Vie 
democratique du Parti - Resolution du Bureau Politique du PCF', ibid.; see our ch. I and 2. 
30 lean-Pierre Gaudard, Les orphe/ins du PC (Paris: Bel fond, 1986), p. 129. 
31 Georges Marchais, Avancer sur fa voie du 22e Congres (rapport presenti all Comile Central des 16, 
27 t!l 28 avril 1978). 
3] Etienne Balibar, Guy Bois, Georges Labica and lean-Pierre Lefebvre, Ouvrons la !enetre, camaradL's 
(Paris: Maspero, 1979), p. 184. 
33 Lucien Seve in Les Nouvelles Litteraires, n02639, 15 June 1978, p. 21. 
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ideological gash made to the communist carapace34 could potentially be exploited both 
by the bourgeois right-wing class enemy35 and the one which swore to take three million 
votes from the FCP,36 the one which competed with the Party in terms of influence 
within French society and inside the Union of the Left, namely the Socialist Party.37 As a 
consequence, there was not a shadow of a doubt in the minds of communist leaders: 
criticisms expressed by communist intellectual dissidents in the 'bourgeois' press, 'au 
nom d'un vague anarchisme petit-bourgeois' according to Georges Marchais/8 could 
only weaken the Party in the class struggle and reduce its sphere of influence to the 
benefit of the Socialist Party.39 
In this context, communist leaders were neither entirely wrong, nor completely 
right. They were not entirely wrong, for criticisms expressed by communist intellectual 
dissidents were even more likely to be exploited by other French political parties because 
they came from within the FCP, and because they were put forward by front-line 
communist intellectuals such as the historian Elleinstein and the philosopher Althusser. 
These so-called bourgeois parties could, therefore, draw their anti-Communist arguments 
from within the FCP, which in any case could only strengthen their freedom of action 
against the Party and reduce the communist striking force. 
They were not completely right either, for communist intellectual dissidents never 
wanted to weaken their Party by expressing themselves outside communist platforms. 
34 Jacques Ralite talked about '[une] telure dans Ie metal du parti', in Etienne Balibar, Guy Bois, 
Georges Labica and Jean-Pierre Lefebvre, Ouvrons lafenetre, camarades, p. 182. . . 
35 Christian Colombani quoting, among others, Guy Herrnier, Roland Leroy and Georges Marchals, m 
'M. Marchais: nous ne souhaitons, nous ne voulons exclure personne', Le Monde, 6 June 1978; 
'Preserver et developper la vie democratique du parti - Resolution du Bureau Politique du PC~", 
L 'Humanite, 20 May 1978; Paul Laurent, Le PCF comme if est: entretien avec Roger Faivre (Pans: 
Editions Sociales, 1978), pp. 146-7. . . 
36 Franyois Mitterrand at the International Socialist Congress of Vienna, 28 May 191'2, quoted m Rene 
Andrieu, Lettre a ceux qui se reclament du socialisme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978), p. 103: . 
37 Marchais, interviewed on France Inter, Petit dejeuner politique, 6 April 1978 and quoted m 'Un debat 
positif et enrichissant, declare Georges Marchais sur France-Inter', L 'Humanile, 7 April 1978. 
38 Marchais, Avancer sur Ia voie du 22'! Congres (rapport presente au Comilt! Central des ]6. ::7 el ::8 
avril 1978). 
39 Charles Piraux, (manual worker), 'Pour une democratie revolutionnaire', Luttes et Debals. January 
1979, p. 26; Elleinstein, lIs vous trompent, camarades!, p. 115. 
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They never wanted to marginalize themselves from the rest of the communist counter-
society by becoming dissidents 'certified non-conformists'. Elleinstein said it: '[Je ne me 
suis jamais considere] comme un contestataire mais comme un communiste it part entiere 
discutant d'un certain nombre d'aspects de la politique du parti. ,40 In fact, communist 
intellectual dissidents did not have any choice. Turned down by the communist press, 
they could only express their opinions in the so-called bourgeois press. 41 Teased by a 
communist Leadership acting as a psychic stimulus, they could only react by defending 
their ideas even more strongly. 
However, in the 1970s, the leaders of the French Communist Party did not see 
things from this angle: their approach was much more definite. For them, communist 
intellectual dissidents formed 'un petit groupe gagne par Ie vertige,-l2 which had to be 
brought back down to earth. But if in other times the Party did eradicate movements of 
dissident by expelling purely and simply their more active members,43 at the end of the 
1970s, by contrast, this was not really possible any more.44 As Paul Laurent wrote in 
1977, 
Ie developpement de Ia VIe democratique du parti fait qu'un desaccord 
momentane sur un probleme merite [ ... ] une patience dans la discussion [ ... ] qui 
40 Jean Elleinstein quoted in Thierry Pfister, 'La rete de L 'Humanite - M. Marchais: il n 'y a pas de 
contestataires au PCP', Le Monde, 12 September 1978. 
41 Louis Althusser, Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie Parti Communiste (Paris: Maspero, 1978), p. 36, 
also published in Le Monde, 25 April 1978; Jean Elleinstein, 'Du XXW C?ngres du PC~ a."e~hec de 
Ia gauche - La revolution n'est plus ce qu'elle etait', Le Monde, I3 Apnl 1978; ~enn Flszbm: Les 
bouches s 'ouvrent (Paris: Fayard, 1980), p. 36; Jane Jenson and George Ross, f leH' from InSide a 
French Communist Cell in Crisis (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 36-7: 
'''Le retard de notre parti a se mettre a jour ne saurait, sans grave dommage, s'accroitre'". Mclarent 
plus de trois cent communistes' (Petition d'Aix-en-Provence signed, among others, by Althusser and 
Elleinstein), Le Monde, 20 May 1978. 
-l2 Colombani quoting Marchais in 'M. Marchais: nous ne souhaitons, nous ne voulons c\.clure 
personne', Le Monde, 6 June 1978. '.. . 
-l3 Francette Lazard, Reflexion de la commission d'arbitrage sur fa portee. au regard de I hlstOire. de fa 
mutation des pratiques du debat dans Ie part; (rapport presente au Co m ilL; Central des 16 et J7 
novembre 1998), (L 'Humanite, 19 November 1998). _ . 
-l-l Marchais quoted in 'M. Marchais: il y a quelques contestations', Le Monde, I) Apnl 1978; 'A\cc les 
intellectuels communistes pour Ie 2Y Congres', L 'Humanite, 3 May 1978. 
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fait que, effectivement, Ie probleme de rexclusion se pose de plus en plus 
rarement. Ca ne veut pas dire qu'il soit impensable aujourd'hui qu'il y ait des 
gens qui soient exclus du parti.45 
From Paul Laurent's statement, it was clear that the French Communist Party definitely 
wanted to project an image of indulgence and diplomacy to the general pUblic. 
The Party wanted to be more understanding not only by acknowledging the 
relative freedom of expression of any communist, but also by expressing its respect for 
the plurality of opinion of its members.46 This was on the basis that such discussion 
would merely be about minor and ephemeral disagreements, kept private within the 
Party's organisations. The Party also wanted to be more diplomatic by doing away with a 
mode of treatment of dissent which was too imprinted with Sovietism to reflect fully its 
will to detach itself from the Soviet model, and by opting for the argumentative strength 
to bring its stray sheep back into the flock, instead of physically ejecting them from the 
If the FCP's approach was initially sensible, however, it was unfortunately not 
pushed far enough at the end of the 1970s. Old methods used to crush movements of 
dissent were reintroduced. Rehabilitations of formerly expelled communist dissidents, or 
even simple words of excuse towards them, were never pronounced. The internal 
democratisation of the Party, which was promised at the 22nd Congress of 1976, did not 
take place until the 1990s. As Althusser wrote towards 1980, in one of his unpublished 
manuscripts: 
Je sais bien que les choses ont change et que Marchais a eu Ie courage et la 
-15 Paul Laurent, "Centralisme democratique: tenir les deux termes', La Nouvelle Critique, 1977, p. J. 
46 "Avec les intellectuels communistes pour Ie 22" Congres', L 'Humanite, 3 May 1978. 
-17 Laurent, Le PCF comme if est: entretien avec Roger Faivre, pp. 146-7. 
177 
sage sse politique (mais pouvait-il faire autrement) de dire: "Dans Ie parti. on 
n'exclut plus.' D'accord, mais un mot comme <ra, n'efface pas Ie passe [ ... J [il 
n'est toujoursJ pas question de discuter, pas question de rehabiliter qui que ce 
soit.48 
Indeed, the Party's refusal to expel its most critical members did not wipe off the past, 
just as it did not erase the mechanisms of crushing dissent, nor the dramatic 
consequences such methods had on communist dissidents - and this was precisely what 
Elleinstein and Althusser condemned. 
In the 1970s, Elleinstein and Althusser did not hesitate to denounce the methods of 
crushing dissent which were used by the Leadership of the French Communist Party in 
order to force communist intellectual dissidents either to tow the line, or to leave the 
Party. Victims of these very Soviet-like methods, which contrasted with the Party's 
public strategy of openness adopted in the 1970s, Elleinstein and Althusser left behind 
them sufficiently precise writings to understand the two main stages through which any 
determined communist intellectual dissident inevitably went, namely progressive 
blacklisting and definitive condemnation. 
In the 1970s, progressive blacklisting included three stages which aimed to 
exercise increasing pressure on the dissident who was guilty of having hit a different note 
from that of the Party Leadership, guilty of having pinpointed problems inherent to the 
Party, condemnable for having criticised French and Soviet communist policies. 
First, the communist intellectual dissident was generally called to the summit of 
the Party's organisational pyramid to hear a cold and cutting sermon to which he could 
48 Louis Althusser, Projet de livre sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee de la main peut etrt: It: 
communisme, Paris, IMEC, fond Althusser, AL T2.A28-03.01 to .07, unpublished manuscripts. 
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only yield like a child at Sunday schoo1.49 'Tu ft!pondras apres tant que tu voudras. Pour 
Ie moment, c'est moi qui parle. Prends des notes et tais-toi· 50 the dissident was firmly 
told. Any answer back was useless, any way out was impossible: the dissident could only 
sit there and listen to the enumeration of his sins against the divine order of the FCP. 
And this was precisely what happened to Elleinstein. The historian, who was summoned 
by Georges Marchais after the publication of a series of critical articles in Le Monde in 
April 1978 reported that: 
C'etait Ie Georges Marchais des mauvais jours que j'avais en face de moi [ ... ]. II 
parla [ ... ] plus d'une demi-heure [ ... ]. [11] me reprocha d'affaiblir Ie Parti en Ie 
critiquant publiquement et de denaturer Ie sens meme des travaux du 22e 
Congres [ ... ]. Je critiquais trop l'URSS [ ... ]. J'aidais trop Ie Parti Socialiste [ ... ]. 
Je voulais desintegrer Ie Parti et l' empecher d' exercer une influence dirigeante et 
Ie transformer en club de discussion51 [ ••• ] il me sommait de me retracter, faute de 
quoi il me ferait condamner par la direction du Parti [ ... ].52 
From Elleinstein's statement, it appears clear that the Party Leadership was haunted by 
fears. These concerns were to some extent blown out of all proportion, for it was 
certainly not in the interest of the intellectual communist activist to express destructive 
criticisms in order to weaken a Party he believed in. However, the Party's concerns could 
be justified if we look at them from the Leadership's perspective. Because of its content, 
49 Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme, pp. 67-8. 
50 Elleinstein, lis vous trompe nt, camarades!, pp. 12-3. 
51 Laurent 'Centralisme democratique: tenir les deux termes', p. 2: 'Le parti communiste n'est pas un 
club ou s'affrontent des opinions fondamentalement opposees.' 
52 Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades!, pp. 12-13; it is worth noting that the same type of 
treatment was applied to communists, other than intellectuals, cf. Raymond Jean, La singularite 
d'erre communiste (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979), p. 126: 'Un communiste [ ... ] qui posait de 
nombreuses questions et soulevait beaucoup de problemes dans sa cellule s'entendait dire [ ... ] par un 
responsable federal [ ... ]: "[ ... ] tu melanges tout, tu ferais bien de prendre un peu de recu\. et meme 
d'aller passer quelques jours a la campagne!'" 
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any criticism expressed publicly by a front-line communist intellectual automatically took 
much more weight, not only among other communists keen to hear what some of their 
comrades had to say, but also among other left-wing voters who could legitimately cast a 
suspicious glance at the FCP's internal functioning and strategy. In this context, the 
Party Leadership could not afford to take any risk - and it did not shrink from the 
methods needed to curtail the 'risk effect' sparked by communist intellectual dissidents, 
for ideological and psychological pressures on the communist intellectual dissident 
followed next. 
Second, the Leadership of the French Communist Party could call on a sense of 
pressing duty among communist intellectual dissidents. In the 1970s, as the communist 
fortress was attacked by class enemies and the interests of the working class were 
threatened by Giscardian power, they had to help the party.53 The Leadership's call came 
from the heart, and if this method did not produce the expected 'tow the line' response, 
communist leaders did not hesitate to embark on the next stage, which was a public 
denunciation of their dissident activities. 
Third, if the Leadership's public denunciations of dissidents activities started in a 
rather impersonal and general manner, 54 they were nonetheless rapidly transformed into 
precise attacks which allowed the Party to name and put the spotlight on communist 
intellectual dissidents, to brand them as outsiders and to isolate them from the rest of the 
group. Only the psychologically strongest and the most determined resisted, for this 
technique of quasi-rejection from the tightly-knit communist group played on fears -
the fear of being cut off from one's old comrades, the fear of being the only one to be 
wrong against the others, 55 the fear of being rejected from the very cocooning 
53 See ch. 3. 
54 Althusser. Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie Parti Communiste, p. 1~; Jean Rony: "Le ~C au 
quotidien' in Olivier Duhamel and Henri Weber, Changer Ie PC? (Pans: Presse Unlwrsltam~ de 
France. 1979), p. 57. 
55 Claude Roy, Somme toute (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 25. 
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communist counter-society. However, these fears were in any case fully justified, for this 
was precisely what an unconditional condemnation from the Party could lead to. 
The unconditional condemnation of communist intellectual dissidents often 
started with infamous accusations being launched by the Party Leadership against the 
dissidents in order to discredit them in the eyes of their comrades.56 Althusser thus spoke 
of moral torture 'par l'accusation d'etre un "policier", un "escroc" ou un "traitre",.57 
Elleinstein declared that he was accused of being '[un] maitre-penseur d'Hersant,.58 The 
historian Philippe Ro brieux59 even asserted that the Party did not hesitate to publish the 
amount of the royalties Elleinstein made from his publications dealing with the party.60 
Consequently, the accusations of the Leadership were not only limited to strong words: 
they came pretty close to defamation. But communist leaders knew what they were 
doing, for from then onwards, they could invite other communists to condemn the 
intellectual dissidents. 61 In this context, the Leadership not only played on the long-tried 
opposition between workers and 'bourgeois' intellectuals,62 nor did it content itself with 
hanging Damocles' sword over the head of their close entourage,63 which could be 
suspected of the same heresy,64 it went further than that. It encouraged other Party 
intellectuals to establish an indictment against fellow intellectuals who were too critical.65 
If all this did not work, as a last resort, communist leaders could purely and simply 
56 Philippe Robrieux, La secte (Paris: Editions Stock, 1985), p. 54. 
57 Louis Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', Le Monde. 25 April 1978. 
58 Jean Elleinstein, '231: Congres du PCF - La paralysie', Maintenant, 7 May 1979; Hersant was a 
right-wing newspaper owner. 
59 Robrieux was close to Servin and Casanova (see introduction) in the 1960s. He left the FCP in 1968. 
60 Philippe Robrieux, Histoire interieure du Parti communiste (1972-1982), vol. 3 (Paris: Fayard, 1982, 
p.324. 
61 Robrieux, ibid., p. 522. 
62 Victor Leduc, 'The French Communist Party: between Stalinism and Eurocommunism', Political 
Quateriy, 49 (1978), 409. . ' . 
63 Althusser, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie partl communIste, LI! Monde, 25 AprIl 1978. 
64 Robrieux, Histoire interieure du Parti communiste (1972-198'}), p. 324. . 
65 Pierre Daix.. Les heretiques du PCF (Paris: Editions Robert Latfont, 1980), pp. 269-71: followmg the 
publication of his book Ce que je sais de Soljenitsyne (~aris: Le Seuil, .197~). Daix w~s p~blicly 
condemned at the jell! de I 'Huma. by Roland Leroy, LoUIS Aragon and, IrOnIcally, Ellemstem and 
Althusser. 
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disrniss66 or push the communist intellectual dissidents to resign from their Party posts67 
in order to replace them with more fervent acolytes68 - a technique whose aim was to 
degrade the dissidents both professionally and psychologically. 
As a consequence, the leaders of the French Communist Party won all the time:69 
dissidents could only leave the Party. In communist language, they 'excluded 
themselves', as the Party no longer expelled its members, who were too critical. In 
common language, by contrast, they had no other option but to leave a Party which had 
launched a powerful, and certainly effective 'riposte politique,70 against them, and which 
could anyway 'forget' to renew their membership cards. The dice were loaded, but the 
trick was well-known among communist intellectual dissidents who could only playa 
game they were bound to lose. This prompted Elleinstein to write bitterly in 1981: 
Heureusement que nous ne sommes pas en Union sovietique! Georges Marchais 
et Lucien Seve ne pourront pas me faire interner en hopital psychiatrique, rnais je 
me suis auto-exclu du Parti, parait-il, et l'on ne me redo nne pas rna carte!7! 
In this context, the FCP ignored these 'problems' - i.e. communist intellectual 
dissidents - and all the criticisms against democratic centralism and French communist 
political orientations. Communist dissidents were no longer 'dissidents' as such, for they 
did not belong to the Party anymore. Their criticisms no longer put internal pressure on 
the Party, for they became externalised in the realm of bourgeois party politics. In the 
66 Jean, La singuiarite d'etre communiste, pp. 128-9. 
67 Antoine Spire, Profession: permanent (Paris: Seuil, 1980), p. 236. 
68 Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme, pp. 67-8, 'Ce qui dure encore dans Ie PC franlYais -
Le temps des glaciations', Le Monde, 23 February 1979, and '230: Congres du PCF - La paralysie', 
Maintenant, 7 May 1979. 
69 Gaudard, Les orphelins du PC, p. 130; Bureau Politique, Apres ies travaux des 26, 27 el 18 avril, 
(Cahiers du Communisme, March 1978). 
70 Piraux, 'Pour une democratie revolutionnaire', p. 23. 
71 Elleinstein, lis vous trompenl, camarades!, p. 132. 
182 
Soviet Union, dissidents were airbrushed out of official photographs, as if they had never 
existed. In France, within the FCP, a similar 'normalisation process' took place. 
Elleinstein called it '[une] pince diabolique,n used to crush dissidents, and Althusser 
spoke of '[des] machinations a ecraser un homme,73 not only morally, but also physically. 
Indeed, from the moment a French communist became a dissident, he no longer counted 
in the eyes of the Leadership - he was depersonalized. The person was eclipsed.74 The 
human being was put aside only to become all too irritating to be kept intact. As 
Althusser wrote in one of his manuscripts, addressing himself to communists who did not 
dare to express any criticism, or objection towards their Party for fear of its dogmatic 
Leadership,75 
il y ales etres humains qui se taisent non seulement parce qu' ils se nSfugient de 
temps en temps dans Ie silence, mais tout simplement parce qu'ils sont des 
animaux humains et n'ont pas pu franchir la barriere du langage, donc de 
l'h ·t' 76 umam e. 
Consequently, freedom of expression, or even the right to be a unique human entity, 
which are taken for granted in a country like France, were flouted by the FCP, which was 
paradoxically keen to assert its will to put freedom at the very heart of the communist 
project of society.77 Therefore, the methods of dealing with dissidents which were used 
72 Elleinstein, lis vous trompent, camaradesf, p. 115. 
73 Althusser, Projet de livre sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee de la main peut etre Ie communisme, 
unpublished manuscripts. 
74 Spire, Profession: permanent, p. 234: 'Tres n!gulierement, L 'Humanite annonyait rna participation au 
Panorama [de France Culture] en disant quelques mots du ou des livres dont il allait etre question. 
Apres mon article dans Temoignage Chretien, ce fut Ie silence. Bien plus, quand Panorama etait 
annonce, on en citait tous les participants, sauf moi.' 
75 See ch. 1. 
76 Althusser, Projet de livre sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee de la main peut etre Ie communisme. 
unpublished manuscripts. 
77 Gerard Belloin, Nos reves camarades (Paris: Seuil, 1979), p. 136. 
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by the French Communist Party in the 1970s could be compared to those of the USSR,78 
whose Communist Party also resorted to double-talk. In this context, if we could read in 
Temps Nouveaux in 1978 that 'Ie peus est attentif aux critiques des cit oyens, il 
s'applique it remedier aux insuffisances qu'ils devoilent. Dans la liberte de la critique, 
notre parti voit une manifestation authentique de la democratie', 79 behind the scenes the 
CPSU did not hesitate either to scorn its dissidents in its publications in Russian, 80 or to 
stamp on them. The example of the physician, father of the H bomb and 1975 Nobel 
Price Winner, Andrei Sakharov, illustrates this. 
Accused in 1980 of 'direct betrayal of the interests of [the Soviet] motherland 
and the Soviet people,81 then assigned to residence in Gorky,82 the dissident Sakharov 
fell under the fire of the epsu in the 1970s for having asked publicly for the 
democratisation of the Soviet state, and for having sent directly a letter to Brezhnev 
requesting the implementation of liberal reforms.83 Sakharov described the methods of 
intimidation used by the Soviet Union to push him back into line: 
In recent years I have carried on my activities under conditions of ever-increasing 
pressure on me, and especially my famill4 [ ••• ] we were harassed by anonymous 
phone calis, with threats and absurd accusations [ ... ]. [In an article entitled 'A 
supplier of slander' which was published in February of 1973] I was characterised 
78 Elleinstein, Une certaine idee du communisme, p. 7l. 
79 Vsevolod Ejov (Russian historian), 'Dictature et democratie', Temps Nouveaux, 1978, p.19. 
80 Gooding, Rulers and Subjects: Government and People in Russia, 1801-1991, p. 269. He quotes 
Pravda (1977): 'Dissidents [ ... ] [are] "unconcealed ennemies of socialism" who "exist only because 
they are supported, paid and praised by the West.'" 
81 Gooding, ibid., p. 269. 
82 From 1980 to 1986; Gooding, ibid., p. 270. 
83 Andrei Sakharov, 'Progress, coexistence and intellectual freedom' (June 1968) and "Manifesto II' 
(March 1970), Sakharov speaks, English translation (London: Colins Harvill Press, 1974); Marshall 
S. Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 
pp. 181-2: letter sent in March 1970 by Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev and Valentin Turchin; 
Gooding, Rulers and Subjects, p. 271. 
84 Jean Chiama and Jean-Fran90is Soulet, Histoire de fa dissidence: oppositions et revoltes en URSS et 
dans les democraties populaires de fa mort de Staline a nos jours (Paris: Seuil, 1982), p. 375. 
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as an extremely naive person who [ ... ] 'willingly accepted the compliments of the 
Pentagon' [ ... ]. I was summoned to the KGB [ ... ] [and] by the deputy prosecutor 
of the USSR, Malyarov. The basis content of the talk was threats [ ... ]. Next came 
a nation-wide campaign in which I was condemned by representatives of all strata 
f . 85 o our socIety. 
In his telephone conversation with Malyarov, Sakharov was among other things accused 
of publishing articles in the foreign 'anti-Communist' press and of rallying to forces 
hostile to the USSR - accusations to which the physician answered: 'I would be very 
glad to have my writings published in the Soviet press [ ... ]. But that is obviously out of 
h . ,86 t e questIon. 
This conversation, these Soviet methods, definitely recall what happened in the 
1970s in the French Communist Party which was always all too keen to emulate its 
Soviet big brother, and too inclined to try to create a micro-society of the USSR within 
its own French communist counter-society. Consequently, personal losses were heavy-
they were certainly heavier for Soviet dissidents like Sakharov, who effectively put their 
own lives at stake when fighting for democracy, but they were, nevertheless, far from 
being negligible for French communist intellectual dissidents. 87 
If the intellectua11ife of French communist intellectual dissidents was relatively 
active, in the sense that they incessantly refined their arguments in order to have an 
impact on the Party, their social existence within the FCP was, by contrast, more and 
more difficult. The historian Philippe Robrieux thus wrote of Elleinstein, '[il n'y avait] 
plus de reveillons de Noel et plus aucun de ces dejeuners ou de ces diners en fami11e', but 
85 Sakharov, Sakharov speaks, pp. 49-51. 
86 Sakharov, "Interview with Mikhail P. Malyarov, first deputy Soviet prosecutor' (August 1973). ibid, 
pp. 181-4. 
87 Louis Althusser, L'avenir dure /ongtemps, sui vi de Les/ails (Paris: StocklIMEC, 1992), pp. ::!31-~: 
Althusser spoke of "[des] experiences souvent revoltantes sinon personnellement effroyables: 
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instead 'la distance, Ie froid et, it l'occasio~ de rares propos soigneusement retenus et 
calcules,88 - statement which Elleinstein confirmed when talking about 'des mains [qui] 
se ferment, des sourires [qui] disparaissent, des amities, pourtant anciennes, [qui] se 
denouent'89 - practices which prompted Althusser to thunder against the Leadership in 
such a way that he was unable to finish his sentence: 
Pour ce qui est de reconnaitre ses propres erreurs, que dis-je, et je pese mes 
mots, ses propres mensonges, calomnies, machinations it ecraser un homme, ses 
proces de Moscou90 [ ... ]: ses propres crimes ne se terminant pas it la maniere 
stalinienne certes, mais se terminant dans la misere morale, la torture de la 
solitude par l'abandon de to us [ ... ] par la misere tout court, par l'impossibilite de 
trouver du travail, et Ie tout s'additionnant, se terminant par la mort tout court 
survenue de desespoir [ ... ] ou d'un geste ultime de desespoir, Ie suicide91 
Althusser's analysis was right in the sense that some communist dissidents, like the 
former Party worker Antoine Spire, who resigned from the Party's Editions Sociales in 
1978, were suddenly thrown into a more brutal and less cocooning non-communist 
world which they had previously not only rejected, but also fought against. Spire even 
confessed that 'il faut avoir vecu ces jours d'incertitude ou tout disparait: activite et 
surtout statut social. Angoisse indescriptible. Peur. On parle de chomage.,92 However, 
Althusser forgot to mention cases like Pierre Daix, who did not live his deliberate 
88 Robrieux, Histoire interieure du Parti communiste (1972-1982), p. 324. 
89 Elleinstein, 'Ce qui dure encore dans Ie PC franyais - Le temps des glaciations', Le Monde, 23 
February 1979. 
90 It is interesting to note that Elleinstein did not hesitate to talk about 0 [une] chasse aux sorcieres' in 
Une certaine idee du communisme, pp. 67-8; cf. Elleinstein, one Congres du PCF - La paralysie', 
Maintenant, 7 May 1979. 
91 Althusser, Projet de h\'re sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee de la main peut etre Ie communisme. 
unpublished manuscripts. 
92 Spire, Profession: permanent, p. 244. 
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departure from the Party as a slow deat~ but rather as an intellectual rebirth. 'Non 
seulement cette decision [de quitter Ie Parti] ne me coutait pas', Daix wrote in 1976, 
'mais elle m'a brusquement libere. Enfin je mettais mes actes en rapport avec rna vie et 
rna conscience. ,93 
The major difference between Spire and Daix was on the ground of anticipation 
and realism. Spire failed to understand the power of the Party's mechanism for crushing 
dissidents and critics which had been running steadily for years on end. He also failed to 
understand that nobody could win against a Leadership too sure of its own Knowledge 
and Truth, and too opposed to any form of persistent objection, even if it was a justified 
one. In the 1970s, either you surrendered to the Leadership and you stayed in the Party, 
or you persisted in your criticisms and you left it. There was no room for compromise. 
Daix realised this. He left just in time, for he would have been ejected had he not chosen 
to leave the Party. However - to Spire's credit - Elleinstein and Althusser's 
experience also shows that communist intellectual dissidents kept hoping for things to 
change. If the Party no longer expelled its most critical members, then maybe, maybe 
they could express themselves freely despite the Leadership's vituperative attacks against 
them, while remaining inside the Party as long as possible. Althusser was fully aware of 
this. He wrote: 
II est trop clair que je realisais [ ... ] dans Ie Parti mon desir d'initiative a m04 mon 
desir d'opposition farouche a la direction et a l'appareil, mais aussi au sein du 
Parti meme, c'est-a-dire de sa protection [ ... ] je pensais [ ... ] qu'en restant [ ... ] sur 
une position si ouvertement oppositionnelle [ ... ] je pouvais faire la preuve, au 
moins formelle, qu'une action d'opposition a l'interieur du Parti etait possible sur 
des bases theoriques et politiques serieuses, et donc qu 'une transformation du 
93 Pierre Daix, }'ai cro au malin (Paris: R Laifont, 1976), p. 443; see our ch. 3. 
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Parti etait, a long tenne peut -etre, possible. 94 
A long tenn transfonnation of the Party was indeed possible on the basis of ideas 
launched commonly by communist intellectual dissidents. The refonn of democratic 
centralism, the condemnation of Soviet practices and the constitution of a Left-wing 
alliance in the 1990s proved this point - although the Leadership took all the credit for 
these renovations. However, at the end of the 1970s, a short tenn transformation of the 
Party was impossible on an individual basis. Indeed, apart from the petition of Aix-en-
Provence which was signed by over 300 dissidents in 1978,95 communist intellectual 
dissidents were divided, and therefore relatively weak, in front of a united, and therefore 
powerful, Leadership.96 In that context, if communist intellectual dissidents had 
differences on certain aspects of the Fep's strategy, they nevertheless had a solid base of 
common ideas on which they could have relied in order to disseminate their critical views 
within the Party, to render them acceptable and to accelerate the transformation of the 
Party. In fact, the key to counteracting the Leadership's mechanism for crushing dissent 
was to turn this dissidence into a widespread, common and ordinary action within the 
Party - meaning into an action which could have been too strong for the Leadership to 
break. However, as Elleinstein wrote, 
face a une direction resolue, il aurait fallu une grande resolution, mais ce n'etait 
pas possible dans l'etat d'esprit de la plupart des camarades. Nous n'osions pas 
franchir Ie pas et creer un veritable front de resistance contre la direction du Parti. 
Nous etions prisonniers des mecanismes du centralisme democratique, tels que 
94 Althusser, L 'avenir dure [ongtemps, pp. 191, 227-8. 
95 '''Le retard de notre parti a se mettre a jour ne saurait, sans grave dommage, s'accroitre", Mclarent 
plus de trois cent communistes' (Petition d'Aix-en-Provence signed, among others, by Althusser and 
Elleinstein), Le Monde, 20 May 1978. 
96 oM. Marchais: il y a quelques contestations', Le Monde, 15 April 1978. 
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nous les avions nous-memes appliques pendant des annees durant [ ... J. Face a une 
direction a peu pres unie, resolue, nous ne faisions pas Ie poids [ ... J l'action ne 
pouvait qU'etre individuelle.97 
To conclude, if the treatment of internal dissent by the French Communist Party was in 
all aspects reprehensible, it was nonetheless the case that FCP leaders acted under the 
forceful influence of the Soviet Union. Indeed, if at times intellectual dissidents such as 
Althusser and Elleinstein seemed to be de doux reveurs, it was nonetheless the case that 
they expressed ideas which were admittedly ahead of their times, but which were also 
challenging, 'revolutionary', and thus too dangerous in the eyes of Moscow. The system 
in which communist parties evolved had to be preserved and, consequently, intellectual 
dissidents had to be eradicated. 
As a result, in the 1970s, the French Communist Party alienated itself little by 
little not only from its mere sympathisers, or ardent defenders of the communist cause, 
but also from its intellectuals, thus causing a de-intellectualisation of the FCP - a de-
intellectualisation the Party never wished to have, as intellectuals gave it a certain 
prestige. Robert Hue acknowledged this in 1995 by writing: 'Par vagues successives [ ... ] 
beaucoup d'intellectuels proches du Parti communiste s'en eloignerent, beaucoup de 
ceux qui etaient communistes nous quitterent'. 98 
However, in the 1990s, it was all very well for the French Communist Party's 
General Secretary Robert Hue to acknowledge and abandon the Party's old methods of 
treating internal dissident, which had proved to be contrary to the Party's 
democratisation. The fact remained that the FCP did not and still does not try to look 
97 Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades!, pp. 119-21. 
98 Robert Hue, Le communisme: fa mutation (Paris: Stock, 1995), p. 128. 
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closely at the motivations of communist intellectual dissidents like Elleinstein and 
Althusser. nor at the validity of their actions, nor at their impact on long-term Party 
politics. On the contrary, for 1990s communist leaders, Elleinstein and Althusser were 
remote and eccentric figures who belonged to the past. This made the Party's analysis of 
their dissenting actions relatively simple: Althusser, c 'etait un reveur ... Et Elleinstein 
il va bien, ace qu 'il para it, on peut par/Dis Ie croiser dans la rue.99 
qq By reference to an informal conversation I had with Francette Lazard at the Espact! .\1arx in July 
1999. 
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CONCLUSION 
Marked as heretics by the French Communist Party in the 1970s, defeated by the Great 
Inquisitors of the communist Holy Office at the beginning of the 1980s, Jean Elleinstein 
and Louis Althusser nevertheless managed to put their imprint on the Party on two 
levels. First, as from the 1980s, dissident movements became the norm within the FCP 
- even if communist leaders refused to talk about tendencies, preferring to adopt the 
concept of diversity of opinion among the Party's members. 1 Second, the Party started 
transforming itself as from 1985, both in terms of internal organisation and political 
orientation. 
It was under the influence of the communist intellectual dissidents Elleinstein and 
Althusser that dissenting movements, and beyond them the formation of tendencies, 
became the norm within the French Communist Party from the 1980s onwards - and 
nothing seemed to predict this. Nothing seemed to predict it for, towards the end of the 
1970s, the FCP had apparently made a clean sweep of any internal dissent by eliminating 
Elleinstein and Althusser, consequently beheading the Eurocommunist and neo-Marxist 
tendencies of their figureheads. 2 Towards the end of the 1970s, the FCP had apparently 
rediscovered a relative unity of thought by eliminating any major and internal opposition 
to the Leadership which had become public knowledge.3 However, the phenomenon of 
tendencies, which was exacerbated by Elleinstein and Althusser in the 1970s, was bound 
to have a long-lasting effect on the French Communist Party for three reasons. 
First, the criticisms made by Elleinstein and Althusser in the 1970s proved to be 
1 See ch. 2. 
2 See ch. 8. 
3 David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 19(4), p. 111. 
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relatively popular among many other FCP activists. Instead of remaining limited to a few 
communist intellectuals, dissent spread to all the levels of the Party, penetrating the 
grassroots in particular. Dissent thus became widespread and normal. For this reason, it 
became durable. 4 
Second, the very character of Elleinstein and Althusser transformed the 
traditional, and relatively brief, pattern of dissenting movements. Indeed, their 
determination to make their Party evolve, as much in its form as in its ideology and 
political orientation, was unshakeable. Their intellectual intransigence was implacable. 5 
Their will to remain an integral part of the Party, despite all the obstacles set by 
communist leaders, was inflexible. A new form of thought thus developed within the 
French Communist Party. Collective thought, for 'the Party', and beyond it for 
international communism, gave way to a more original, nonconformist and individualistic 
way of thinking. Elleinstein and Althusser, however, were not solely responsible for this 
mutation. The economic crisis which shook France in the 1970s changed the mode of 
social perception of the French in general: the 'me-first' mentality became a more and 
more central theme among individuals.6 In this context, the communist leadership could 
only have more difficulty in disseminating a collective way of thinking and imposing mass 
action. 
Third, the dissenting movements launched by Elleinstein and Althusser in the 
1970s were relatively structured - although they were much more centred around key 
personalities than ideological groups capable of forming strong opposition fronts to the 
Leadership.7 These movements were structured insofar as they were divided into "left-
wing' and 'right-wing' communist tendencies, and insofar as they encompassed 
.t Raymond Keroch, a communist activist, quoted in the section 'Point de vue', Luttes et Debats, June 
1979, p. 56. 
5 See ch. 3. 
6 Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza, Histoire de fa France au.xxe siecle.· de 1974 a nos jours, vol. 5 
(Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1994), pp. 223-4, 230. 
7 Jean Elleinstein, Ils vous trompent, camarades! (Paris: Belfond, 1981), pp. 119-21; see also our ch. 8. 
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communist ideologies ranging from neo-Marxism to Eurocommunism. 
In this context, it was not surprising that the phenomenon of tendencies could 
develop. In the 1980s, the progressive groups Renovateurs, Gestionnaires and 
Reconstructeurs were formed. 8 In the 1990s, dissenting movements became even more 
widespread, ranging from Ultra-orthodoxes, Orthodoxes and Conservateurs to 
Re/ondateurs.9 1980s and 1990s dissenting movements within the FCP would have been 
unlikely to happen without Elleinstein and Althusser. However, if on the one hand these 
movements became a constant phenomenon within the FCP from the 1970s onwards, on 
the other hand, communist leaders' attempts at eradicating them became systematic. 10 
Indeed, the Leadership's intolerance of any contradiction within the Party, denial of any 
criticism, and elimination of any opposition by means of purges were more than a 
Leninist and Stalinist tradition: over time, they became a reflex. 
In any case, this reflex went against the Leadership's pledge to democratise the 
Party's internal organisation and to recognise the diversity of opinion of its members. It 
demonstrated, instead, the Leadership's instinct of preservation. Indeed, communist 
leaders were - and still are - perfectly aware of the slow, but steady, loss of popularity 
of the FCP since 1974:11 this decline was far too blatant to be ignored. \2 In this context, 
the Party could not afford to scatter its resources uselessly by fighting an internal battle 
8 In the 1980s, Pierre Juquin and Marcel Rigout were, among others, Renovateurs; Philippe Herzog was 
a Gestionnaire; Claude Poperen, Felix Damette, Charles Fiterman, Jacques Ralite, Anicet Le Pors and 
Guy Hermier (who became a Refondateur later on) were Reconstructeurs; cf., among others, Bell and 
Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, pp. 113-114, 223, 225; Ronald Tiersky, 
'Declining Fortunes of the French Communist Party', Problems o/Communism (1988), to. 
9 Pascal Virot, 'Hue, un marathonien contre l'euro', Liberation, 19 January 1998, p. 14; Ariane Chemin, 
'La lutte des classes remplacee par l' "intervention citoyenne"', Le Monde, 19 December 1996, p. 6; 
Ariane Chemin, 'Les "conservateurs" du PCF menent une bataille d'amendements', Le Mo nde , 23 
December 1996, p. 6 (article written at the time of the 29th Congress of the FCP, Arche de la Defense. 
18-22 December 1996). 
\0 By reference to the elimination of the Renovateurs in 1988 and to the Reconstructeurs in 1987 (at the 
time of26 Congress of the FCP); cf Jean Baudoin, 'Le declin du PCF', Regards sur I 'actualite (April 
1991),43. 
11 See ch. 7. 
12 Robert Hue, Le communisme: fa mutation (Paris: Stock, 1995), p. 128. 
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for two reasons.13 First, the Party could not split up into factions. It would be on the 
road to ruin and, to some extent, it could also weaken the whole of the Left. 14 Second, 
the Party could not allow tendencies to enter into an open contest for the Leadership. If 
any conservative branch of the FCP came to dominate the Leadership, it would put a 
definitive halt to the Party's reforms - in terms of the modernisation of its ideology. 
democratisation of its institutions and governmental participationl5 - which it had been 
carrying out since the 1960S16 and, to a greater extent, since the 1970s. 
However, if this argument is relatively convincing nowadays, it was not valid in 
the 1970s: the pattern taken by the dissent was different. Tendencies were not as openly 
polarised as in the 1980s and 1990s. The Party's neo-Marxist left-wing branch, 
represented by Althusser was relatively close to the Party's Eurocommunist right-wing 
branch incarnated by Elleinstein. Indeed, although these tendencies had basically different 
ideologies, they were both progressive when it came to the democratisation of the 
Party's internal organisation,17 the unlocking of Stalinist practices, adaptation to social 
and economic change,18 rejection of the Soviet model,19 and participation in a left-wing 
alliance.20 They were more progressive than their Leadership - although Marchais did 
not have any choice but to succumb to Soviet pressures, as the KGB threatened him with 
the prospect of revealing his war record. 21 However, as from 1985, everything changed. 
13 See ch. 2. 
14 By reference to Lionel Jospin' s government of "Gauche plurielle' which includes, since 1997, 
ministers from the Socialist Party, Les Verts and the FCP. It is also worth noting that, without the 
FCP, the SP cannot reach a majority vote at the National Assembly. 
15 For instance, in the late 1990s, the Orthodoxes and the Conservateurs were against the participation 
ofthe FCP in Lionel Jospin's coalition government; cf. Virot, "Hue, un marathonien contre I 'euro'. 
16 By reference to the FCP's move towards the Union ofthe Left; see ch. 7. 
17 See ch. 1,2, and 8. 
18 See ch. 4. 
19 See ch. 6. 
20 See ch. 7. 
21 Christopher Andrew, interview of, "Le KGB en France', Le Nouvel Observateur, 23-29 September 
1999, p. 145: 'Ie KGB a serieusement envisage de faire publier les documents sur Ie passe de 
Marchais en Allemagne pendant la guerre'; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin 
Archive (London: Penguin, 1999), ch. 18 on Eurocommunism; Althusser, Sur la mort du PCF (\fort 
ct sUll'ie du PCF), (1982-83?), Paris, lMEC, fond Althusser, AL T2.A29-01.05, unpublished 
manuscripts: 'Tout ce beau monde vit sous la direction d'un Georges Marchais tenu par les 
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Under Marchais' influence, the FCP leadership became more progressive than some of 
the Party's dissenting movements22 and consequently pressed for refonns leading to the 
transformation of the Party. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, the transformation of the French Communist Party 
was made possible by the destalinisation of the USSR by its move towards a market 
economy - that is to say, by its desovietisation, which was played in two rounds. First, 
the programme of refonns launched by Mikhail Gorbachev from 1985 to 1991 
encouraged the FCP to resume the progressive vision of socialism23 it had adopted in the 
1970s, in its Eurocommunist phase. Second, the break-up of the USSR and the 
successive advent of a capitalist-style CIS freed the FCP from its ideological shackles.24 
The FCP was free to reject the Soviet model of socialism and to determine its own 
strategy - but it was also forced to analyse its Leninist and Stalinist practices,25 forced 
to demonstrate that socialism could survive the fall of the USSR and take other fonns 
than those previously applied in the East.26 
The task set by the French Communist Party was relatively large, but it was not 
insurmountable - far from it. In the 1990s, the FCP started democratising itself 
progressively by abandoning the principle of democratic centralism, 27 by recognising 'la 
sovietiques et ses propres camarades pour avoir eu un jour vingt ans et avoir commis la bevue de 
partir dans la production de guerre allemande'; see our ch. l. 
22 By reference to the Ultra-orthodoxes, the Othodoxes and the Conservateurs who are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, hostile to the Gauche plurielle and to the reforms carried out by Hue within the FCP. 
23 It is worth noting that if Gorbachev had a progressist vision of socialism which suited the FCP, he was 
nonetheless condemned by French communist leaders for giving too capitalist an orientation to his 
policy; cf. Bell and Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic, p. 119; Martin 1. 
Bull, 'The West European Communist Movement in the Late Twentieth Century', West European 
Politics, 18, no. 1 (January 1995), 85; this progressive vision of socialism did not, however, fully 
extend to the treatment of Soviet 'dissidents'; cf. Background Brief on Soviet Union: Continued 
Repression of Dissent (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1985). 
14 See ch. 6. 
25 30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux imigalites (textes adoptes par Ie 3d 
Congres), (Martigues, 23-26 March 2000); L 'Humanite, 27 March 2000, p. vii; see our ch. 6. 
26 In that respect, Jean Baudoin talked about '[la destabilisation duJ poumon du syteme' in 'Le Mclin du 
PCF', 41; Robert Hue, Le communisme: un nouveau projet (Paris: Stock, 1999). p. 125; Hue. Le 
communisme: la mutation, p. 44; Hue quoted in 30e Congres, ibid., and in L 'Humanite, ibid., p. xx: 
see our ch. 5. 
27 Following a decision taken by the Central Committee in September 1993, the 28th Congress of the 
FCP wiped away the principle of democratic centralism by replacing it with the concept of 
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souverainete des adherents, ,28 by encouragmg horizontal contact at all levels of its 
organisation, 29 and by taking away the sacred aura of the Leadership.30 In the 1990s, the 
Party questioned the Stalinist practices it had used previously to treat internal dissent3l 
and officially accepted the right of its members to differ in their opinions32 - without 
recognising tendencies, as wished by Althusser in the 1970s.33 In the 1990s, the Party 
reshaped its strategy to take account of France's social and economic environment by 
updating its analysis of social classes and by acknowledging the diversity of the working 
class.34 In the 1990s, the Party was determined to build a constructive political union 
with Lionel Jospin's Socialist party.35 
These transformations were those demanded by Elleinstein and Althusser back in 
the 1970s. They did not exactly match their demands, but they answered them to a large 
extent. 36 However, they came too late - too late to prevent communist activists from 
fleeing the party,37 too late to attract again a large number of prominent and influential 
'souverainete des communistes'; 28e Congres, Rapport de la commission sur les statuts (rapport 
pnisente par Francette Lazard) suivi de Les statuts du PCF (St-Ouen, 25-29 January 1994). 
28 Francette Lazard, Rapport introductiJ au Comite Central des 28, 29 et 30 septembre 1993, 
(L 'Humanite, 29 September 1993); 28e Congres, ibid.; see our ch. 1. 
29 30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites; see our ch. 1. 
30 Paul Lespagnol quoted in L 'Humanite, 27 March 2000, pp. 8-9; see our ch. 1; according to a 2000 
Sofres poll, 82% of French communists found the FCP democratic; poll mentioned in Gerard 
Courtois, 'Le 30e congres du PCF prend ses marques avant de sauter Ie pas du "nouveau 
communisme''', Le Monde, 25 March 2000, p. 12. 
31 Francette Lazard, Reflexion de la commission d'arbitrage sur la portee, au regard de I 'histoire, de la 
mutation des pratiques du debat dans Ie parti (rapport presente au Comite Central des 16 et 17 
novembre 1998), (L 'Humanite, 19 November 1998); 30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour 
s 'attaquer aux inegalites; see our ch. 8. , 
32 2ge Congres, La politique du Parti Communiste Franr;ais (document adopte par Ie 2~ Congres) , 
(Arche de la Defense, 18-22 December 1996); L 'Humanite, 23 December 1996; see our ch. 2, 3, and 
8. 
33 See ch. 2. 
34 30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites; see our ch. 4. 
35 Hue, Le communisme: la mutation, p. 319-20; see our ch. 7. 
36 It is worth noting that according to a 2000 Sofres poll, 73% of French communists found the Fep 
reformist, but 54% of them thought that '[Ie Party a] un peu change, mais sans modifier I'essentiel'; 
poll mentionned in Courtois, 'Le 30e congres du PCF prend ses marques avant de sauter Ie pas du 
"nouveau communisme"'. 
37 Marc Lazar, 'Communism in Western Europe in the 1980s', Journal of Communist Studies, 4 
(September 1988), 245-6; Lazar talked about the dedin in the number of workers and young people 
belonging to the FCP. According to the author, FCP membership numbers went down from 520,000 
in 1978 to 380,000 in 1984. In 'Party Decline and Changing Party Systems - France and the French 
Communist Party', Comparative Politics, 25, no. 1 (October 1992), 44, George Ross noted that "the 
PCF's retreat has opened up important ideological and electoral terrain upon which France's two 
important new partisan aspirants, the National Front and the Greens, have been busily hunting new 
196 
intellectuals to its ranks,38 too late to curb the spiral of decline in which the Party found 
itself trapped from 1974 onwards. In that sense, it would have been desirable if the FCP 
had transformed itself in the 1970s, when it was carried by the dynamics of 
Eurocommunism, the Union of the Left and its 22nd Congress of 1976. Unfortunately, 
this transformation was impossible: as has been demonstrated, the margin of manoeuvre 
of Georges Marchais was too limited. On the one hand Moscow had appointed him as 
the head of the Party - an appointment which acted as a guarantee of his docility and 
which could be revoked at the slighest faux pas. On the other hand Moscow knew 
enough about him and his past in Germany during the Second World War to exercise 
constant pressure over him.39 Consequently, Georges Marchais could be considered as 
the weak link within the FCP, despite all his goodwill. 
As a result, at the beginning of the twenty-fist century, the French Communist 
Party is no longer the Grand Parti it was after 1945. It is rather a complementary 
political force - a position Robert Hue accepts stoically when declaring that oil n'est 
ecrit nulle part qu'il doit y avoir necessairement un Parti communiste fort et influent dans 
Ie France du xxr~ siecle' ,40 and a position Althusser predicted back in the early 1980s 
when he wrote: '[Le Parti Communiste Fran~ais est] voue a mourir sur pied dans une 
histoire que d'autres font desormais a sa place et en leur nom. ,41 
support'. This was denied by Claude Poperen's 'Rapport a la session du Comite Central des 26 et 27 
juin 1984': 'Nous [communistes] sommes essentiellement touches par l' abstention et non par un 
glissement de nos voix sur un ou plusieurs partis', quoted in Michel Naudy, PCF: Ie suicide (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1986), p. 194. 
38 David S. Bell, 'Communism and French Intellectuals', Modem and Contemporary France (1993),34; 
Zbigniev Brzezinski, 'The Grand Failure: the Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: [no pub.], 1989), p. 207, quoted in Frank L. Wilson, 'Communism at Crossroads: 
Changing Roles in the Western Democracies', Problems o/Communism (1992),96; Jeannine Verdes-
Leroux, Le reveil des somnambules: Ie parti communiste, les intellectuels et la culture (1956-1985), 
(Paris: Fayard, 1987), p. 45. 
39 By reference, for instance, to the biographies held by the KGB; cf. Andrew and Mitrokhin. The 
Mitrokhin Archive, ch. 18 on Eurocommunism 
40 Hue quoted in Alain Beuve-Mery, 'Le Parti communiste est en panne d'idees, d'animation et 
d'argent', Le Monde, 21 November 2000, p. 7. 
41 Louis Althusser, Sur la mort du PCF (Mort et survie du PCFj, (1982-83?), Paris, IMEC. fond 
Althusser, AL T2.A29-01.05, unpublished manuscripts. 
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APPENDIX: 
DIAGRAM OF THE FCP'S INTERNAL ORGANISATION 
(UNTIL 1993) 
Comite Central Bureau Politique 
Secretaire General 
t 
Federations Bureaux 
Secreta ires 
t 
Sections Bureaux 
Secretaires 
telect 
Cellules elect ~ Bureaux 
Secretaires 
Sources: Jean Elleinstein, Le PC (Paris: Grasset, 1976), pp. 42-78, and Annie Kriegel, 
Les communistes jran9ais (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968), ch. X. 
198 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Aderet~ M., The French Communist Party: a Critical History (1920-8-/) from 
Comintern to 'the Colours of France' (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) 
Adler, A., and others, L 'URSS et nous (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1978) 
Agulhon, Maurice, Andre Nouschi and Ralph Schor, La France de 1940 a nos jours 
(Paris: Editions Nathan, 1995) 
Althusser, Louis, Pour Marx (Paris: Maspero, 1966) 
Althusser, Louis, Positions (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976) 
Althusser, Louis, 22e congres (Paris: Maspero, 1977) 
Althusser, Louis, Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie Parti Communiste (Paris: Maspero, 
1978) 
Althusser, Louis, L 'avenir dure longtemps, suivi de Les faits (Paris: StocklIMEC, 1992) 
Althusser, Louis, Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, vol. 1 (Paris: StocklIMEC, 1994) 
Andrew, Christopher, and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (London: Penguin, 
1999) 
Andrieu, Rene, Lettre a ceux qui se reclament du socialisme (Paris: Albin MicheL 1978) 
Andrieu, Rene, Choses dites, 1958-1978: vingt ans redacteur en chef a 'L 'Humanite ' 
(Paris: Editions Sociales, 1982) 
Aron, Raymond, L 'opium des intellectuels (Paris: Cahnann-Levy, 1955) 
Aron, Raymond, Les elections de mars et la V Republique (Paris: Julliard, 1978) 
Background Brief on Soviet Union: Continued Repression of Dissent (London: Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 1985) 
Balibar. Etienne, On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, English translation (London: 
NLB,1977) 
Balibar, Etienne, Guy Bois, Georges Labica and Jean-Pierre Lefebvre. Ouvrons fa 
fenetre, camarades (Paris: Maspero, 1979) 
Barak, Michel, Fractures au PCF - Des communistes parlent (Aix-en-Provcncc: 
EDISUD; Paris: Karthala, 1980) 
199 
Beauvoir, Simone de, La force des choses (Paris: Gallimard 1963) 
Becker, Jean-Jacques, Le Parti Communiste veut-il prendre Ie pouvoir? La strategie du 
PCF de 1930 a nosjours (Paris: Seuil, 1981) 
Bell, David S., ed., Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism 
(Oxford: Berg., 1993) 
Bell, David S., and Byron Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
Belloin, Gerard, Nos reves camarades (paris: Seuil, 1979) 
Benoist, Jean-Marie, Chronique de decomposition du PCF (Paris: Editions de la Table 
Ronde, 1979) 
Bernstein, Serge, and Pierre Milza, Histoire de la France au d siecle: de 1974 a nos 
jours, vol. 5 (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1994) 
Bluche, Frederic, and Stephane Rials, eds., Les revolutions franraises (Paris: Fayard, 
1989) 
Boggs, Car4 and David Plotke, eds., The Politics of Eurocommunism: Socialism in 
Transition (London: Macmillan, 1980) 
Bottigelli, Emile, La naissance du parti ouvrier franrais (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1981) 
Femand Braude4 L'identite de la France - Les hommes et les choses, vol. 2 (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1990) 
Briere, Jacques, Vive la crise! Crise de la societe, crise du PCF (Paris: Seuil, 1979) 
Bulgakov, Mikhail, Diaboliad, English translation (London: Harvill Press, 1995) 
Bullock, Allan, Hitler and Staline: Parallel Lives (London: HarperCollins, 1991) 
BurIes, Jean, Le Parti Communiste dans la societe franraise (Paris: Editions Sociales, 
1979) 
BurIes, Jean, Roger Martelli and Serge Wolikow, Les communistes et leur strategie 
(Paris: Editions Sociales, 1981) 
Cadiot, Jean-Michel, Mitterrand et les communistes: les dessous d'un mariage de raison 
(Paris: Editions Ramsay, 1994) 
Cardoze, Michel, Nouveau voyage a I'interieur du PCF (Paris: Librairie Artheme 
Fayard, 1986) 
Caute, David, The Fellow-Travellers: Intellectual Friends of Communism (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) 
200 
Chambaz, Jacques, Realites et strategie: le PCF, une demarche nouvelle (Paris: 
MessidorlEditions Sociales, 1990) 
Changer la vie: Programme de Gouvernement du Parti Socialiste et Programme 
Commun de la Gauche (Paris: Flammarion, 1972) 
Chevenement, Jean-Pierre, Les socialistes, les communistes et les autres (Paris: Aubier, 
1977) 
Chiama, Jean, and Jean-Franyois Soulet, Histoire de la dissidence: oppositions et 
revoltes en URSS et dans les democraties populaires de la mort de Staline a nos jours 
(Paris: Seuil, 1982) 
Cholokov, Mikhail, Le Don paisible, French translation (Paris: Julliard: Pre sse de la Cite, 
1991) 
Cole, Alistair, and Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems and Elections since 1789 
(London: Aldershot Gower, 1989) 
Contre Althusser (Paris: Union Generale d'Edition, 1974) 
Daix, Pierre, Ce que je sais de Soljenitsyne (Paris: Le Seuil, 1973) 
Daix, Pierre, J'ai cru au matin (Paris: R. Laffont, 1976) 
Daix, Pierre, Le socialisme du silence (Paris: Le Seuil, 1976) 
Daix, Pierre, La crise du PCF (Paris: Seuil, 1978) 
Daix, Pierre, Les heretiques du PCF (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1980) 
Debray, Regis, Lettre ouverte aux communistes franrais et a quelques autres (Paris: 
Seuil, 1978) 
Domenach, Jean-Marie, Enquete sur les idees contemporaines (Paris: Seuil, 1981) 
Domenach, Jean-Marie, Lettre ames ennemis de classe (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1984) 
Dreyfus, Michel, PCF: crises et dissidences de 1920 a nos jours (Brussels: Ed. 
Complexe, 1990) 
Duhame4 Olivier, and Henri Weber, Changer Ie PC? (Paris: Presse Universitaire de 
France, 1979) 
Elleinstein, Jean, Histoire de I 'URSS, 4 vols (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972. 1973, 197..t. 
and 1975) 
Elleinstein, Jean, Histoire du phenomene stalinien (Paris: Grasset, 1975) 
Elleinstein, Jean, Le PC (Paris: Grasset, 1976) 
ElleinsteiI4 Je~ Lettre ouverte aux jranrais sur la Republique du Programme C ommun 
(Paris: Albin Miche4 1977) 
ElleinsteiI4 Je~ 'The Skein of History Unrolled Backwards', in Eurocommunism. its 
Roots in Italy and Elsewhere, ed. by George Urban (London: Temple Smith, 1978) 
ElleinsteiI4 Jean, Une certaine idee du communisme (Paris: Julliard, 1979) 
Elleinstein, Je~ Staline - Trotsky: Ie pouvoir et la revolution (Paris: Julliard, 1979) 
ElleinsteiI4 Jean, lIs vous trompent, camarades! (paris: Belfond, 1981) 
ElleinsteiI4 Jean, Histoire mondiale des socialismes, vol. 6 (Paris: A. Colin, 1984) 
ElleinsteiI4 Je~ and Thierry Maulnier, Dialogue inattendu (Paris: Flammarion, 1979) 
Fabien, Jean, Kremlin - PCF: conversations secretes (Paris: O. Orban, 1984) 
Fabien, Je~ La guerre des camarades (Paris: O. Orban, 1985) 
Fabien, Je~ Les nouveaux secrets des communistes (Paris: Albin Miche4 1990) 
Fabre, Jean, Franyois Hincker and Lucien Seve, Les communistes et I 'Etat (Paris: 
Editions Sociales, 1977) 
Fajon, Etienne, L 'Union est un combat (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975) 
FiszbiI4 Henr~ Les bouches s 'ouvrent (Paris: Fayard, 1980) 
Fremontier, Jacques, La vie en bleu: voyage en culture ouvriere (Paris: Fayard, 1980) 
Furet, Franyois, Le passe d'une illusion: essai sur l'idee communiste au rr siecle 
(Paris: R. Laffont: Calmann-Levy, 1995) 
Gaudard, Jean-Pierre, Les orphelins du PC (Paris: Belfond, 1986) 
Geerlandt, Robert, Garaudy et Althusser: Ie debat sur I 'humanisme dans Ie Parti 
Communiste Franrais et son enjeu (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1978) 
Gildea, Robert, Barricades and Borders: Europe, 1800-1914 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) 
Gildea, Robert, France since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
Goldring. Maurice, L 'accident (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1978) 
Gooding, John, Rulers and Subjects: Government and People in Russia. 1801-1991 
(London: Arnold, 1996) 
Harris, Andre, and Alain de Sedouy, Voyage a l'interieur du Parti Communiste (Paris: 
Le Seuil, 1974) 
202 
Hassner, Pierre, 'France and the Soviet Union', in Western Approaches to the Soder 
Union, ed. by Treverton and Al. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988) 
Herzog, Philippe, La societe au pouvoir: pour de passer capitalisme et communisme 
(Paris: Editions Julliard, 1994) 
Hincker, Franc;o is, Le Parti Communiste au carrefour: essai sur quin~e ans de son 
histoire, 1965-1981 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1981) 
Hue, Robert, Le communisme: la mutation (Paris: Stock, 1995) 
Hue, Robert, Le communisme: un nouveau projet (Paris: Stock, 1999) 
Jean, Raymond, La singularite d 'etre communiste (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979) 
Jenson, Jane, and George Ross, View from Inside a French Communist Cell in Crisis 
(Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1984) 
Johnson, R. W., The Long March of the Left (London: Macmillan, 1981) 
Jospin, Lionel, L 'invention du possible (paris: Flammarion, 1991) 
Juquin, Pierre, Programme commun: I 'actualisation a dossiers ouverts (Paris: Editions 
Sociales, 1977) 
Kelly, Michael, Modern French Marxism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988) 
Kindersley, Richard, ed., In Search of Eurocommunism (London: Macmillan, 1981) 
Kriegel, Annie, Les communistes franc;ais (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968) 
Kriege4 Annie, 'The International Role of the French Communist Party since World War 
II', in The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France, ed. by 
Donald L. Blackmer and Annie Kriegel (Cam. Mass.: Centre for International Affairs, 
1975) 
Kriegel, Annie, Le communisme au jour Ie jour: chroniques du Figaro, 1976-1979 
(Paris: Hachette, 1979) 
Labacqz, Albert, Les droites et les gauches sous la V Republique (Paris: Editions 
France-Empire, 1984) 
Larkin, Maurice, France since the Popular Front (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 
Laurens, Andre, and Thierry Pfister, Les nouveaux communistes (Paris: Stock, 1973) 
Laurent, Paul, Le PCF comme il est: entretien avec Roger Faivre (Paris: Editions 
Sociales, 1978) 
Lavau, Georges, A quoi sert Ie Parti Communiste Franc;ais ? (Paris: Fayard. 1981) 
203 
Lazitc~ Branko, L 'echec permanent: I 'alliance socialiste-communiste (Paris: R. 
Laffont, 1978) 
Lecoeur, Auguste, Le PCF: continuite dans Ie changement (Paris: R. Laffont 1977) 
Lecoeur, Auguste, La strategie du mensonge: du Kremlin a Georges Marchais (Paris: 
Editions Ramsay, 1980) 
Lefranc, Georges, Le mouvement socialiste sous la troisieme republique (18:5-1940), 
(Paris: Payot, 1963) 
Lenin, Vladimir llitc~ Lenin's Thesis on Bourgeois Democracy and Proletarian 
Dictatorship, English translation (Glasgow: Socialist Labour Press, 1920) 
Lenin, Vladimir llitc~ La maladie infantile du communisme: Ie gauchisme, French 
translation (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1953: [no pub.], 1962) 
Lenin, Vladimir llitc~ On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, English translation 
(Glasgow: Socialist Labour Press, 1976) 
Lenin, Vladimir llitch, Sur la route de I 'insurrection, French translation (Paris: Librairie 
de l'Humanite, 1924) 
Lenin, Vladimir llitch, Que faire? French translation (Paris: Librairie de l'Humanite, 
1925) 
Lenin, Vladimir llitc~ A Contribution to the History of the Question of the Dictatorship, 
English translation (Moscow: Progress, 1980) 
Le Pors, Anicet, Marianne a I 'encan (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980) 
Leroy, Roland, La quete du bonheur ( Paris: Grasset, 1995) 
Macciocchi, Maria Antonietta, Letters from inside the Italian Communist Party to Louis 
Althusser, English translation (London: [no pub.], 1973) 
Marchais, Georges, Le deji democratique (Paris: Grasset, 1973) 
Marchais, Georges, Par Ions franchement (Paris: Grasset, 1977) 
Marchais, Georges, L 'espoir au present (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980) 
Marie, Jean-Jacques, Trotsky: textes et debats (Paris: Librairie Generale Fran~aise, 1984) 
Martelli, Roger, Le rouge et Ie bleu: essai sur Ie communisme dans I 'histoire fram;aise 
(Paris: Les Editions de l' Atelier: Les Editions Ouvrieres, 1995) 
Marx, Karl, Class Struggles in France, 1948-50, English translation (London: CP Dutt .. 
1934; Bristol [no pub.], 1942) 
204 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works in One Volume, English translation 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968) 
Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 18,,/4, English translation 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970) 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, English translation 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990) 
McCauley, Martin, Stalin and Stalinism (Harlow: Longman, 1995) 
Mclean, Ian, Alan Montefiore, and Peter Winch, eds., The Political Responsibility of 
Intellectuals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
Mitterrand, Fran~is, Ma part de verite - De la rupture a I 'unite (Paris: Fayard, 1969) 
Mitterrand, Fran~ois, L 'abeille et I 'architecte - Chronique (Paris: Flarnmarion, 1978) 
Mitterrand, Fran~ois, Ici et maintenant (Paris: Fayard, 1980) 
Mitterrand, Fran~ois, Politique 2, 1977-1981 (Paris: Fayard, 1981) 
Molina, Gerard, and Yves Vargas, Dialogue a I'interieur du parti communiste fram;ais 
(Paris: Maspero, 1978) 
Mongin, Olivier, Face au scepticisme (1976-1993): les mutations du paysage 
intellectuel ou I'invention de I'intellectuel democratique (Paris: Editions de la 
Decouverte, 1994) 
Naudy, Michel, PCF: Ie suicide (Paris: Albin Michel, 1986) 
Parchomenko, Walter, Soviet Images of Dissident and Non Conformists (New York: 
Praeger, 1986) 
Parmelin, Helene, Liberez les communistes! (Paris: Editions Stock, 1979) 
Pipes, Richard, The Russian Revolution (London: HarperCollins: Fontana Press, 1992) 
Plissonnier, Gaston, Une vie pour lutter (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1984) 
Poperen, Jean, L 'unite de la gauche (1965-1973), (Paris: Fayard, 1975) 
Poperen, Jean, Le nouveau contrat socialiste (Paris: Ramsay, 1985) 
Programme commun de gouvernement de Gauche: Propositions socialisles pour 
I 'aclualisalion (Paris: Flammarion, 1978) 
Pushkin, Alexander, The Queen of Spades and Other Stories, English translation 
(London: Penguin Books, 1962) 
Ranciere, Jacques, La lefon d'Althusser (Paris: Gallimard, 197..!-) 
205 
Revel, Jean-Fran9ois, The Totalitarian Temptation, English translation (London: Seeker 
and Warburg, 1995) 
Rey, Henri, and Fran90ise Subileau, Les militants socialistes a I 'epreuve du pout'oi,. 
(Paris: Pre sse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1991) 
Robrieux, Philippe, Histoire interieure du Parti communiste (1972-1982), vol. 3 and 4 
(Paris: Fayard, 1982 and 1984) 
Robrieux, Philippe, La secte (Paris: Editions Stock, 1985) 
Rony, Jean, Trente ans de parti: un communiste s'interroge (Paris: C. Bourgeois, 1978) 
Rosenberg, Arthur, A History of Bolshevism: from Marx to the First Five Years Plan 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934) 
Ross, George, Workers and Communists in France: from Popular Front 10 
Eurocommunism (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1982) 
Roy, Claude, Somme toute (Paris: Gallimard, 1976) 
Sakharov, Andrei, Sakharov Speaks, English translation (London: Colins Harvill Press, 
1974) 
Salini, Laurent, Enquete sur Ie PS (Paris: Messidor, 1987) 
Schain, Martin, French Communism and Local Power: Urban Politics and Political 
Change (London: Frances Pinter, 1985) 
Schwab, George, ed., Eurocommunism: the Ideological and Polilical-Theoretical 
Foundations (London: Aldwych, 1981) 
Seligmann, Matthew S., and Roderick R. McLean, Germany from Reich to Republic, 
1871-1918 (London: Macmillan, 2000) 
Serfaty, Simon, ed., The Foreign Policies of the French Left (Colorado: Westview. 
1979) 
Seve, Julien, Communisme: quel second souffle? (Paris: MessidorlEditions Sociales. 
1990) 
Shatz, Marshall S., Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980) 
Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, L 'Archipel du Goulag, French Translation (Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1974) 
Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, Une journee d'Ivan Denissovitch, French translation (Paris: 
Julliard, 1975) 
206 
Spire, Antoine, Profession: permanent (Paris: SeuiL 1980) 
Stietbold, Annette, The French Communist Parti in Transition: PCF-CPSU Relations 
and the Challenge to Soviet Authority (New York: Praeger, 1977) 
Svirski, Grigori, A History of Post-War Soviet Writing: the Literature of Moral 
Opposition (Michigan: Ann Arbor Ardis, 1981) 
Tiersky, Ronald, French Communism, 1920-1972 (New York: London Columbia 
University Press, 1974) 
Tiersky, Ronald, French Communism, Eurocommunism and Soviet Power, in 
Eurocommunism and Detente, ed. by Rudolf L. Tokes (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 
1978) 
Todd, Allan, Revolutions, 1789-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
Todd, EmmanueL La nouvelle France (Paris: Editions du SeuiL 1988) 
Thody, Philip, The Fifth French Republic - Presidents, politics and personalities 
(London: Routledge, 1998) 
Tokes, Rudolf, ed., Eurocommunism and Detente (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978) 
Touraine, Alain, Mort d'une gauche (Paris: Galilee, 1979) 
Verdes-Leroux, Jeannine, Le reveil des somnambules: Ie parti communiste, les 
intellectuels et la culture (1956-1985), (Paris: Fayard, 1987) 
Verdier, Robert, PS-PC: une lutte pour I 'entente (Paris: Seghers, 1976) 
Zarodov, K., The Political Economy of Revolution, English translation (London: Central 
Books Distributor, 1981) 
Zwirn, Jacques, coordinated by L' Association des Amis de la Commune de Paris, La 
Commune de Paris aujourd'hui (Paris: Atelier, 1999) 
Articles 
Althusser, Louis, 'What Must Change in the Party', New Left Review, no. 109 (May-
June 1978), 19-45. 
Ambartsumov E., F. Burlatsky, Y.U. Krasin, and E. Pletnev, 'Against Distortion of the 
Experience of Real Socialism', Coexistence, 17, no. 1 (1980), 101-26. 
Antonian, Armen, and Irwin Wall, 'The French Communists under Fran90is Mitterrand'. 
Political Studies, no. 33 (1985), 254-73. 
Aron, Raymond, 'Incertitudes fran9aises', Commentaire, no. 1 (1978), 7-15. 
~07 
Aviv, Isaac, "The French Communist Party from 1958 to 1978: Crisis and Endurance', 
Western European Politics, 2, no. 2 (1979), 178-97. 
Bailiot, Louis, "Culture, Intellectuals and the Working Class', World Marxist RevielL no. 
10 (1974), 14-5. 
Balibar, Etienne, 'La responsabilite des communistes', Dialectiques, no. 23 (1978), 20-9. 
Baudoin, Jean, "Les phenomenes de contestation au sein du Parti Communiste Fran~ais 
(avri11978-mai 1979)" Revue Franr;aise de Science Politique, no. 30 (1980), 78-111. 
Baudoin, Jean, 'Retour a l'archaiSme?' Revue Politique et Parlementaire, no. 889 
(November-December 1980), 30-40. 
Baudoin, Jean, 'L'assimilation progressive de la Constitution de 1958 par Ie Parti 
Communiste Fran~ais', Revuefranr;aise de science politique (1986),799-815. 
Baudoin, Jean, 'Le dec lin du PCF', Regards sur l'actualite (April 1991 ), 35-43. 
Bell, David S., 'The 27th Congress of the French Communist Party', Modern and 
Contemporary France, no. 45 (April 1991), 59-61. 
Bell, David S., 'Communism and French Intellectuals', Modern and Contemporary 
France (1993), 27-36. 
Berger, Denis, 'PCF: l'impossible strategie', Critique Communiste, no. 22 (February-
March 1978), 23-46. 
Berger, Denis, 'La forteresse lezardee (A propos du XXIII!: Congres du PCF)" Critique 
Communiste, no. 27 (June 1979), 5-32. 
Berger C., G. Desseigne, G. Hercet, 1. Lecuir, D. Lindenberg, D. Motchane, and P. 
Noirot, 'Pourquoi Ie Programme Commun?', Politique Aujourd'hui (February 1973). 
Bleitrach, Danielle, 'Des changements a prendre en consideration', Cahiers du 
Communisme, no. 2 (February 1980), 36-43. 
Bull, Martin 1., 'The West European Communist Movement in the Late Twentieth 
Century', West European Politics, 18, no. 1 (January 1995), 78-97. 
Chambaz, Jacques, 'Classe ouvriere et intellectuels: une alliance feconde necessaire', 
Cahiers du Communisme, no. 2 (February 1977), 24-9. 
Chambaz Jacques 'Les communistes et les intellectuels', Cahiers du Communisme. no. , , 
6-7 (June-July 1978), 26-31. 
Chambaz, Jacques, 'Aujourd'hui et demain, des voies nouvelles pour vaincre', Cahiers 
du Communisme, no. 10 (October 1979), 42-8. 
208 
Charlon, Sue Ellen M., 'Deradicalization and the French Communist Party". Reviev,J of 
Politics, no. 41 (1979),38-60. -
Claudin, Fernando, interview of, 'Eurocommunisme, quelle nouveaute';" , Politique 
Aujourd 'hui (November-December 1976) 
Cohen, Avner, 'Divided Capitalism and Marx's Concept of Politics'. Political Studies. 
no. 43 (1995),92-104. 
Courtieu, Paul, 'Towards an Alliance of the French People', World Marxist Review, no. 
2(1975),4-7. 
Courtieu, Pau~ 'France's Future: Socialism', World Marxist Review, no. 6 (1976),8-11. 
Cranston, Maurice, 'The Ideology of Althusser', Problems of Communism, 12 (March-
April 1973), 53-60. 
Dainov, Eugene, 'Problems of French Communism, 1972-1986', West European Politics 
(1987), 357-75. 
'Declaration commune du parti communiste franyais et du parti communiste italien', 
Recherches Internationales, no. 88-89 (March-April 1976), 208-12. 
Denantes, Franyois, 'Le stalinisme du PCF', Esprit (1979), 130-40. 
Denis, Jacques, 'Sur l'eurocommunisme et les relations europeennes', Cahiers du 
Communisme, no. 4 (April 1978), 92-108. 
Dervilles, Jacques, and Patrick Lecomte, 'Le Parti Communiste Franyais au miroir de ses 
partisans: une image contestee', Revue Fram;aise de Science Politique, no. 33 (1983), 
651-78. 
Devlin, Kevin, 'The Interparty Drama', Problems of Communism (1975), 18-34. 
Devlin, Kevin, 'The Challenge of Eurocommunism', in 'Communism in Europe', 
Problems of Communism, 16 (January-February 1977), 1-20. 
Dru, Jean, 'Perspectives sociales et politiques', Politique Aujourd'hui, no. 7-8 (1979), 
51-72. 
Elkabbach, Jean-Pierre, and Alain Duhame~ 'Interview with Georges Marchais·. 
Communist Affairs, no. 1 (1982), 331-7. 
Ehrmann, Henry W., 'French Communism: Theory and Practice', Problems of 
Communism, 17 (May-June 1978), 58-64. 
Elleinstein, Jean, interview of, 'Sur Ie phenomene stalinien, la democratie et Ie 
socialisme', Esprit, no. 2 (February 1976),241-62. 
Elleinstein, Jean, interview of, 'L'apport de Trotsky au Marxisme", Critique 
Communiste, no. 25 (25 November 1978). 
209 
Fiterman~ Charles, 'L'unite et la difference', Cahiers du Communisme. no. 12 
(December 1976). 
Fracho~ Rene, 'Les conditions du developpement de la creation de la culture nat io nale '. 
Cahiers du Communisme, no. 2 (February 1980), 28-35. 
Friend, Julius W., 'Soviet Behavior and National Response: the Puzzling Case of the 
French Communist Party', Communist and Post-communist Studies, no. 3 (1982). 212-
35. 
George, Fran90is, 'La chance des intellectuels', Les Temps Modernes (September 1972). 
709-15. 
Gorz, Andre, 'Quelle Gauche? Quel programme?', Les Temps Modernes (October 
1972), 1158-73. 
Hamo~ Herve, 'PC-PS: feu l'union', Politique Aujourd 'hui, no. 3-4 (1978). 
Hassner, Pierre, 'L'Eurocommunisme, stade final du Communisme ou de l'Europe?', 
Commentaire, no. 2 (1978), 135-41. 
Hincker, Fran90is, 'Le PCF divorce de la societe', Communisme, no. 11-12 (1986), 86-
98. 
Hincker, Fran90is, 'Le groupe dirigeant du PCF dans les annees 70', Communisme. no. 
10 (1986), 70-9. 
Je~ Raymond, 'Le mot et la ligne', Dialectiques, no. 23 (1978), 15-9. 
Juqu~ Pierre, 'Democratisation et voie fran9aise au socialisme' , Cahiers du 
Communisme, no. 6-7 (June-July 1978), 46-7. 
Kanapa, Jean, 'Les caracteristiques de l'Eurocommunisme', Recherches Internationales. 
no. 88-89 (1976), 9-17. 
Kautsky, John H., 'Karl Kautsky and Eurocommunism', Communist and P05,t-
communist Studies (1981), 3-44. 
Knapp, Andrew, 'Proportional but Bipolar: France's Electoral System in 1986', West 
European Politics, 10, no. 1 (January 1987), 89-109. 
Kolakowski, Leszek, 'The Euro-communist Schism', Encounter (August 1977). 1-+-9. 
Kriegel, Annie, 'PC-PS: les causes de la rupture', Commentaire, no. 3 (1978), 317-28. 
Labbe, Dominique, 'Le discours co mmuniste, , Revue Fram;aise de Science Polilillw.!, 
no. 30 (1980), 46-77. 
Laurent, Paul, 'The Beginnings of a Brighter Future', World ;\larxisl Revit'll'. no. 3 
(March 1975), 5-6. 
110 
Laurent, Pau4 'PCF: etre Ie nombre', Cahiers du Communisme, no. 11 (No\ ~mber 
1976). 
Lazar, Marc, 'Communism in Western Europe in the 1980s', Journal of Communist 
Studies, 4 (September 1988), 243-57. 
Leduc, Victor, 'The French Communist Party: between Stalinism and Eurocommunism·. 
Political Quaterly, 49 (1978), 400-10. 
Le Gall, Gerard, 'Vers l'Eurocommunisme sans Ie PCF?' , Revue Politique ('/ 
Parlementaire, no. 884 (January-February 1980), 30-40. 
Leroy, Roland, 'Le Parti Co mmuniste , les intellectuels et la culture', Cahicrs du 
Communisme, no. 12 (December 1970), 87-97. 
Lindenberg, D., M. Rebriou~ J. Juillard, P. Noirot, and B. Barret-Kriegel, "Les 
intellectuels et Ie pouvoir', Politique Aujourd'hui, no. 1-2 (1978). 
Lipietz, Alain, 'Au-dela du programme, voir les forces et ce qu'on peut en attendre'. [JUS 
Temps Modernes (1976), 904-21. 
Lowenthal, Richard, 'Moscow and the Euroco mmunists, , Problems of Communism, 17 
(May-June 1978), 38-49. 
Macridis, Roy C., 'The French CP's many Faces', Problems of Communism, 15 (May-
June 1976), 59-64. 
Marchais, Georges, 'La bonne voie', Cahiers du Communisme, no. 2 (February 1977), 
4-11. 
Marchais, Georges, 'Rapport au Cornite central', Cahiers du Communisme, no. ') 
(February-March 1996). 
'Mardi 2 mai Etienne Fajon rend compte devant les communistes de la Seine-St-Denis 
des travaux du CC du PCF', Dialectiques, no. 23 (1978), 31-4 (?). 
Mayer, Robert, 'Marx, Lenin and the Corruption of the Working Class', Political 
Studies, no. 41 (1993), 646-9. 
Milhau, Jacques, 'Theoretical Activity of the French Communist Party', World Marxist 
Review, no. 9 (1975), 29-32. 
Nugent, Neill, and David Lowe, 'The French Communist Party: the Road to Democratic 
Government?', Political Quaterly, 48 (1977), 270-87. 
O'Donnel, Paddy. 'Lucien Seve, Althusser and the Contradictions of the PCF', Critique 
Communiste, no. 15 (1981),7-29. 
Ozadczuk-Korab, B.A .. 'Brezhnev's Pyrrhic Victory: the Pan-European Conkrence of 
the Communists in Berlin', International Affairs, no. 32 (1976-77), 178-93. 
:211 
Platone, Fram;ois, 'Les electorats legislatifs sous la Cinquieme Republique". Ren/(! 
Fram;aise de Science Politique, no. 42 (1992), 301-14. 
Platone, Jean, and Jean Ranger, 'L'echec du Parti Communiste Fran~ais aux elections du 
printemps 1981', Revue Fram;aise de Science Politique, no. 31 (1981), 1015-37. 
Portelli, Hughes, 'La voie nationale des PC fran~ais et italien', Projet, no. 106 (June 
1976), 659-72. 
Ranger, Jean, 'Le declin du Parti Communiste Fran~ais', Revue Fram;aise de Science 
Politique, no. 36 (1986), 46-53. 
Riglet, Marc, 'Le PCF: une si etrange politique etrangere', Projet, no. 127 (July-August 
1978), 845-53. 
Rochon, T.R., and R. Pierce, 'Coalitions as Rivalries - French Socialism and 
Communism, 1967-1978', Comparative Politics, 17, no. 4 (July 1985),437-51. 
Ross, George, 'Party Decline and Changing Party Systems - France and the French 
Communist Party', Comparative Politics, 25, no. 1 (October 1992),43-61. 
Schapiro, Leonard, 'The International Department of the CPSU: the Key to Soviet 
Policy', International Affairs, no. 32 (1976-77), 41-55. 
Sodaro, Michael 1., 'Moscow and Mitterrand', Problems of Communism, no. 31 (1982). 
20-36. 
Sodaro, Michael J., 'Whatever Happened to EurocommunismT. Problems of 
Communism (1984), 59-65. 
Spieker, Manfred, 'How the Eurocommunists Interpret Democracy', Review of Politics. 
no. 42 (1980), 427-64. 
Stankovich, Victor de, 'Dissenting French Communists', Problems of Communism, no. 
31 (1982), 50-7. 
Tiersky, Ronald, 'French Communism in 1976', Problems of Communism, 15 (January-
February 1976), 20-47. 
Tiersky, Ronald, 'Declining Fortunes of the French Communist Party', Problems of" 
Communism (1988), 1-22. 
Timmermann, Heinz, 'West European Communism in Flux". Problems of Communism. 
15 (November-December 1976), 74-8. 
Timmermann, Heinz, 'The Eurocommunists and the West', Problems of Communism 
(1979), 31-54. 
Timmermann, Heinz, . Soviet Treatment of Western Communists: a Comparative 
Analysis', Communist and Post-communist Studies (1982), 288-307. 
212 
Valenta, Jiri, 'Eurocommunism and the USSR', Political Quaterly. 51 (1980), 127-40. 
Vieuguet, Andre, 'Pourquoi un parti communiste plus influent. plus fort, plus actif?, 
Cahiers du Communisme, February-March 1976. 
Vieuguet, Andre, 'Un parti communiste influent, fort, act if , Cahiers du Communism£!. 
no. 1 (January 1996). 
Weber, Henri, 'Eurocommunism, Socialism and Democracy', New Left Revielf, no. 110 
(July-August 1978),3-14. 
Wilson, Frank L., 'The French CP's Dilemna', in 'Eurocommunism in 1978'. Prohlems 
o/Communism, 17 (July-August 1978), 1-14. 
Wilson, Frank L., 'French Communism on the Defensive', Problems 0/ Communism 
(1985), 77-84. 
Wilson, Frank L., 'Communism at Crossroads: Changing Roles m the Western 
Democracies', Problems o/Communism (1992), 95-106. 
Wohlforth, William C., 'The Perception of Power: Russia in the pre-1914 Balance', 
World Politics, 39, no. 3 (April 1987), 353-81. 
Wright, Vincent, and Howard Machin, 'The French Socialist Party: Success and the 
Problems of Success', Political Quaterly, 46 (1975), 36-52. 
Y smal, Colette, 'Une nouvelle strategie pour Ie PCF, Projet, no. 94 (April 1975), 428-
38. 
Y smal, Colette, 'Parti communiste: les raISOns d'un durcissement', Proje!, no. 121 
(January 1978), 45-54. 
Ysmal, Colette, 'La crise du Parti communiste', Projet, no. 129 (November 1978),1086-
93. 
Ysmal, Colette, 'Le XXIII€: congres du PC - L'heure de la remise en ordre'. Proje!. no. 
135 (May 1979), 595-604. 
Ysmal, Colette, 'L'hypotheque communiste sur l'electorat socialiste', Politique 
Aujourd'hui, no. 7-8 (1979). 
Z imbler , Brian L., 'Partners or Prisoners? Relations between the PCF and the CPSU, 
1977-1983', Communist and Post-communist Studies (1984), 3-29. 
Documents issued by the Fep 
Borvo. Nicole, Sur la situation politique (rapport presente au Comite Centra! des 16 l'1 
17 novembre 1998) suivi de La discussion, (L 'Humanite. 19 November 1998) 
113 
Bureau Politique, Apres les travaux des 26, 27 et 28 avril (Cahiers du Commlmiwne 
March 1978) ,. , 
Conseil National du PCF (9 and 10 February 1980), Les intellectuels, la culture et 
I 'avancee democratique au socialisme (projet de resolution), (L 'Humanite. 11 
December 1979) 
Conseil National du PCF (Bobigny, 9 and 10 February 1980), ed., Les intellectuels, la 
culture et la revolution (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980): 
Duharcourt, Pierre, 'La construction de l'alliance' 
Hermier, Guy, 'Rapport introductif 
Lazard, Francette, 'Pour un nouvel essor du marxisme (discours d'inauguration 
de l'IRM, Paris, 19 octobre 1979)' 
Marchais, Georges, 'Nous vivons l'epoque des revolutions (Paris-Mutualite. 27 
november 1979)' 
Marchais, Georges, 'Intervention de cloture' 
Marchand, Jean-Pierre, 'Activite intellectuelle du parti et democratie interne' 
Page, Gabriel, 'On peut etre "prophete" en son milieu' 
'Resolution adoptee par Ie Conseil National' 
Declaration du Bureau politique du Parti communiste fram;ais (27 October 1993) 
Ecole elementaire du PCF, La crise de la societe fram;aise, la democratie avancee et Ie 
socialisme, I 'union du peuple fram;ais, Ie role d 'avant-garde du parti communiste 
Laurent, Paul, Une question decisive pour avancer vers Ie changement: un parti plus 
fort, plus influent et plus actif (rapport presente au Comite Central du 28 mai 1980) 
Lazard, Francette, and the IRM (Institut de Recherches Marxistes), Pour un nourel 
essor du Marxisme (Bobigny, 19 October and 2nd December 1979) 
Lazard, Francette, Rapport introductif au Comite Central des 28, 29 el 30 septemhre 
1993 suivi de La discussion (L 'Humanite, 29 September 1993) 
Lazard, Francette, Rapport de la commission sur Ie projet de Statuls, report presented to 
the 28th Congress held from 25 to 29 January 1994 
Lazard, Francette, Reflexion de la commission d'arbitrage sur la porlee, au regard de 
I 'histoire, de la mutation des pratiques du debal dans Ie parti (rapport presente all 
Camite Central des 16 et 17 novembre 1998) suivi de La discussion, (L 'fiwnani1L;. 19 
November 1998) 
214 
Les principes de la politique du Parti Communiste Fram;ais (Paris: Editions Sociales. 
1975) 
Marchais, Georges, 'Union du peuple de France, pour vivre mieux dans la liberte, 
l'independance et la paix (rapport du Comite Central au 20e Congres du PCF, St-OuelL 
13-17 decembre 1972)" in Vivre libre! (Projet de declaration des fibertes soumis a la 
discussion des fram;ais, 1975) 
Marchais, Georges, Vers Ie changement democratique (rapport au Comite Central des 
31 mars et rr avril 1977) 
Marchais, Georges, Le Parti communiste franr;ais s 'adresse aux intellecluels: Ie 
changement avec vous (Paris, Hotel Sheraton, 9 June 1977) 
Marchais, Georges, Plus que jamais agissons pour I 'union et Ie changement (rapport 
presente a la session du Comite Central des 4 et 5 octobre 1977), (L 'Humanite, 7 
October 1977) 
Marchais, Georges, and Roland Leroy, Pour la culture avec les intellectuels (discours 
prononces lors du 25e anniversaire de La Nouvelle Critique), (18 December 1977) 
Marchais, Georges, Pour gagner et changer vraiment, un seul moyen, votez communiste 
Ie 12 mars (rapport presente a la conference nationale des 7 et 8 janvier 1978), suivi de 
Les principales propositions du programme commun de gouvernement actualise 
presente par Ie parti communiste franr;ais 
Marchais, Georges, Avancer sur la voie du 2i Congres (rapport presente au Comite 
Central des 26,27 et 28 avril 1978), (Cahiers du Communisme, March 1978) 
Marchais, Georges, Nous vivons I 'epoque des revolutions (Paris-Mutualite, 27 
November 1979) 
Ouverture d 'une discussion? (Rencontre de 400 intellectuels communistes a Vitry, 9 et 
10 decembre 1979), (Paris: Maspero, 1979): 
Buci-Glucksmann, Christine, 'Breve histoire d'une destalinisation impossible: sur 
les "retards" de 56, 68 et 78' 
'Intervention de Georges Marchais' 
Labica, Georges, 'Le parti, les intellectuels: contribution a ranalyse d'un 
desordre' 
Pour une democratie avancee, pour une France socialiste! (Manifeste du Comile 
Central du parti communiste franr;ais) , (Champigny, 6 December 1968) 
8e Congres du PCF, Quatre annees de lutte pour I 'unite, pour Ie pain. la liberle et la 
paix (rapport d'activite du Comite Central), (Villeurbanne, 22-25 January 1936) 
215 
15e Congres du PCF, L 'union des forces ouvrieres et republicaines pour la restauration 
et la renovation de la democratie (rapport d 'activite du Comite Central presente par 
Maurice Thorez), (Ivry, 24-28 June 1959) 
21 e Congres, Union, Programme Commun, Socialisme: Ie Parti Communiste propose 
(rapport du Comite Central presente par Georges Marchais). (Vitry, 2-+-27 October 
1974) 
22e Congres, Le socialisme pour la France (rapport du Comite Central presente par 
Georges Marchats) suivi de Ce que veulent les communistes pour la France (document 
ado pte par Ie 22e Congres) et des Salutations aux soirees internationales (St Ouen. -+-
10 February 1976) 
23e Congres, Pour une avancee democratique (rapport du Comite Central presente par 
Georges Marchais) suivi de L 'avenir commence maintenant (resolution adoptee par Ie 
23e Congres), (St Ouen, 9-13 May 1979) 
25e Congres, Espoir et combat pour I 'avenir (rapport presente par Georges Marchais). 
(St Ouen, 8-10 February 1985) 
28e Congres, Rapport de la commission sur les statuts (rapport presente par Francette 
Lazard) suivi de Les statuts du PCF (St-Ouen, 25-29 January 1994) 
2ge Congres, La politique du Parti Communiste Franr;ais (document adopte par Ie 2cJ 
Congres), (Arche de la Defense, 18-22 December 1996) 
30e Congres, Un projet communiste pour s 'attaquer aux inegalites (textes adoptes par Ie 
30e Congres), (Martigues, 23-26 March 2000) 
Louis Althusser's unpublished manuscripts 
(Fonds Althusser held by the Institut Memoires de I 'Edition Contemporaine. lMEC. 9 
rue Bleue, 75009 Paris, since 1991) 
AL T2.A22-03 .11 
AL T2.A23-0 1.04 
AL T2.A23-03.01 
Projet de texte sur Ie livre de Jean Elleinstein, Histoire 
du phenomene stalinien (Grasset, 1976) 
Notes sur Ie 2i Congres du PCF 
Le mort saisit Ie vif (expose d'Etienne Balibar annote 
par Althusser) 
AL T2.A24-01.01/02 to -02.01 Les vaches noires, interview imaginaire (Le malais!.' 
du 2 i congres) 
AL T2.A24-04.02 lv'otes de Louis Althusser sur la dic/a/llre £Ill 
proletariat 
AL T2.A24-04.07 
AL T2.A26-03.01 
AL T2.A26-03.02 
AL T2.A27-01.05 
ALT2.A28-03.01 to .07 
AL T2.A29-01.05 
AL T2.A43-01.01 
Newspapers 
* Le Figaro 
* Le Matin 
See among others: 
Fragments sur Ie 22e Congres 
Du bon usage des pays socialisles 
La crise du marxisme 
Projet de texte de la cellule Paul Langevin 
Projet de livre sur Ie communisme (c. 1980): A portee 
de la main peut etre Ie communisme, & Leltre 
d 'Althusser de Grece 
Sur la mort du PCF (Mort el survie du PCF), (1982-
83?) 
A propos de certains themes devefoppes dans la 
conference collective sur les intellectuels: lettre a 
Francette Lazard, fundi 28 juin 1976, & 
devefoppement sur fa futte des classes 
Press documents 
Non communist press 
'Les accusations contre Ie PC de Jean Elleinstein', 4 December 1979. 
* Le Monde 
See among others: 
Althusser, Louis, 'Ce qui ne peut plus durer dans Ie parti communiste', :25-:28 April 
1978. 
Althusser, Louis, and others, 'Des intellectuels signent une Iettre demandant "une 
veritable discussion politique"', 6 Apri11978. 
Beuve-Mery, Alain, and Beatrice Gurrey, 'Le 30e congres du PCF prend ses marques 
avant de sauter Ie pas du '''nouveau communisme''', 25 March 2000, p. 12. 
Beuve-Mery, Alain, 'Le Parti communiste est en panne d'idees, d'animation ct 
d'argenC, 21 November 2000, p. 7. 
217 
'Cent militants: que valent les formalites juridiques face aux eXlgences de la 
democratieT (joint declaration), 17 May 1978. 
Chemin, Ariane, 'Intimites communistes', 19 December 1996, p. 13 
Chemin, Ariane, 'La lutte des classes remplacee par l' "intervention citoyenne'·'. 19 
December 1996, p. 6. 
Chemin, Ariane, 'Les "conservateurs" du PCF menent une bataille d' amendements' , 
23 December 1996, p. 6. 
Colombani, Christian, 'M. Marchais: nous ne souhaitons, nous ne voulons exclure 
personne', 6 June 1978. 
Courtois, Gerard, 'Le 30e congres du PCF prend ses marques avant de sauter Ie pas 
du "nouveau communisme"', 25 March 2000, p. 12. 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Du XXIle Congres du PCF it l'echec de la gauche - La revolution 
n'est plus ce qU'elle etait', 13 April 1978. 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Du XXIle Congres du PCF it l'echec de la Gauche - La mutation 
ncecessaire', 14 April 1978. 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Du XXIle Congres du PCF it l'echec de la Gauche - Aller au fond 
des choses', 15 April 1978. 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Pour une alliance historique entre Ie PCF et Ie PS', 24 August 1978. 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Ce qui dure encore dans Ie PC franyais - Deux pas en arriere', 21 
February 1979. 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Ce qui dure encore dans Ie PC franyais - La mysterieuse 
disparition de l'euro-communisme', 22 February 1979. 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Ce qui dure encore dans Ie PC franyais - Le temps des 
glaciations', 23 February 1979. 
'En publiant leurs interventions it la reunion de Vitry - Les intellectuels 
contestataires precisent leurs positions', 2 March 1979. 
"En reponse it un hebdornadaire sovietique - M. Elleinstein: combien d'annees 
d'hopitalpsychiatrique dois-je subirT, 27 May 1978, p. 10. 
Ferenczi, Thomas, 'Adieux au PCF', 9 February 2001, p. viii. 
Jarreau, Patrick, 'Le PCF et la demobilisation populaire,' 21 April 1979. 
Jean, Raymond, 'La gauche de la gauche', 1 November 1977. 
Jean, Raymond, 'Le parti n"a pas toujours raison", 31 March 1978. 
218 
Kanapa, Je~ "Favoriser rapparition de valeurs morales nouvelles', 10 June 1976, 
Kanapa, Je~ "Le debat dans Ie mouvement communiste', 3 January 1977. 
"Le PCF et les intellectuels - M. Marchais: une veritable guerre ideoloL!ique est 
aujourd'hui conduite', 12 December 1978. ~ 
WLe retard de notre parti it se mettre it jour ne saurait, sans grave dommage, 
s'accroitre", declarent plus de trois cent communistes' (Petition d'Aix-en-Provence 
signed, among others, by Althusser and Elleinstein), 20 May 1978. 
"M. Marchais: il y a quelques contestations', 15 April 1978. 
Molina, Gerard, "Se battre contre ce qui divise', 4 November 1977. 
'PCF-PCI: la declaration commune - "Toutes les libertes devront etre garanties et 
developpees"', 19 November 1975. 
Pfister, Thierry, 'Les reactions au changement', 26 April 1976. 
Pfister, Thierry, "La rete de L 'Humanite - M. Marchais: il n'y a pas de contestataires 
au PCF', 12 September 1978. 
'Repondant it M. Elleinstein - M. Marchais rejette l'idee d'une "troisieme voie" 
entre la social-democratie et Ie socialisme sovietique', 19 August 1978. 
Vernet, Daniel, "M. Elleinstein est devenu un "ennemi du socialisme"', 26 May 1978. 
* Le Quotidien de Paris 
See among others: 
Da~ Pierre, "Marchais n'est pas maitre de ce qu'il fait bouger', 8 October 1976. 
* Liberation 
See among others: 
Llabres, Claude, 'Retoumer au PCF? Je suis mieux dehors', 30 December 1998, p. 4. 
Thibaudat, Jean-Pierre, "Les incantations amoureuses d' Althusser'. 28 July 1997, p. 
28. 
Virot, Pascal, "Hue, un marathonien contre reuro', 19 January 1998, p. 14. 
Virot Pascal 'Le Parti communiste a fait son autocritique en novembre, mais aucunc 
vict~e de p~ge ne souhaite revenir. Les exclus du PCF refusent la main tendue de 
Hue'. 30 December 1998, p. 2. 
* Paris-Hebdo 
219 
Magazines 
* Historia 
Kauffer, Remi 'L'ABC du KGB' in 'Les secrets du KGB'. August 2000. pp. 44-5. 
* Le Nouvel Observateur 
Andrew, Christopher, interview ot: ~Le KGB en France', 23-29 September 1999 pp. 
142-5. ' 
Elleinste~ Jean, 'Un communiste juge les communistes', 6 September 1976, pp. 60-
74. 
Elleinste~ Jean, 'L'avenir des communistes', 25 September 1978, pp. 50-2. 
Jean, Raymond, 'Le Parti n'a pas toujours raison', 29 May 1978. 
Parme~ Helene, 'La contestation dans Ie PCF? C'est la suite normale du XXlr' 
congres', 10 July 1978. 
* L 'Histoire 
Broue, Pierre, 'La verite sur les proces de Moscou', July-August 1998, pp. 34-7. 
Coeure, Sophie, 'Un ecrivain face au systeme: Ie cas Pasternak', luly-August 1998, 
pp.38-9. 
Courtois, Stephane, 'PCF: Ie parti de Moscou', July-August 1998, pp. 42-49. 
Durand, Claude, 'Le choc Soljenitsyne', July-August 1998, pp. 66-8. 
'La profession de foi de John Maynard Keynes', in 'Mille ans de croISsance 
economique,' January 2000, pp. 77. 
Pomian, Krzysztot: 'Communisme et nazisme: les tragedies du siecle', July-August 
1998, pp. 100-5. 
Prost, Antoine, 'Sept millions de grevistes', February 1998, pp. 88-95. 
Rey, Marie-Pierre, 'L'URSS superpuissance: mythe et realite', July-August 1998. pp. 
76-81. 
Werth, Nicolas, 'La Russie sovietique: revolution, socialisme et dictature', July-
August 1998, pp. 8-21. 
Winock, Michel, 'L'age d'or du communisme fran<;:ais', July-August 1998, pp. 56-65. 
220 
* Maintenant 
Elleinste~ Je~ 'Lettre a Fran,(ois, Pierre, Michel et autres "'artilleurs" de Metz', 26 
February 1979, p. 7. 
Elleinste~ Jean, '23e Congres du PCF - La paralysie', 7 May 1979. pp. 3-4. 
Quiles, Yvonne, 'Je veux seulement etre communiste et joumaliste', 12 March 1979, 
p.9. 
Quiles, Yvonne, 'Lettre ouverte a Georges Marchais', 30 avril 1979, p. 2. 
Communist press 
Newspapers 
* Current Digest of Soviet Press 
Articles taken from Pravda and Izvestia and translated from Russian into English. 
See, among others: 
'Conference of European Communists and Workers' Parties: Speech by Comrade G. 
Marchais of the French Communist Party Delegation', Pravda, 3 July 1976. 
'French Communists Hold a Meeting', Pravda, 6 February 1976. 
'Joint Communique of CPSU and French Communist Party Delegations'. Pravda, 11 
January 1980. 
'Joint Statement of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the French 
Communist Party', Pravda, 6 July 1971 and Izvestia, 7 July 1971. 
Zarodov, K., 'Lenin: Democratic to Socialist Revolution - Two Tactics of Social 
Democracy in the Democratic Revolution', Pradva, 6 August 1975. 
* L 'Humanite 
See among others: 
Apel-Muller, Patrick, Pierre Barbancey, Dominique Begles and Alain Raynal. 'Six 
communistes, six opinions', 26 June 1996, p. 3 . 
. Avec les intellectuels communistes pour Ie 2i Congres'. 3 May 1978. 
Berez, Gilbert, letter addressed by. '"Intellectuel, contestataire, done communistc·. 14 
June 1978. 
221 
'Comprendre pour construire l'union - Le texte complet des reponses de Georges 
Marchais a l'emission d'Antenne 2, Questions de Temps', 11 August 1978. ~ 
'Declaration du Bureau politique du parti communiste fram;ais', 29 October 1993. 
Fabre, Jean, 'La crise de la societe fran9aise, la crise de l'imperialisme' (report to the 
Party conference on 'La crise de la societe fran9aise et la crise dans Ie monde 
capitaiiste'), 24 May 1975. 
'Georges Marchais a Antenne 2: changer et changer vraiment', 19 May 1977, p. 3. 
'Georges Marchais: avancer sur la voie du 22e Congres', 28 April 1978. 
Jean, Raymond, 'Politique et litterature', 12 May 1978. 
Kanapa, Jean, 'Une voie originale, une voie nationale" 27 October 1976. 
Marchais, Georges, 'Vers Ie changement democratique', 1st April 1977. 
Marchais, Georges, interview of, 'Changer et changer vraiment', 19 May 1977. 
'Preserver et developper la vie democratique du parti - Resolution du Bureau 
Politique du PCF', 20 May 1978. 
'Renforcer notre Parti en qualite et en quantite - Les reponses de G. Marchais aux 
journalistes', 22 June 1978. 
Spire, Arnaud, 'Emmanuel Todd: revolte et decontraction', 26 June 1996, p. 6. 
'Un debat positif et emichissant, declare Georges Marchais sur France-Inter', 7 April 
1978. 
* L 'Humanite Hebdo 
See among others: 
Duhamel, Alain, and Dominique Gador, m 'Un nouveau commurusme. est-ce 
possible?' 25-26 March 2000, pp. 7-9. 
Local publications 
* L 'Etincelle 70 (Publication edited by the Federation ofVesoul, Haute-Saone) 
Georges Marchais, 'Notre parti, ni son electorat, ne saurait accepter ce role ni (('tt(' 
situation', April 1979. 
* Unir (Publication edited by the Chantelle Section, Montlw;on, Allier) 
Magazines 
* Arguments (Publication edited by non-conformist intellectuals) 
See no. 3, January-February 1978 on the communist and socialist parties. 
* Esprit 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Entretien sur Ie phenomene stalinien, la democratie et Ie socialisme', 
February 1976, pp. 241-62. 
Lazar, Marc, 'Le PC sous les decombres', March-April 1989, pp. 141-8. 
* France Nouvelle 
Be 110 in, Gerard, ' Un disco urs, une po litique' , June 1977, pp. 10-1. 
Belloin, Gerard, 'Autogestion et Ie role des intellectuels', 13 February 1978, pp. 35-
37. 
Boccara, Paul, interview of: 'Le programme commun au present', 1977, pp. 42-7. 
BurIes, Jean, Lucien Marest, and Serge Wolikov, 'Les intellectuels', 28 April - 4 May 
1979, pp. 6-10. 
Chambaz, Jacques, interview with, 'Des raisons nouvelles pour l'alliance', 1976, pp. 
24-7. 
Chambaz, Jacques, 'Intellectuels, c1asse ouvriere: faire progresser I'alliance', 10 July 
1978, pp.11-13. 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'Continuons la discussion', 1976, pp. 18-22. 
Kanapa, Jean, 'Les caracteristiques de l'eurocommunisme', 18 September 1978, pp. 
42-6. 
Konopnicki, Guy, 'Ouvriers et intellectuels. Au jour Ie jour ... et au-deli!' , 1 March 
1976, pp. 11-3. 
Laurent, Paul, 'Regards pour 1977', 1977, pp. 6-9. 
Malberg, Henri, 'Le mecanisme de la tendance', 5 June 1978, pp. 9-10. 
* La Nouvelle Critique 
Chambaz, Jean, 'La culture a besoin de liberte' , 1976, pp. 7-10. 
Hincker, Fran«rois, 'L'union: d'ou venons-nous? OU allons-nous?' 1977. pp. 1 R-22. 
Laurent, Paul, 'Centralisme democratique: tenir les deux tennes', 1977. pp. 2-5. 
Molina, Gerard, 'Sur un pluralisme interne au parti', 1978, pp. 12-3. 
* Les Nouvelles Litteraires 
See no. 2639, 15 June 1978 on communist dissidents. 
* Luttes et Debats (Internal publication edited by dissident communist activists) 
'Entretien avec deux membres de comite de section d'entreprise (SNCF)", JanuaI) 
1979, pp. 8-17. 
Inse4 A., 'La prise du pouvoir par les travailleurs', March 1979, pp. 25-29. 
Keroch, Raymond, in 'Point de vue', June 1979, pp. 54-60. 
'L'affaire du comite Lariboisiere', January 1979, p. 28. 
Laurent, Christine, 'Sur l'alliance ouvriers-intellectuels', March 1979, pp . .+5-6. 
'Le parti de la classe ouvriere ... et les intellectuels', January 1980, pp. 33-38. 
Lequie~ Stefan, 'Droit de tendance ou centralisme democratique', June 1979, pp. 
49-53. 
Piraux, Charles, 'Pour une democratie revolutionnaire', January 1979, pp. 23-26. 
* M-Mensuel, Marxisme, Mouvement 
* Politique Aujourd'hui 
Jean Dru, 'Perspectives sociales et po lit ique s , , February 1979, pp. 51-72. 
* Politique Hebdo 
Elleinstein, Jean, 'PC: Elleinstein s'explique', 23-29 January 1978, pp. 5-8. 
* Proletariat (Politica4 theoretica4 Marxist-Leninist publication of Mao's thought) 
Lannou, Yves, 'Critique des positions d'Althusser', 1978, pp. 36-41. 
* Revolution 
* Temps Nouveaux 
Ejov, Vsevolod, "Dictature et democratie', 1978, pp. 18-21. 
Sedov, Youri, 'Une falsification au lieu d'une etude objective', 1977. pp. 12-5. 
Sedov. Youri, 'Revenir a Eduard Bernstein? Elleinstein decouVTc sonjcu', \ta~ 1978. 
pp. 14-5. 
Television and radio programmes 
Antenne 2, Cartes sur tables, 18.May 1977. 
Antenne 2, Question de Temps, 9 August 1978. 
BBC2, Tourists of the Revolution - The people's flag, 25 March 2000. 
France Inter, Petit dejeuner politique, 6 April 1978. 
France Inter, Journal de 13 heures, 17 August 1978. 
f&U~- l. r!~~ ~~.!!!L 
